* GPL HEADER END
*/
/*
- * Copyright (C) 2013, Trustees of Indiana University
+ * Copyright (C) 2013, 2015, Trustees of Indiana University
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014, 2016, Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Author: Jeremy Filizetti <jfilizet@iu.edu>
* Author: Andrew Korty <ajk@iu.edu>
*/
#define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#else
-#include <liblustre.h>
-#endif
+#include <crypto/ctr.h>
#include <obd.h>
#include <obd_class.h>
#include <obd_support.h>
#include "gss_err.h"
+#include "gss_crypto.h"
#include "gss_internal.h"
#include "gss_api.h"
#include "gss_asn1.h"
+#define SK_INTERFACE_VERSION 1
+#define SK_MSG_VERSION 1
+#define SK_MIN_SIZE 8
+#define SK_IV_SIZE 16
+
+/* Starting number for reverse contexts. It is critical to security
+ * that reverse contexts use a different range of numbers than regular
+ * contexts because they are using the same key. Therefore the IV/nonce
+ * combination must be unique for them. To accomplish this reverse contexts
+ * use the the negative range of a 64-bit number and regular contexts use the
+ * postive range. If the same IV/nonce combination were reused it would leak
+ * information about the plaintext. */
+#define SK_IV_REV_START (1ULL << 63)
+
struct sk_ctx {
+ enum cfs_crypto_crypt_alg sc_crypt;
+ enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg sc_hmac;
+ __u32 sc_expire;
+ __u32 sc_host_random;
+ __u32 sc_peer_random;
+ atomic64_t sc_iv;
+ rawobj_t sc_hmac_key;
+ struct gss_keyblock sc_session_kb;
};
+struct sk_hdr {
+ __u64 skh_version;
+ __u64 skh_iv;
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+/* The format of SK wire data is similar to that of RFC3686 ESP Payload
+ * (section 3) except instead of just an IV there is a struct sk_hdr.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * | struct sk_hdr | ciphertext (variable size) | HMAC (variable size) |
+ * --------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+struct sk_wire {
+ rawobj_t skw_header;
+ rawobj_t skw_cipher;
+ rawobj_t skw_hmac;
+};
+
+static inline unsigned long sk_block_mask(unsigned long len, int blocksize)
+{
+ return (len + blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
+}
+
+static int sk_fill_header(struct sk_ctx *skc, struct sk_hdr *skh)
+{
+ __u64 tmp_iv;
+ skh->skh_version = be64_to_cpu(SK_MSG_VERSION);
+
+ /* Always using inc_return so we don't use our initial numbers which
+ * could be the reuse detecting numbers */
+ tmp_iv = atomic64_inc_return(&skc->sc_iv);
+ skh->skh_iv = be64_to_cpu(tmp_iv);
+ if (tmp_iv == 0 || tmp_iv == SK_IV_REV_START) {
+ CERROR("Counter looped, connection must be reset to avoid "
+ "plaintext information\n");
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static int sk_verify_header(struct sk_hdr *skh)
+{
+ if (cpu_to_be64(skh->skh_version) != SK_MSG_VERSION)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+void sk_construct_rfc3686_iv(__u8 *iv, __u32 nonce, __u64 partial_iv)
+{
+ __u32 ctr = cpu_to_be32(1);
+
+ memcpy(iv, &nonce, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
+ iv += CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
+ memcpy(iv, &partial_iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
+ iv += CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE;
+ memcpy(iv, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
+}
+
+static int sk_fill_context(rawobj_t *inbuf, struct sk_ctx *skc)
+{
+ char *ptr = inbuf->data;
+ char *end = inbuf->data + inbuf->len;
+ char sk_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ char sk_crypt[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ u32 tmp;
+
+ /* see sk_serialize_kctx() for format from userspace side */
+ /* 1. Version */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&ptr, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read shared key interface version\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (tmp != SK_INTERFACE_VERSION) {
+ CERROR("Invalid shared key interface version: %d\n", tmp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 2. HMAC type */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&ptr, end, &sk_hmac, sizeof(sk_hmac))) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read HMAC algorithm type\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ skc->sc_hmac = cfs_crypto_hash_alg(sk_hmac);
+ if (skc->sc_hmac != CFS_HASH_ALG_NULL &&
+ skc->sc_hmac != CFS_HASH_ALG_SHA256 &&
+ skc->sc_hmac != CFS_HASH_ALG_SHA512) {
