2 * Modifications for Lustre
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2011, 2015, Intel Corporation.
8 * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
12 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
13 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
14 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
15 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
16 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
18 * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
19 * All rights reserved.
21 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
22 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
24 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
25 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
28 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
30 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
31 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
32 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
33 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
34 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
35 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
39 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
40 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
41 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
42 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
43 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
44 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
45 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
46 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
47 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
52 #include <linux/init.h>
53 #include <linux/module.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/crypto.h>
56 #include <linux/mutex.h>
59 #include <obd_class.h>
60 #include <obd_support.h>
61 #include <lustre_net.h>
62 #include <lustre_import.h>
63 #include <lustre_sec.h>
66 #include "gss_internal.h"
70 #include "gss_crypto.h"
72 static spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
76 char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */
77 char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */
78 int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */
79 int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */
80 int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */
81 unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */
85 * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption.
86 * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS
87 * yet. this need to be fixed in the future.
89 static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
90 [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */
91 .ke_dispname = "des-cbc-md5",
92 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des)",
93 .ke_hash_name = "md5",
97 #ifdef HAVE_DES3_SUPPORT
98 [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
99 .ke_dispname = "des3-hmac-sha1",
100 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
101 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
107 [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
108 .ke_dispname = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
109 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
110 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
115 [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
116 .ke_dispname = "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
117 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
118 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
123 [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
124 .ke_dispname = "arcfour-hmac-md5",
125 .ke_enc_name = "ecb(arc4)",
126 .ke_hash_name = "md5",
133 static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
135 if (enctype < ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
136 return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
142 int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
144 struct krb5_enctype *ke;
146 if (kctx->kc_enctype >= ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) ||
147 enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
148 CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
152 ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
154 /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
155 if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC &&
156 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
159 /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
160 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
161 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
163 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
164 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
171 void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
173 rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used);
175 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye);
176 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi);
177 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc);
181 __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
183 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
186 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
188 kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0);
191 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)))
194 /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */
195 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
196 gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
199 /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
200 * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
201 * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
203 * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
205 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
209 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
211 kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint;
214 if (gss_get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
217 /* old style enc/seq keys in format:
221 * we decompose them to fit into the new context
225 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
228 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
231 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
235 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
236 tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype)
239 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
243 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
246 /* old style fallback */
247 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc))
253 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported rfc1964 context\n");
256 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
259 /* Flags for version 2 context flags */
260 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001
261 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002
262 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004
265 __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
267 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
269 /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
270 * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
271 * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
273 * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
275 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
279 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
282 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR)
283 kctx->kc_initiate = 1;
284 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX)
286 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
287 kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
290 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send,
291 sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send)))
295 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
298 /* size of each key */
299 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
302 /* number of keys - should always be 3 */
303 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
307 CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint);
312 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
315 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize))
318 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
321 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported v2 context\n");
324 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
328 * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing
329 * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature
330 * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc.
333 __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf,
334 struct gss_ctx *gctx)
336 struct krb5_ctx *kctx;
337 char *p = (char *)inbuf->data;
338 char *end = (char *)(inbuf->data + inbuf->len);
339 unsigned int tmp_uint, rc;
341 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) {
342 CERROR("Fail to read version\n");
343 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
346 /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */
348 CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint);
349 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
354 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
356 if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) {
357 kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint;
358 rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end);
360 rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end);
364 rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx);
367 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
370 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
373 gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx;
374 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
378 __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
379 struct gss_ctx *gctx_new)
381 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
382 struct krb5_ctx *knew;
386 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
388 knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1;
389 knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx;
390 knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init;
391 knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey;
392 knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
394 memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed));
395 knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv;
396 knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send;
397 knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype;
399 if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
402 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye))
404 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi))
406 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc))
408 if (krb5_init_keys(knew))
411 gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew;
412 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully copied reverse context\n");
413 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
416 delete_context_kerberos(knew);
418 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
422 __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
425 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
427 *endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
428 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
432 void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx)
434 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
436 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
441 * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended
442 * with krb5 wire token header.
