2 * Modifications for Lustre
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2011, 2013, Intel Corporation.
8 * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
12 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
13 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
14 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
15 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
16 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
18 * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
19 * All rights reserved.
21 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
22 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
24 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
25 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
28 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
30 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
31 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
32 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
33 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
34 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
35 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
39 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
40 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
41 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
42 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
43 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
44 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
45 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
46 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
47 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
53 #include <linux/init.h>
54 #include <linux/module.h>
55 #include <linux/slab.h>
56 #include <linux/crypto.h>
57 #include <linux/mutex.h>
59 #include <liblustre.h>
63 #include <obd_class.h>
64 #include <obd_support.h>
65 #include <lustre/lustre_idl.h>
66 #include <lustre_net.h>
67 #include <lustre_import.h>
68 #include <lustre_sec.h>
71 #include "gss_internal.h"
76 static spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
80 char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */
81 char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */
82 int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */
83 int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */
84 int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */
85 unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */
89 * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption.
90 * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS
91 * yet. this need to be fixed in the future.
93 static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
94 [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */
103 [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
112 [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
113 "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
121 [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
122 "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
130 [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
141 #define MAX_ENCTYPES sizeof(enctypes)/sizeof(struct krb5_enctype)
143 static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
145 if (enctype < MAX_ENCTYPES && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
146 return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
152 int keyblock_init(struct krb5_keyblock *kb, char *alg_name, int alg_mode)
154 kb->kb_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg_name, alg_mode, 0);
155 if (IS_ERR(kb->kb_tfm)) {
156 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm: %s, mode %d\n",
161 if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(kb->kb_tfm, kb->kb_key.data, kb->kb_key.len)) {
162 CERROR("failed to set %s key, len %d\n",
163 alg_name, kb->kb_key.len);
171 int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
173 struct krb5_enctype *ke;
175 if (kctx->kc_enctype >= MAX_ENCTYPES ||
176 enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
177 CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
181 ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
183 /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
184 if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC &&
185 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
188 /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
189 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
190 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
192 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
193 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
200 void keyblock_free(struct krb5_keyblock *kb)
202 rawobj_free(&kb->kb_key);
204 crypto_free_blkcipher(kb->kb_tfm);
208 int keyblock_dup(struct krb5_keyblock *new, struct krb5_keyblock *kb)
210 return rawobj_dup(&new->kb_key, &kb->kb_key);
214 int get_bytes(char **ptr, const char *end, void *res, int len)
219 if (q > end || q < p)
227 int get_rawobj(char **ptr, const char *end, rawobj_t *res)
233 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &len, sizeof(len)))
237 if (q > end || q < p)
240 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(res->data, len);
245 memcpy(res->data, p, len);
251 int get_keyblock(char **ptr, const char *end,
252 struct krb5_keyblock *kb, __u32 keysize)
256 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(buf, keysize);
260 if (get_bytes(ptr, end, buf, keysize)) {
261 OBD_FREE_LARGE(buf, keysize);
265 kb->kb_key.len = keysize;
266 kb->kb_key.data = buf;
271 void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
273 rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used);
275 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye);
276 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi);
277 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc);
281 __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
283 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
286 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
288 kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0);
291 if (get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)))
294 /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */
295 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
296 get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
300 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
304 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
306 kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint;
309 if (get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
312 /* old style enc/seq keys in format:
316 * we decompose them to fit into the new context
320 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
323 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
326 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
330 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
331 tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype)
334 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
338 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
341 /* old style fallback */
342 if (keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc))
348 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully imported rfc1964 context\n");
351 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
354 /* Flags for version 2 context flags */
355 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001
356 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002
357 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004
360 __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
362 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
365 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
369 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
372 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR)
373 kctx->kc_initiate = 1;
374 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX)
376 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
377 kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
380 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send, sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send)))
384 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
387 /* size of each key */
388 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
391 /* number of keys - should always be 3 */
392 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
396 CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint);
401 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
404 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize))
407 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
410 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully imported v2 context\n");
413 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
417 * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing
418 * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature
419 * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc.
