}
static
-void buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, char *ptr, int len)
+void buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, void *ptr, int len)
{
sg->page = virt_to_page(ptr);
sg->offset = offset_in_page(ptr);
return(ret);
}
+#ifdef HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER
+
static inline
int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
rawobj_t *key,
struct krb5_header *khdr,
int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
rawobj_t *cksum)
-#ifdef HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER
{
struct hash_desc desc;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
}
+ for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
+ if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
+ continue;
+ sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page;
+ sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset;
+ sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len;
+ ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
+ }
+
if (khdr) {
buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
return ll_crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
}
-#else /* HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */
+
+#else /* ! HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */
+
+static inline
+int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
+ rawobj_t *key,
+ struct krb5_header *khdr,
+ int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
+ rawobj_t *cksum)
{
struct scatterlist sg[1];
__u32 keylen = key->len, i;
crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
}
+ for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
+ if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
+ continue;
+ sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page;
+ sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset;
+ sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len;
+ crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
+ }
+
if (khdr) {
buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
crypto_hmac_final(tfm, key->data, &keylen, cksum->data);
return 0;
}
+
#endif /* HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */
static inline
struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
struct krb5_header *khdr,
int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
rawobj_t *cksum)
{
struct hash_desc desc;
ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
}
+ for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
+ if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
+ continue;
+ sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page;
+ sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset;
+ sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len;
+ ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
+ }
+
if (khdr) {
buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
struct krb5_header *khdr,
int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
rawobj_t *cksum)
{
struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
if (ke->ke_hash_hmac)
rc = krb5_digest_hmac(tfm, &kb->kb_key,
- khdr, msgcnt, msgs, cksum);
+ khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
else
rc = krb5_digest_norm(tfm, kb,
- khdr, msgcnt, msgs, cksum);
+ khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
if (rc == 0)
code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
return code;
}
+static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
+ struct krb5_header *khdr,
+ int privacy)
+{
+ unsigned char acceptor_flag;
+
+ acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
+
+ if (privacy) {
+ khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
+ khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
+ khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
+ khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
+ } else {
+ khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
+ khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
+ khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
+ khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
+ }
+
+ khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
+ spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+ khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
+ spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+}
+
+static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
+ struct krb5_header *khdr,
+ int privacy)
+{
+ unsigned char acceptor_flag;
+ __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
+
+ acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
+
+ if (privacy) {
+ tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
+ ec_rrc = 0x0;
+ } else {
+ tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
+ ec_rrc = 0xffff;
+ }
+
+ /* sanity checks */
+ if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
+ CERROR("bad token id\n");
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+ if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
+ CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ }
+ if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
+ CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ }
+ if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
+ CERROR("bad filler\n");
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+ if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
+ be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
+ CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
static
__u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
int msgcnt,
rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt,
+ lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
rawobj_t *token)
{
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
struct krb5_header *khdr;
- unsigned char acceptor_flag;
rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- __u32 rc = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
/* fill krb5 header */
LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
-
- khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
- khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
- khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
- khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
- khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
- spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
- khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
- spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+ fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
/* checksum */
if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
- khdr, msgcnt, msgs, &cksum))
- goto out_err;
+ khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
ke->ke_hash_size);
token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
- rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-out_err:
rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return rc;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static
__u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
int msgcnt,
rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt,
+ lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
rawobj_t *token)
{
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
struct krb5_header *khdr;
- unsigned char acceptor_flag;
rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- __u32 rc = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
+ __u32 major;
if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
- /* sanity checks */
- if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != KG_TOK_MIC_MSG) {
- CERROR("bad token id\n");
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
- if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
- CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- }
- if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
- CERROR("bad filler\n");
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
- if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != 0xffff ||
- be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != 0xffff) {
- CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
+ return major;
}
if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
- khdr, msgcnt, msgs, &cksum))
+ khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) {
+ CERROR("failed to make checksum\n");
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
ke->ke_hash_size)) {
CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
- rc = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- goto out;
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
- rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-out:
rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return rc;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static
}
static
+int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
+ struct krb5_header *khdr,
+ char *confounder,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *cipher,
+ int adj_nob)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
+ __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
+
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
+
+ blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
+ LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
+
+ ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
+ ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
+ ciph_desc.flags = 0;
+
+ /* encrypt confounder */
+ buf_to_sg(&src, confounder, blocksize);
+ buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
+
+ rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* encrypt clear pages */
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
+ src.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page;
+ src.offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset;
+ src.length = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len + blocksize - 1) &
+ (~(blocksize - 1));
+
+ if (adj_nob)
+ nob += src.length;
+
+ dst.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page;
+ dst.offset = src.offset;
+ dst.length = src.length;
+
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = dst.offset;
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = dst.length;
+
+ rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
+ src.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* encrypt krb5 header */
+ buf_to_sg(&src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
+ buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
+
+ rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc,
+ &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr));
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (adj_nob)
+ desc->bd_nob = nob;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
+ * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
+ */
+static
+int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
+ struct krb5_header *khdr,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *cipher,
+ rawobj_t *plain)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
+ __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
+ int blocksize, i, rc;
+
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
+
+ blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
+ LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
+
+ ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
+ ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
+ ciph_desc.flags = 0;
+
+ if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
+ CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
+ return -EPROTO;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt head (confounder) */
+ buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data, blocksize);
+ buf_to_sg(&dst, plain->data, blocksize);
+
+ rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * decrypt clear pages. note the enc_iov is prepared by prep_bulk()
+ * which already done some sanity checkings.