445 __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
446 struct gss_keyblock *kb,
447 struct krb5_header *khdr,
448 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
449 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
451 digest_hash hash_func)
453 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
454 struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
455 enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg hash_algo;
459 hash_algo = cfs_crypto_hash_alg(ke->ke_hash_name);
461 /* For the cbc(des) case we want md5 instead of hmac(md5) */
462 if (strcmp(ke->ke_enc_name, "cbc(des)"))
463 req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, kb->kb_key.data,
466 req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, NULL, 0);
469 CERROR("failed to alloc hash %s : rc = %d\n",
470 ke->ke_hash_name, rc);
474 cksum->len = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_algo);
475 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
482 hdr.data = (__u8 *)khdr;
483 hdr.len = sizeof(*khdr);
487 CERROR("hash function for %s undefined\n",
491 rc = hash_func(req, &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs);
495 if (!ke->ke_hash_hmac) {
498 cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
499 rc = gss_crypt_generic(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL,
500 cksum->data, cksum->data,
507 cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
509 return rc ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
512 static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
513 struct krb5_header *khdr,
516 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
518 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
521 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
522 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
523 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
524 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
526 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
527 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
528 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
529 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
532 khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
533 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
534 khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
535 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
538 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
539 struct krb5_header *khdr,
542 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
543 __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
545 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
548 tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
551 tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
556 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
557 CERROR("bad token id\n");
558 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
560 if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
561 CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
562 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
564 if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
565 CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
566 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
568 if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
569 CERROR("bad filler\n");
570 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
572 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
573 be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
574 CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
575 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
577 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
581 __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
588 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
589 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
590 struct krb5_header *khdr;
591 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
594 /* fill krb5 header */
595 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
596 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
597 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
600 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, khdr,
601 msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
603 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
605 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
606 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
607 memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
610 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
611 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
618 __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
625 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
626 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
627 struct krb5_header *khdr;
628 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
631 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
632 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
633 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
636 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
638 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
639 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
640 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
644 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
645 CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
646 token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
647 GOTO(out, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
650 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
651 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
653 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
655 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
656 if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
658 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
659 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_BAD_SIG);
661 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
669 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
672 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
673 struct krb5_header *khdr,
675 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
679 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
680 struct scatterlist src, dst;
681 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
682 int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
683 SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
685 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
686 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
687 LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
689 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
690 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
691 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
693 /* encrypt confounder */
694 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, confounder, blocksize);
698 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
700 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
703 skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
704 skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
705 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
706 blocksize, local_iv);
708 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
710 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
711 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
714 CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
715 skcipher_request_zero(req);
719 /* encrypt clear pages */
720 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
721 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
722 sg_set_page(&src, BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
723 (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len +
726 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
729 sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
730 sg_set_page(&dst, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
731 src.length, src.offset);
733 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset = dst.offset;
734 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len = dst.length;
736 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst,
737 src.length, local_iv);
738 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, &dst, &src, src.length);
740 CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
741 skcipher_request_zero(req);
746 /* encrypt krb5 header */
747 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
749 skcipher_request_zero(req);
753 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
756 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
757 skcipher_request_zero(req);
761 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
762 sizeof(*khdr), local_iv);
763 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
765 skcipher_request_zero(req);
767 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
768 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
771 CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
782 * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
783 * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
785 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
787 * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
788 * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
789 * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to
790 * bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len.
791 * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
792 * data in a page which is not the last one.
793 * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
794 * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
795 * and bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len should be
796 * round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
797 * should have been done by prep_bulk().