422 __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf,
423 struct gss_ctx *gctx)
425 struct krb5_ctx *kctx;
426 char *p = (char *) inbuf->data;
427 char *end = (char *) (inbuf->data + inbuf->len);
428 unsigned int tmp_uint, rc;
430 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) {
431 CERROR("Fail to read version\n");
432 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
435 /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */
437 CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint);
438 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
443 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
445 if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) {
446 kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint;
447 rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end);
449 rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end);
453 rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx);
456 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
459 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
462 gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx;
463 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
467 __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
468 struct gss_ctx *gctx_new)
470 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
471 struct krb5_ctx *knew;
475 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
477 knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1;
478 knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx;
479 knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init;
480 knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey;
481 knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
483 memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed));
484 knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv;
485 knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send;
486 knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype;
488 if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
491 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye))
493 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi))
495 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc))
497 if (krb5_init_keys(knew))
500 gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew;
501 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully copied reverse context\n");
502 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
505 delete_context_kerberos(knew);
507 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
511 __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
512 unsigned long *endtime)
514 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
516 *endtime = (unsigned long) ((__u32) kctx->kc_endtime);
517 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
521 void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx)
523 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
525 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
530 void buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, void *ptr, int len)
532 sg_init_table(sg, 1);
533 sg_set_buf(sg, ptr, len);
537 __u32 krb5_encrypt(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
544 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
545 struct scatterlist sg;
546 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
551 desc.info = local_iv;
554 if (length % crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0) {
555 CERROR("output length %d mismatch blocksize %d\n",
556 length, crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm));
560 if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 16) {
561 CERROR("iv size too large %d\n", crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
566 memcpy(local_iv, iv, crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
568 memcpy(out, in, length);
569 buf_to_sg(&sg, out, length);
572 ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&desc, &sg, &sg, length);
574 ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&desc, &sg, &sg, length);
581 int krb5_digest_hmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm,
583 struct krb5_header *khdr,
584 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
585 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
588 struct hash_desc desc;
589 struct scatterlist sg[1];
592 crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, key->data, key->len);
596 crypto_hash_init(&desc);
598 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
599 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
601 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
602 crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
605 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
606 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
609 sg_set_page(&sg[0], iovs[i].kiov_page, iovs[i].kiov_len,
610 iovs[i].kiov_offset);
611 crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
615 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
616 crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
619 return crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
623 int krb5_digest_norm(struct crypto_hash *tfm,
624 struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
625 struct krb5_header *khdr,
626 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
627 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
630 struct hash_desc desc;
631 struct scatterlist sg[1];
638 crypto_hash_init(&desc);
640 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
641 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
643 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
644 crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
647 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
648 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
651 sg_set_page(&sg[0], iovs[i].kiov_page, iovs[i].kiov_len,
652 iovs[i].kiov_offset);
653 crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
657 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
658 crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
661 crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
663 return krb5_encrypt(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL, cksum->data,
664 cksum->data, cksum->len);
668 * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended
669 * with krb5 wire token header.
672 __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
673 struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
674 struct krb5_header *khdr,
675 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
676 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
679 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
680 struct crypto_hash *tfm;
681 __u32 code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
684 if (!(tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ke->ke_hash_name, 0, 0))) {
685 CERROR("failed to alloc TFM: %s\n", ke->ke_hash_name);
686 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
689 cksum->len = crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm);
690 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
696 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac)
697 rc = krb5_digest_hmac(tfm, &kb->kb_key,
698 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
700 rc = krb5_digest_norm(tfm, kb,
701 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
704 code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
706 crypto_free_hash(tfm);
710 static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
711 struct krb5_header *khdr,
714 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
716 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
719 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
720 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
721 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
722 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
724 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
725 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
726 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
727 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
730 khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
731 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
732 khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
733 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
736 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
737 struct krb5_header *khdr,
740 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
741 __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
743 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
746 tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
749 tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
754 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
755 CERROR("bad token id\n");
756 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
758 if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
759 CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
760 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
762 if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
763 CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
764 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
766 if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
767 CERROR("bad filler\n");
768 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
770 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
771 be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
772 CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
773 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
775 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
779 __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
786 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
787 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
788 struct krb5_header *khdr;
789 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
791 /* fill krb5 header */
792 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
793 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
794 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
797 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
798 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum))
799 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
801 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
802 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
803 memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
806 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
808 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
812 __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
819 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
820 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
821 struct krb5_header *khdr;
822 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
825 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
826 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
827 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
830 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
832 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
833 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
834 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
838 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
839 CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
840 token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
841 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
844 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
845 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) {
846 CERROR("failed to make checksum\n");
847 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
850 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
851 if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
853 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
855 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
859 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
863 int add_padding(rawobj_t *msg, int msg_buflen, int blocksize)
867 padding = (blocksize - (msg->len & (blocksize - 1))) &
872 if (msg->len + padding > msg_buflen) {
873 CERROR("bufsize %u too small: datalen %u, padding %u\n",
874 msg_buflen, msg->len, padding);
878 memset(msg->data + msg->len, padding, padding);
884 int krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
891 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
892 struct scatterlist src, dst;
893 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}, *buf;
900 desc.info = local_iv;
903 for (i = 0; i < inobj_cnt; i++) {
904 LASSERT(buf + inobjs[i].len <= outobj->data + outobj->len);
906 buf_to_sg(&src, inobjs[i].data, inobjs[i].len);
907 buf_to_sg(&dst, buf, outobj->len - datalen);
911 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(
912 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
914 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(
915 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