+ CERROR("Invalid hmac type: %s\n", sk_hmac);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 3. crypt type */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&ptr, end, &sk_crypt, sizeof(sk_crypt))) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read crypt algorithm type\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ skc->sc_crypt = cfs_crypto_crypt_alg(sk_crypt);
+ if (skc->sc_crypt == CFS_CRYPT_ALG_UNKNOWN) {
+ CERROR("Invalid crypt type: %s\n", sk_crypt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 4. expiration time */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&ptr, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read context expiration time\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ skc->sc_expire = tmp + ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+ /* 5. host random is used as nonce for encryption */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&ptr, end, &skc->sc_host_random,
+ sizeof(skc->sc_host_random))) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read host random\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 6. peer random is used as nonce for decryption */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&ptr, end, &skc->sc_peer_random,
+ sizeof(skc->sc_peer_random))) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read peer random\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 7. HMAC key */
+ if (gss_get_rawobj(&ptr, end, &skc->sc_hmac_key)) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read HMAC key\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (skc->sc_hmac_key.len <= SK_MIN_SIZE) {
+ CERROR("HMAC key must key must be larger than %d bytes\n",
+ SK_MIN_SIZE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 8. Session key, can be empty if not using privacy mode */
+ if (gss_get_rawobj(&ptr, end, &skc->sc_session_kb.kb_key)) {
+ CERROR("Failed to read session key\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sk_delete_context(struct sk_ctx *skc)
+{
+ if (!skc)
+ return;
+
+ rawobj_free(&skc->sc_hmac_key);
+ gss_keyblock_free(&skc->sc_session_kb);
+ OBD_FREE_PTR(skc);
+}
+
static
__u32 gss_import_sec_context_sk(rawobj_t *inbuf, struct gss_ctx *gss_context)
{
- struct sk_ctx *sk_context;
+ struct sk_ctx *skc;
+ bool privacy = false;
if (inbuf == NULL || inbuf->data == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- OBD_ALLOC_PTR(sk_context);
- if (sk_context == NULL)
+ OBD_ALLOC_PTR(skc);
+ if (!skc)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- gss_context->internal_ctx_id = sk_context;
- CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully imported sk context\n");
+ atomic64_set(&skc->sc_iv, 0);
+
+ if (sk_fill_context(inbuf, skc))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ /* Only privacy mode needs to initialize keys */
+ if (skc->sc_session_kb.kb_key.len > 0) {
+ privacy = true;
+ if (gss_keyblock_init(&skc->sc_session_kb,
+ cfs_crypto_crypt_name(skc->sc_crypt), 0))
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ gss_context->internal_ctx_id = skc;
+ CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported sk%s context\n",
+ privacy ? "pi" : "i");
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+out_err:
+ sk_delete_context(skc);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
static
__u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_sk(struct gss_ctx *gss_context_old,
- struct gss_ctx *gss_context_new)
+ struct gss_ctx *gss_context_new)
{
- struct sk_ctx *sk_context_old;
- struct sk_ctx *sk_context_new;
+ struct sk_ctx *skc_old = gss_context_old->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct sk_ctx *skc_new;
- OBD_ALLOC_PTR(sk_context_new);
- if (sk_context_new == NULL)
+ OBD_ALLOC_PTR(skc_new);
+ if (!skc_new)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- sk_context_old = gss_context_old->internal_ctx_id;
- memcpy(sk_context_new, sk_context_old, sizeof(*sk_context_new));
- gss_context_new->internal_ctx_id = sk_context_new;
- CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully copied reverse sk context\n");
+ skc_new->sc_hmac = skc_old->sc_hmac;
+ skc_new->sc_crypt = skc_old->sc_crypt;
+ skc_new->sc_expire = skc_old->sc_expire;
+ skc_new->sc_host_random = skc_old->sc_host_random;
+ skc_new->sc_peer_random = skc_old->sc_peer_random;
+
+ atomic64_set(&skc_new->sc_iv, SK_IV_REV_START);
+
+ if (rawobj_dup(&skc_new->sc_hmac_key, &skc_old->sc_hmac_key))
+ goto out_err;
+ if (gss_keyblock_dup(&skc_new->sc_session_kb, &skc_old->sc_session_kb))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ /* Only privacy mode needs to initialize keys */
+ if (skc_new->sc_session_kb.kb_key.len > 0)
+ if (gss_keyblock_init(&skc_new->sc_session_kb,
+ cfs_crypto_crypt_name(skc_new->sc_crypt),