800 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
801 struct krb5_header *khdr,
802 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
807 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
808 struct scatterlist src, dst;
809 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
810 int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
811 int blocksize, i, rc;
812 SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
814 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
815 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
816 LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
817 LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
819 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
820 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
821 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
823 if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
824 CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
828 /* decrypt head (confounder) */
829 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data, blocksize);
833 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, plain->data, blocksize);
835 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
839 skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
840 skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
841 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
842 blocksize, local_iv);
844 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
846 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
847 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
850 CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
851 skcipher_request_zero(req);
855 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
857 if (BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
858 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
859 CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
860 i, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
861 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len,
863 skcipher_request_zero(req);
868 if (ct_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len >
869 desc->bd_nob_transferred)
870 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
871 desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
873 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
874 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
875 if (pt_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len >
877 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
878 desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
880 /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
881 LASSERT(ct_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).
883 desc->bd_nob_transferred);
884 LASSERT(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len <=
885 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len);
888 if (BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len == 0)
891 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
892 sg_set_page(&src, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
893 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len,
894 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
896 if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
898 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page);
900 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
901 src.length, local_iv);
902 rc = crypto_skcipher_decrypt_iv(req, &dst, &src, src.length);
904 CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
905 skcipher_request_zero(req);
909 if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
910 memcpy(page_address(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page) +
911 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
912 page_address(BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).
914 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
915 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len);
918 ct_nob += BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
919 pt_nob += BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
922 if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
923 CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
924 desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
925 skcipher_request_zero(req);
929 if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
930 CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
931 desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
932 skcipher_request_zero(req);
936 /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
938 while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
939 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i++).kiov_len = 0;
941 /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
942 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data + blocksize,
947 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
950 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
954 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
955 src.length, local_iv);
956 rc = crypto_skcipher_decrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
958 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
959 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
961 skcipher_request_zero(req);
963 CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
967 if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
968 CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
976 __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
982 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
983 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
984 struct krb5_header *khdr;
986 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
987 rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
988 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
989 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
994 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
995 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
997 crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
1000 * final token format:
1001 * ---------------------------------------------------
1002 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
1003 * ---------------------------------------------------
1006 /* fill krb5 header */
1007 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1008 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1009 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1011 /* generate confounder */
1012 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1014 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1015 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1016 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1017 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1020 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1021 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(
1022 kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1024 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1026 /* padding the message */
1027 if (gss_add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
1028 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1031 * clear text layout for checksum:
1032 * ------------------------------------------------------
1033 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1034 * ------------------------------------------------------
1036 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1037 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1038 data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1039 data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1040 data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
1041 data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
1043 /* compute checksum */
1044 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1045 khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum,
1047 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1048 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1051 * clear text layout for encryption:
1052 * -----------------------------------------
1053 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1054 * -----------------------------------------
1056 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1057 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1058 data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
1059 data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
1060 data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
1061 data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
1063 /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
1064 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1065 cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
1066 LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
1068 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1069 rawobj_t arc4_keye = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1070 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *arc4_tfm;
1072 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1073 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
1075 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1076 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1079 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1080 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1081 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1082 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1085 if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1087 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1089 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1092 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 3, data_desc,
1095 crypto_free_sync_skcipher(arc4_tfm);
1097 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1099 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 3,
1100 data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1104 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1106 /* fill in checksum */
1107 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1108 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1109 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1112 /* final token length */
1113 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1114 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1116 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1121 __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1122 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
1124 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1127 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
1128 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1129 LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
1130 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1132 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1134 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1135 LASSERT(BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page);
1137 * offset should always start at page boundary of either
1138 * client or server side.