918 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(
919 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
921 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(
922 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
926 CERROR("encrypt error %d\n", rc);
930 datalen += inobjs[i].len;
931 buf += inobjs[i].len;
934 outobj->len = datalen;
939 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
942 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
943 struct krb5_header *khdr,
945 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
949 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
950 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
951 struct scatterlist src, dst;
952 int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
954 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
955 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
957 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
958 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
959 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
962 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
965 /* encrypt confounder */
966 buf_to_sg(&src, confounder, blocksize);
967 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
969 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
971 CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
975 /* encrypt clear pages */
976 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
977 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page,
978 (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len + blocksize - 1) &
980 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset);
983 sg_set_page(&dst, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page, src.length,
986 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = dst.offset;
987 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = dst.length;
989 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
992 CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
997 /* encrypt krb5 header */
998 buf_to_sg(&src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
999 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1001 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
1004 CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
1015 * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
1016 * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
1018 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
1020 * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
1021 * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
1022 * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len.
1023 * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
1024 * data in a page which is not the last one.
1025 * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
1026 * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
1027 * and bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len should be round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
1028 * should have been done by prep_bulk().
1031 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
1032 struct krb5_header *khdr,
1033 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1038 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
1039 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1040 struct scatterlist src, dst;
1041 int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
1042 int blocksize, i, rc;
1044 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1045 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1046 LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1048 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
1049 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
1050 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
1052 ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
1053 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
1054 ciph_desc.flags = 0;
1056 if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
1057 CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1061 /* decrypt head (confounder) */
1062 buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data, blocksize);
1063 buf_to_sg(&dst, plain->data, blocksize);
1065 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
1067 CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
1071 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
1073 if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
1074 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
1075 CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
1076 i, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1077 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len, blocksize);
1082 if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
1083 desc->bd_nob_transferred)
1084 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
1085 desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
1087 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
1088 if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >desc->bd_nob)
1089 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob -pt_nob;
1091 /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
1092 LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len <=
1093 desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1094 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len <=
1095 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len);
1098 if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
1101 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page,
1102 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len,
1103 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset);
1105 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
1106 sg_assign_page(&dst, desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page);
1108 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
1111 CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
1115 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
1116 memcpy(page_address(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page) +
1117 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1118 page_address(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page) +
1119 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1120 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len);
1123 ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
1124 pt_nob += desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len;
1127 if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
1128 CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
1129 desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
1133 if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
1134 CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
1135 desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
1139 /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
1141 while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
1142 desc->bd_iov[i++].kiov_len = 0;
1144 /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
1145 buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1146 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1148 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
1151 CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
1155 if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
1156 CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
1164 __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1170 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1171 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1172 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1174 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1175 rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
1176 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1180 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1181 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
1183 crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
1186 * final token format:
1187 * ---------------------------------------------------
1188 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
1189 * ---------------------------------------------------
1192 /* fill krb5 header */
1193 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1194 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1195 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1197 /* generate confounder */
1198 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1200 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1201 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1202 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1203 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1206 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1207 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1209 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1211 /* padding the message */
1212 if (add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
1213 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1216 * clear text layout for checksum:
1217 * ------------------------------------------------------
1218 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1219 * ------------------------------------------------------
1221 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1222 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1223 data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1224 data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1225 data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
1226 data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
1228 /* compute checksum */
1229 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1230 khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum))
1231 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1232 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1235 * clear text layout for encryption:
1236 * -----------------------------------------
1237 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1238 * -----------------------------------------
1240 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1241 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1242 data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
1243 data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
1244 data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
1245 data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
1247 /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
1248 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1249 cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
1250 LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
1252 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1254 struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
1256 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1257 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1258 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1259 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1262 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1263 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1264 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1265 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1268 if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1270 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1272 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1275 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
1276 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1278 crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1280 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1282 do {} while(0); /* just to avoid compile warning */
1284 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
1285 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1289 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1290 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1293 /* fill in checksum */
1294 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1295 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1296 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1298 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1300 /* final token length */
1301 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1302 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1306 __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1307 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
1309 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1312 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1313 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1314 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1316 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1318 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1319 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page);
1321 * offset should always start at page boundary of either
1322 * client or server side.