+ 0))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ gss_context_new->internal_ctx_id = skc_new;
+ CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully copied reverse sk context\n");
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+out_err:
+ sk_delete_context(skc_new);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
static
__u32 gss_inquire_context_sk(struct gss_ctx *gss_context,
- unsigned long *endtime)
+ time64_t *endtime)
{
- *endtime = 0;
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
+
+ *endtime = skc->sc_expire;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static
+u32 sk_make_hmac(enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg algo, rawobj_t *key, int msg_count,
+ rawobj_t *msgs, int iov_count, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
+ rawobj_t *token)
+{
+ struct cfs_crypto_hash_desc *desc;
+ int rc2, rc;
+
+ desc = cfs_crypto_hash_init(algo, key->data, key->len);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(desc);
+ goto out_init_failed;
+ }
+
+ rc2 = gss_digest_hash(desc, NULL, msg_count, msgs, iov_count, iovs,
+ token);
+ rc = cfs_crypto_hash_final(desc, key->data, &key->len);
+ if (!rc && rc2)
+ rc = rc2;
+out_init_failed:
+ return rc ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static
__u32 gss_get_mic_sk(struct gss_ctx *gss_context,
int message_count,
rawobj_t *messages,
lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
rawobj_t *token)
{
- token->data = NULL;
- token->len = 0;
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ return sk_make_hmac(skc->sc_hmac,
+ &skc->sc_hmac_key, message_count, messages,
+ iov_count, iovs, token);
+}
+
+static
+u32 sk_verify_hmac(enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg algo, rawobj_t *key,
+ int message_count, rawobj_t *messages,
+ int iov_count, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
+ rawobj_t *token)
+{
+ rawobj_t checksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ __u32 rc = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ checksum.len = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(algo);
+ if (token->len < checksum.len) {
+ CDEBUG(D_SEC, "Token received too short, expected %d "
+ "received %d\n", token->len, checksum.len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(checksum.data, checksum.len);
+ if (!checksum.data)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (sk_make_hmac(algo, key, message_count,
+ messages, iov_count, iovs, &checksum)) {
+ CDEBUG(D_SEC, "Failed to create checksum to validate\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(token->data, checksum.data, checksum.len)) {
+ CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
+ rc = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+cleanup:
+ OBD_FREE(checksum.data, checksum.len);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* sk_verify_bulk_hmac() differs slightly from sk_verify_hmac() because all
+ * encrypted pages in the bulk descriptor are populated although we only need
+ * to decrypt up to the number of bytes actually specified from the sender
+ * (bd_nob) otherwise the calulated HMAC will be incorrect. */
+static
+u32 sk_verify_bulk_hmac(enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg sc_hmac, rawobj_t *key,
+ int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, int iovcnt,
+ lnet_kiov_t *iovs, int iov_bytes, rawobj_t *token)
+{
+ struct cfs_crypto_hash_desc *desc;
+ rawobj_t checksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int rc = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ struct sg_table sgt;
+ int bytes;
+ int i;
+
+ checksum.len = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(sc_hmac);
+ if (token->len < checksum.len) {
+ CDEBUG(D_SEC, "Token received too short, expected %d "
+ "received %d\n", token->len, checksum.len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(checksum.data, checksum.len);
+ if (!checksum.data)
+ return rc;
+
+ desc = cfs_crypto_hash_init(sc_hmac, key->data, key->len);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ req = (struct ahash_request *) desc;
+ for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
+ if (!msgs[i].len)
+ continue;
+
+ rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sgt, sg, msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto hash_cleanup;
+
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, msgs[i].len);
+ rc = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+ if (rc) {
+ gss_teardown_sgtable(&sgt);
+ goto hash_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ gss_teardown_sgtable(&sgt);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < iovcnt && iov_bytes > 0; i++) {