1140 if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset & blocksize) {
1141 CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
1142 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset, i);
1143 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1146 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset =
1147 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset;
1148 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
1149 (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len +
1150 blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
1153 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1157 __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1158 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1159 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1161 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1162 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1163 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1165 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1166 rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
1167 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1171 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
1173 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1176 * final token format:
1177 * --------------------------------------------------
1178 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
1179 * --------------------------------------------------
1182 /* fill krb5 header */
1183 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1184 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1185 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1187 /* generate confounder */
1188 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1190 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1191 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1192 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1193 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1196 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1197 blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1201 * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
1202 * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
1203 * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
1205 LASSERT(blocksz <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1206 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksz && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksz == 0);
1207 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
1210 * clear text layout for checksum:
1211 * ------------------------------------------
1212 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1213 * ------------------------------------------
1215 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1216 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1218 /* compute checksum */
1219 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1221 desc->bd_iov_count, GET_KIOV(desc),
1222 &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
1223 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1224 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1227 * clear text layout for encryption:
1228 * ------------------------------------------
1229 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1230 * ------------------------------------------
1232 * ---------- (cipher pages) |
1234 * -------------------------------------------
1235 * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
1236 * -------------------------------------------
1238 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1239 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1241 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1242 cipher.len = blocksz + sizeof(*khdr);
1244 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1248 rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1249 conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
1252 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1254 /* fill in checksum */
1255 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1256 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1257 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1260 /* final token length */
1261 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1262 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1264 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1269 __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1274 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1275 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1276 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1277 unsigned char *tmpbuf;
1278 int blocksz, bodysize;
1279 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1280 rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
1281 rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
1284 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1288 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1289 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1290 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1293 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1295 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1296 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1297 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1302 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1303 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1306 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1307 blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1310 /* expected token layout:
1311 * ----------------------------------------
1312 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
1313 * ----------------------------------------
1315 bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
1317 if (bodysize % blocksz) {
1318 CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1319 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1322 if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
1323 CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1324 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1327 if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
1328 CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
1329 msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
1330 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1334 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1336 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1338 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
1340 cipher_in.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1341 cipher_in.len = bodysize;
1342 plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
1343 plain_out.len = bodysize;
1345 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1347 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *arc4_tfm;
1349 cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
1350 cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
1352 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1353 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
1355 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1356 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1359 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1360 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1361 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1362 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1365 if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1367 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1369 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1372 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 1, &cipher_in,
1375 crypto_free_sync_skcipher(arc4_tfm);
1377 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1379 cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1381 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 1,
1382 &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1386 CERROR("error decrypt\n");
1389 LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
1391 /* expected clear text layout:
1392 * -----------------------------------------
1393 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1394 * -----------------------------------------
1397 /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
1398 if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
1400 CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
1404 /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1405 * ------------------------------------------------------
1406 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1407 * ------------------------------------------------------
1409 hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1410 hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
1411 hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1412 hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1413 hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1414 hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
1415 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1416 khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum,
1420 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1421 if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
1422 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1423 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1424 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1428 msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1429 memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
1431 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1433 OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1434 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1439 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1440 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1441 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1443 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1444 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1445 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1447 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1448 rawobj_t cipher, plain;
1449 rawobj_t data_desc[1];
1453 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
1456 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1457 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1458 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1461 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1463 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1464 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1465 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1470 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1471 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1475 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1476 blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1478 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksz && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksz == 0);
1481 * token format is expected as:
1482 * -----------------------------------------------
1483 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
1484 * -----------------------------------------------
1486 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr) +
1488 CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
1489 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1492 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1493 cipher.len = blocksz + sizeof(*khdr);
1494 plain.data = cipher.data;
1495 plain.len = cipher.len;
1497 rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1498 desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
1500 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1503 * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1504 * ------------------------------------------
1505 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1506 * ------------------------------------------
1508 data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
1509 data_desc[0].len = blocksz;
1511 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1515 &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
1516 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1517 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1519 if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr),
1520 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1521 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1522 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1523 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1524 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
1527 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1528 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1531 int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
1535 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
1538 written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
1539 enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
1543 static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
1544 .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
1545 .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos,
1546 .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos,
1547 .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
1548 .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
1549 .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
1550 .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
1551 .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
1552 .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
1553 .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
1554 .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
1555 .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
1558 static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = {
1560 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N,
1562 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
1566 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A,
1568 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
1572 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I,
1574 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
1578 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P,
1580 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV,
1585 static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
1586 /* .gm_owner uses default NULL value for THIS_MODULE */
1588 .gm_oid = (rawobj_t)
1589 {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"},
1590 .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
1592 .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs,
1595 int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
1599 spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
1601 status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
1603 CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
1607 void cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
1609 lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);