1324 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset & blocksize) {
1325 CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
1326 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset, i);
1327 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1330 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset;
1331 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len +
1332 blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
1335 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1339 __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1340 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1341 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1343 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1344 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1345 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1347 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1348 rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
1349 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1353 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1356 * final token format:
1357 * --------------------------------------------------
1358 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
1359 * --------------------------------------------------
1362 /* fill krb5 header */
1363 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1364 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1365 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1367 /* generate confounder */
1368 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1370 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1371 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1372 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1373 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1376 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1377 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1381 * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
1382 * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
1383 * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
1385 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1386 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1387 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
1390 * clear text layout for checksum:
1391 * ------------------------------------------
1392 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1393 * ------------------------------------------
1395 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1396 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1398 /* compute checksum */
1399 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1401 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
1403 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1404 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1407 * clear text layout for encryption:
1408 * ------------------------------------------
1409 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1410 * ------------------------------------------
1412 * ---------- (cipher pages) |
1414 * -------------------------------------------
1415 * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
1416 * -------------------------------------------
1418 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1419 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1421 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1422 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1424 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1428 rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1429 conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
1433 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1434 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1437 /* fill in checksum */
1438 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1439 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1440 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1442 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1444 /* final token length */
1445 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1446 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1450 __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1455 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1456 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1457 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1458 unsigned char *tmpbuf;
1459 int blocksize, bodysize;
1460 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1461 rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
1462 rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
1468 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1469 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1470 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1473 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1475 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1476 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1477 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1482 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1483 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1486 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1487 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1490 /* expected token layout:
1491 * ----------------------------------------
1492 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
1493 * ----------------------------------------
1495 bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
1497 if (bodysize % blocksize) {
1498 CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1499 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1502 if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
1503 CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1504 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1507 if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
1508 CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
1509 msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
1510 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1514 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1516 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1518 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
1520 cipher_in.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1521 cipher_in.len = bodysize;
1522 plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
1523 plain_out.len = bodysize;
1525 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1527 struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
1529 cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
1530 cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
1532 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1533 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1534 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1535 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1538 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1539 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1540 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1541 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1544 if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
1545 arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
1546 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1548 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1551 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
1552 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1554 crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1556 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1558 cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1560 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
1561 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1565 CERROR("error decrypt\n");
1568 LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
1570 /* expected clear text layout:
1571 * -----------------------------------------
1572 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1573 * -----------------------------------------
1576 /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
1577 if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
1579 CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
1583 /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1584 * ------------------------------------------------------
1585 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1586 * ------------------------------------------------------
1588 hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1589 hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
1590 hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1591 hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1592 hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1593 hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
1594 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1595 khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum))
1598 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1599 if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
1600 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1601 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1602 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1606 msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1607 memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
1609 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1611 OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1612 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1617 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1618 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1619 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1621 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1622 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1623 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1625 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1626 rawobj_t cipher, plain;
1627 rawobj_t data_desc[1];
1633 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1634 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1635 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1638 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1640 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1641 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1642 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1647 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1648 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1652 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1653 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1655 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1658 * token format is expected as:
1659 * -----------------------------------------------
1660 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
1661 * -----------------------------------------------
1663 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) +
1665 CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
1666 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1669 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1670 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1671 plain.data = cipher.data;
1672 plain.len = cipher.len;
1674 rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1675 desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
1677 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1680 * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1681 * ------------------------------------------
1682 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1683 * ------------------------------------------
1685 data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
1686 data_desc[0].len = blocksize;
1688 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1690 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
1692 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1693 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1695 if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr),
1696 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1697 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1698 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1699 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1700 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
1703 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1704 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1707 int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
1711 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
1714 written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
1715 enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
1719 static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
1720 .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
1721 .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos,
1722 .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos,
1723 .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
1724 .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
1725 .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
1726 .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
1727 .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
1728 .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
1729 .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
1730 .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
1731 .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
1734 static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = {
1736 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N,
1738 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
1742 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A,
1744 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
1748 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I,
1750 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
1754 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P,
1756 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV,
1762 * currently we leave module owner NULL
1764 static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
1765 .gm_owner = NULL, /*THIS_MODULE, */
1767 .gm_oid = (rawobj_t)
1768 {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"},
1769 .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
1771 .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs,
1774 int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
1778 spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
1780 status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
1782 CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
1786 void cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
1788 lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);