+ if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ bytes = min_t(int, iov_bytes, iovs[i].kiov_len);
+ iov_bytes -= bytes;
+
+ sg_init_table(sg, 1);
+ sg_set_page(&sg[0], iovs[i].kiov_page, bytes,
+ iovs[i].kiov_offset);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, bytes);
+ rc = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+ if (rc)
+ goto hash_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(token->data, checksum.data, checksum.len)) {
+ rc = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ goto hash_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+hash_cleanup:
+ cfs_crypto_hash_final(desc, checksum.data, &checksum.len);
+
+cleanup:
+ OBD_FREE_LARGE(checksum.data, checksum.len);
+
+ return rc;
}
static
lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
rawobj_t *token)
{
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
+
+ return sk_verify_hmac(skc->sc_hmac, &skc->sc_hmac_key,
+ message_count, messages, iov_count, iovs, token);
}
static
rawobj_t *message, int message_buffer_length,
rawobj_t *token)
{
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
+ size_t sht_bytes = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(skc->sc_hmac);
+ struct sk_wire skw;
+ struct sk_hdr skh;
+ rawobj_t msgbufs[3];
+ __u8 local_iv[SK_IV_SIZE];
+ unsigned int blocksize;
+
+ LASSERT(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+
+ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+ if (gss_add_padding(message, message_buffer_length, blocksize))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ memset(token->data, 0, token->len);
+
+ if (sk_fill_header(skc, &skh) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ skw.skw_header.data = token->data;
+ skw.skw_header.len = sizeof(skh);
+ memcpy(skw.skw_header.data, &skh, sizeof(skh));
+
+ sk_construct_rfc3686_iv(local_iv, skc->sc_host_random, skh.skh_iv);
+ skw.skw_cipher.data = skw.skw_header.data + skw.skw_header.len;
+ skw.skw_cipher.len = token->len - skw.skw_header.len - sht_bytes;
+ if (gss_crypt_rawobjs(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm, local_iv, 1, message,
+ &skw.skw_cipher, 1))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ /* HMAC covers the SK header, GSS header, and ciphertext */
+ msgbufs[0] = skw.skw_header;
+ msgbufs[1] = *gss_header;
+ msgbufs[2] = skw.skw_cipher;
+
+ skw.skw_hmac.data = skw.skw_cipher.data + skw.skw_cipher.len;
+ skw.skw_hmac.len = sht_bytes;
+ if (sk_make_hmac(skc->sc_hmac, &skc->sc_hmac_key,
+ 3, msgbufs, 0, NULL, &skw.skw_hmac))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ token->len = skw.skw_header.len + skw.skw_cipher.len + skw.skw_hmac.len;
+
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
__u32 gss_unwrap_sk(struct gss_ctx *gss_context, rawobj_t *gss_header,
rawobj_t *token, rawobj_t *message)
{
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
+ size_t sht_bytes = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(skc->sc_hmac);
+ struct sk_wire skw;
+ struct sk_hdr *skh;
+ rawobj_t msgbufs[3];
+ __u8 local_iv[SK_IV_SIZE];
+ unsigned int blocksize;
+ int rc;
+
+ LASSERT(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+
+ if (token->len < sizeof(skh) + sht_bytes)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ skw.skw_header.data = token->data;
+ skw.skw_header.len = sizeof(struct sk_hdr);
+ skw.skw_cipher.data = skw.skw_header.data + skw.skw_header.len;
+ skw.skw_cipher.len = token->len - skw.skw_header.len - sht_bytes;
+ skw.skw_hmac.data = skw.skw_cipher.data + skw.skw_cipher.len;
+ skw.skw_hmac.len = sht_bytes;
+
+ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+ if (skw.skw_cipher.len % blocksize != 0)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ skh = (struct sk_hdr *)skw.skw_header.data;
+ rc = sk_verify_header(skh);
+ if (rc != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* HMAC covers the SK header, GSS header, and ciphertext */
+ msgbufs[0] = skw.skw_header;
+ msgbufs[1] = *gss_header;
+ msgbufs[2] = skw.skw_cipher;
+ rc = sk_verify_hmac(skc->sc_hmac, &skc->sc_hmac_key, 3, msgbufs,
+ 0, NULL, &skw.skw_hmac);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ sk_construct_rfc3686_iv(local_iv, skc->sc_peer_random, skh->skh_iv);
+ message->len = skw.skw_cipher.len;
+ if (gss_crypt_rawobjs(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm, local_iv,
+ 1, &skw.skw_cipher, message, 0))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static
__u32 gss_prep_bulk_sk(struct gss_ctx *gss_context,
- struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
{
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
+ int blocksize;
