Whamcloud - gitweb
LU-2216 mdt: remove obsolete DNE code
[fs/lustre-release.git] / lustre / ptlrpc / gss / gss_krb5_mech.c
index 7eb0c95..b11b267 100644 (file)
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; -*-
- * vim:expandtab:shiftwidth=8:tabstop=8:
- *
+/*
  * Modifications for Lustre
  *
- * Copyright  2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2011, Whamcloud, Inc.
  *
  * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
  */
  *
  */
 
-#ifndef EXPORT_SYMTAB
-# define EXPORT_SYMTAB
-#endif
 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #else
 #include <liblustre.h>
@@ -77,7 +73,7 @@
 #include "gss_asn1.h"
 #include "gss_krb5.h"
 
-static spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
+static cfs_spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
 
 struct krb5_enctype {
         char           *ke_dispname;
@@ -155,12 +151,12 @@ static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
 static
 int keyblock_init(struct krb5_keyblock *kb, char *alg_name, int alg_mode)
 {
-        kb->kb_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg_name, alg_mode, 0);
-        if (kb->kb_tfm == NULL) {
-                CERROR("failed to alloc tfm: %s, mode %d\n",
-                       alg_name, alg_mode);
-                return -1;
-        }
+       kb->kb_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg_name, alg_mode, 0);
+       if (IS_ERR(kb->kb_tfm)) {
+               CERROR("failed to alloc tfm: %s, mode %d\n",
+                      alg_name, alg_mode);
+               return -1;
+       }
 
         if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(kb->kb_tfm, kb->kb_key.data, kb->kb_key.len)) {
                 CERROR("failed to set %s key, len %d\n",
@@ -241,7 +237,7 @@ int get_rawobj(char **ptr, const char *end, rawobj_t *res)
         if (q > end || q < p)
                 return -1;
 
-        OBD_ALLOC(res->data, len);
+        OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(res->data, len);
         if (!res->data)
                 return -1;
 
@@ -257,12 +253,12 @@ int get_keyblock(char **ptr, const char *end,
 {
         char *buf;
 
-        OBD_ALLOC(buf, keysize);
+        OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(buf, keysize);
         if (buf == NULL)
                 return -1;
 
         if (get_bytes(ptr, end, buf, keysize)) {
-                OBD_FREE(buf, keysize);
+                OBD_FREE_LARGE(buf, keysize);
                 return -1;
         }
 
@@ -736,7 +732,7 @@ __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
         }
 
         cksum->len = ll_crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm);
-        OBD_ALLOC(cksum->data, cksum->len);
+        OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
         if (!cksum->data) {
                 cksum->len = 0;
                 goto out_tfm;
@@ -777,9 +773,9 @@ static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
         }
 
         khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
-        spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+        cfs_spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
         khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
-        spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+        cfs_spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
 }
 
 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
@@ -984,6 +980,9 @@ int krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
         RETURN(0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
+ */
 static
 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
                       struct krb5_header *khdr,
@@ -1063,13 +1062,26 @@ int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
 /*
  * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
  * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
+ *
+ * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
+ * plain text size.
+ * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
+ *   bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
+ *   be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len.
+ *   this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
+ *   data in a page which is not the last one.
+ * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
+ *   thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
+ *   and bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len should be round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
+ *   should have been done by prep_bulk().
  */
 static
 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
                       struct krb5_header *khdr,
                       struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
                       rawobj_t *cipher,
-                      rawobj_t *plain)
+                      rawobj_t *plain,
+                      int adj_nob)
 {
         struct blkcipher_desc   ciph_desc;
         __u8                    local_iv[16] = {0};
@@ -1104,35 +1116,42 @@ int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
                 return rc;
         }
 
-        /*
-         * decrypt clear pages. note the enc_iov is prepared by prep_bulk()
-         * which already done some sanity checkings.
-         *
-         * desc->bd_nob is the actual plain text size supposed to be
-         * transferred. desc->bd_nob_transferred is the actual cipher
-         * text received.
-         */
         for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
              i++) {
-                if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
-                        continue;
+                if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
+                    desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
+                        CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
+                               i, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset,
+                               desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len, blocksize);
+                        return -EFAULT;
+                }
 
-                if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
-                    desc->bd_nob_transferred)
-                        desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
-                                desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
+                if (adj_nob) {
+                        if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
+                            desc->bd_nob_transferred)
+                                desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
+                                        desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
 
-                desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
-                if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len > desc->bd_nob)
-                        desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
+                        desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
+                        if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >desc->bd_nob)
+                                desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob -pt_nob;
+                } else {
+                        /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
+                        LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len <=
+                                desc->bd_nob_transferred);
+                        LASSERT(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len <=
+                                desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len);
+                }
+
+                if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
+                        continue;
 
                 src.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page;
                 src.offset = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset;
                 src.length = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
 
                 dst = src;
-
-                if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize == 0)
+                if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
                         dst.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page;
 
                 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
@@ -1142,7 +1161,7 @@ int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
                         return rc;
                 }
 
-                if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize) {
+                if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
                         memcpy(cfs_page_address(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page) +
                                desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
                                cfs_page_address(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page) +
@@ -1154,6 +1173,23 @@ int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
                 pt_nob += desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len;
         }
 
+        if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
+                CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
+                       desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
+                return -EFAULT;
+        }
+
+        if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
+                CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
+                       desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
+                return -EFAULT;
+        }
+
+        /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
+        if (adj_nob)
+                while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
+                        desc->bd_iov[i++].kiov_len = 0;
+
         /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
         buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
         buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
@@ -1208,7 +1244,7 @@ __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
         fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
 
         /* generate confounder */
-        get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
+        cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
 
         /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
          * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
@@ -1272,11 +1308,11 @@ __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
                         GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
                 }
 
-                arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
-                if (arc4_tfm == NULL) {
-                        CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
-                        GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
-                }
+               arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
+               if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
+                       CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
+                       GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
+               }
 
                 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
                                                arc4_keye.len)) {
@@ -1378,7 +1414,7 @@ __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
         fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
 
         /* generate confounder */
-        get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
+        cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
 
         /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
          * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
@@ -1524,7 +1560,7 @@ __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx  *gctx,
         }
 
         /* decrypting */
-        OBD_ALLOC(tmpbuf, bodysize);
+        OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
         if (!tmpbuf)
                 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
 
@@ -1548,11 +1584,11 @@ __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx  *gctx,
                         GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
                 }
 
-                arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
-                if (arc4_tfm == NULL) {
-                        CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
-                        GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
-                }
+               arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
+               if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
+                       CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
+                       GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
+               }
 
                 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
                                          arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
@@ -1621,7 +1657,7 @@ arc4_out:
 
         major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 out_free:
-        OBD_FREE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
+        OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
         rawobj_free(&cksum);
         return major;
 }
@@ -1629,7 +1665,7 @@ out_free:
 static
 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
                                struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
-                               rawobj_t *token)
+                               rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
 {
         struct krb5_ctx     *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
         struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
@@ -1685,7 +1721,7 @@ __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
         plain.len = cipher.len;
 
         rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
-                               desc, &cipher, &plain);
+                               desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
         if (rc)
                 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
 
@@ -1788,7 +1824,7 @@ int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
 {
         int status;
 
-        spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
+        cfs_spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
 
         status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
         if (status)