+ int i;
+
+ LASSERT(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
+ if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset & blocksize) {
+ CERROR("offset %d not blocksize aligned\n",
+ BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset =
+ BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset;
+ BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
+ sk_block_mask(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len, blocksize);
+ }
+
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
+static __u32 sk_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, __u8 *iv,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *cipher,
+ int adj_nob)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_desc cdesc = {
+ .tfm = tfm,
+ .info = iv,
+ .flags = 0,
+ };
+ struct scatterlist ptxt;
+ struct scatterlist ctxt;
+ int blocksize;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+ int nob = 0;
+
+ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+
+ sg_init_table(&ptxt, 1);
+ sg_init_table(&ctxt, 1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
+ sg_set_page(&ptxt, BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
+ sk_block_mask(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len,
+ blocksize),
+ BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
+ nob += ptxt.length;
+
+ sg_set_page(&ctxt, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
+ ptxt.length, ptxt.offset);
+
+ BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset = ctxt.offset;
+ BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len = ctxt.length;
+
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&cdesc, &ctxt, &ptxt,
+ ptxt.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("failed to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (adj_nob)
+ desc->bd_nob = nob;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static __u32 sk_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, __u8 *iv,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *cipher,
+ int adj_nob)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_desc cdesc = {
+ .tfm = tfm,
+ .info = iv,
+ .flags = 0,
+ };
+ struct scatterlist ptxt;
+ struct scatterlist ctxt;
+ int blocksize;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+ int pnob = 0;
+ int cnob = 0;
+
+ sg_init_table(&ptxt, 1);
+ sg_init_table(&ctxt, 1);
+
+ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize != 0) {
+ CERROR("Transfer not a multiple of block size: %d\n",
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && cnob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
+ i++) {
+ lnet_kiov_t *piov = &BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i);
+ lnet_kiov_t *ciov = &BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i);
+
+ if (ciov->kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
+ ciov->kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
+ CERROR("Invalid bulk descriptor vector\n");
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ /* Must adjust bytes here because we know the actual sizes after
+ * decryption. Similar to what gss_cli_ctx_unwrap_bulk does for
+ * integrity only mode */
+ if (adj_nob) {
+ /* cipher text must not exceed transferred size */
+ if (ciov->kiov_len + cnob > desc->bd_nob_transferred)
+ ciov->kiov_len =
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred - cnob;
+
+ piov->kiov_len = ciov->kiov_len;
+
+ /* plain text must not exceed bulk's size */
+ if (ciov->kiov_len + pnob > desc->bd_nob)
+ piov->kiov_len = desc->bd_nob - pnob;
+ } else {
+ /* Taken from krb5_decrypt since it was not verified
+ * whether or not LNET guarantees these */
+ if (ciov->kiov_len + cnob > desc->bd_nob_transferred ||
+ piov->kiov_len > ciov->kiov_len) {
+ CERROR("Invalid decrypted length\n");
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ciov->kiov_len == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ sg_init_table(&ctxt, 1);
+ sg_set_page(&ctxt, ciov->kiov_page, ciov->kiov_len,
+ ciov->kiov_offset);
+ ptxt = ctxt;
+
+ /* In the event the plain text size is not a multiple
+ * of blocksize we decrypt in place and copy the result
+ * after the decryption */
+ if (piov->kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
+ sg_assign_page(&ptxt, piov->kiov_page);
+
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&cdesc, &ptxt, &ctxt,
+ ctxt.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("Decryption failed for page: %d\n", rc);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (piov->kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
+ memcpy(page_address(piov->kiov_page) +
+ piov->kiov_offset,
+ page_address(ciov->kiov_page) +
+ ciov->kiov_offset,
+ piov->kiov_len);
+ }
+
+ cnob += ciov->kiov_len;
+ pnob += piov->kiov_len;
+ }
+
+ /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
+ if (adj_nob)
+ while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
+ BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i++).kiov_len = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(cnob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
+ CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred, cnob);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pnob != desc->bd_nob)) {
+ CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
+ desc->bd_nob, pnob);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static
__u32 gss_wrap_bulk_sk(struct gss_ctx *gss_context,
- struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *token,
- int adj_nob)
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *token,
+ int adj_nob)
{
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
+ size_t sht_bytes = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(skc->sc_hmac);
+ struct sk_wire skw;
+ struct sk_hdr skh;
+ __u8 local_iv[SK_IV_SIZE];
+
+ LASSERT(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+
+ memset(token->data, 0, token->len);
+ if (sk_fill_header(skc, &skh) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ skw.skw_header.data = token->data;
+ skw.skw_header.len = sizeof(skh);
+ memcpy(skw.skw_header.data, &skh, sizeof(skh));
+
+ sk_construct_rfc3686_iv(local_iv, skc->sc_host_random, skh.skh_iv);
+ skw.skw_cipher.data = skw.skw_header.data + skw.skw_header.len;
+ skw.skw_cipher.len = token->len - skw.skw_header.len - sht_bytes;
+ if (sk_encrypt_bulk(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm, local_iv,
+ desc, &skw.skw_cipher, adj_nob))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ skw.skw_hmac.data = skw.skw_cipher.data + skw.skw_cipher.len;
+ skw.skw_hmac.len = sht_bytes;
+ if (sk_make_hmac(skc->sc_hmac, &skc->sc_hmac_key, 1, &skw.skw_cipher,
+ desc->bd_iov_count, GET_ENC_KIOV(desc), &skw.skw_hmac))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
{
+ struct sk_ctx *skc = gss_context->internal_ctx_id;
+ size_t sht_bytes = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(skc->sc_hmac);
+ struct sk_wire skw;
+ struct sk_hdr *skh;
+ __u8 local_iv[SK_IV_SIZE];
+ int rc;
+
+ LASSERT(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm);
+
+ if (token->len < sizeof(skh) + sht_bytes)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ skw.skw_header.data = token->data;
+ skw.skw_header.len = sizeof(struct sk_hdr);
+ skw.skw_cipher.data = skw.skw_header.data + skw.skw_header.len;
+ skw.skw_cipher.len = token->len - skw.skw_header.len - sht_bytes;
+ skw.skw_hmac.data = skw.skw_cipher.data + skw.skw_cipher.len;
+ skw.skw_hmac.len = sht_bytes;
+
+ skh = (struct sk_hdr *)skw.skw_header.data;
+ rc = sk_verify_header(skh);
+ if (rc != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = sk_verify_bulk_hmac(skc->sc_hmac, &skc->sc_hmac_key, 1,
+ &skw.skw_cipher, desc->bd_iov_count,
+ GET_ENC_KIOV(desc), desc->bd_nob,
+ &skw.skw_hmac);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ sk_construct_rfc3686_iv(local_iv, skc->sc_peer_random, skh->skh_iv);
+ rc = sk_decrypt_bulk(skc->sc_session_kb.kb_tfm, local_iv,
+ desc, &skw.skw_cipher, adj_nob);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
void gss_delete_sec_context_sk(void *internal_context)
{
struct sk_ctx *sk_context = internal_context;
-
- OBD_FREE_PTR(sk_context);
+ sk_delete_context(sk_context);
}
int gss_display_sk(struct gss_ctx *gss_context, char *buf, int bufsize)
static struct subflavor_desc gss_sk_sfs[] = {
{
+ .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_SKN,
+ .sf_qop = 0,
+ .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
+ .sf_name = "skn"
+ },
+ {
+ .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_SKA,
+ .sf_qop = 0,
+ .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
+ .sf_name = "ska"
+ },
+ {
.sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_SKI,
.sf_qop = 0,
.sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
},
};
-/*
- * currently we leave module owner NULL
- */
static struct gss_api_mech gss_sk_mech = {
- .gm_owner = NULL, /*THIS_MODULE, */
+ /* .gm_owner uses default NULL value for THIS_MODULE */
.gm_name = "sk",
.gm_oid = (rawobj_t) {
- 12,
- "\053\006\001\004\001\311\146\215\126\001\000\001",
+ .len = 12,
+ .data = "\053\006\001\004\001\311\146\215\126\001\000\001",
},
.gm_ops = &gss_sk_ops,
- .gm_sf_num = 2,
+ .gm_sf_num = 4,
.gm_sfs = gss_sk_sfs,
};
git://git.whamcloud.com / fs / lustre-release.git / blobdiff