+ *
+ * desc->bd_nob is the actual plain text size supposed to be
+ * transferred. desc->bd_nob_transferred is the actual cipher
+ * text received.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
+ i++) {
+ if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred)
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
+
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
+ if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len > desc->bd_nob)
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
+
+ src.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page;
+ src.offset = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset;
+ src.length = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
+
+ dst = src;
+
+ if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize == 0)
+ dst.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page;
+
+ rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
+ src.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize) {
+ memcpy(cfs_page_address(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page) +
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
+ cfs_page_address(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page) +
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len);
+ }
+
+ ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
+ pt_nob += desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
+ buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
+ buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
+
+ rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc,
+ &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr));
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
+ CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static
__u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
rawobj_t *gsshdr,
rawobj_t *msg,
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
struct krb5_header *khdr;
- unsigned char acceptor_flag;
int blocksize;
rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- rawobj_t data_desc[4], cipher;
+ rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
__u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
- int enc_rc = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
LASSERT(ke);
LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
/* fill krb5 header */
LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
- acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
-
- khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
- khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
- khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
- khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
- khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
- spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
- khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
- spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+ fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
/* generate confounder */
get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
- data_desc[3].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
- data_desc[3].len = sizeof(*khdr);
/* compute checksum */
if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- khdr, 4, data_desc, &cksum))
+ khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
struct ll_crypto_cipher *arc4_tfm;
if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- NULL, 1, &cksum, &arc4_keye)) {
+ NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
- GOTO(arc4_out, enc_rc = -EACCES);
+ GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
}
arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
if (arc4_tfm == NULL) {
CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
- GOTO(arc4_out_key, enc_rc = -EACCES);
+ GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
}
if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
arc4_keye.len)) {
CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
arc4_keye.len);
- GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, enc_rc = -EACCES);
+ GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
}
- enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
- 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
+ rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
+ 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
arc4_out_tfm:
ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
arc4_out_key:
arc4_out:
do {} while(0); /* just to avoid compile warning */
} else {
- enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
- 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
+ rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
+ 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* fill in checksum */
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
+ memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
+ cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size);
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+
+ /* final token length */
+ token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static
+__u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ int blocksize, i;
+
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+
+ blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page);
+ /*
+ * offset should always start at page boundary of either
+ * client or server side.
+ */
+ if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset & blocksize) {
+ CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset, i);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset;
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len +
+ blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static
+__u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ int blocksize;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
+ __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ LASSERT(ke);
+ LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
+
+ /*
+ * final token format:
+ * --------------------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
+ * --------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+ /* fill krb5 header */
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
+ khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
+ fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
+
+ /* generate confounder */
+ get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
+
+ /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
+ * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
+ blocksize = 1;
+ } else {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
+ * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
+ * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
+ */
+ LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
+ LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
+
+ /*
+ * clear text layout for checksum:
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = conf;
+ data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
+
+ /* compute checksum */
+ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
+ khdr, 1, data_desc,
+ desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
+ &cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
+
+ /*
+ * clear text layout for encryption:
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | | |
+ * ---------- (cipher pages) |
+ * result token: | |
+ * -------------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
+ * -------------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = conf;
+ data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
+
+ cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
+ cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
+
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LBUG();
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
+ conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
}
- if (enc_rc != 0) {
+ if (rc != 0) {
rawobj_free(&cksum);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
struct krb5_header *khdr;
- unsigned char acceptor_flag;
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
int blocksize, bodysize;
rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
- __u32 rc = GSS_S_FAILURE, enc_rc = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+ __u32 major;
LASSERT(ke);
- acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
-
if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
- /* sanity check header */
- if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
- CERROR("bad token id\n");
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
- if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
- CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- }
- if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
- CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- }
- if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
- CERROR("bad filler\n");
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
- if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != 0x0 ||
- be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != 0x0) {
- CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
+ return major;
}
/* block size */
if (!tmpbuf)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
cipher_in.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
cipher_in.len = bodysize;
plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- NULL, 1, &cksum, &arc4_keye)) {
+ NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
- GOTO(arc4_out, enc_rc = -EACCES);
+ GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
}
arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
if (arc4_tfm == NULL) {
CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
- GOTO(arc4_out_key, enc_rc = -EACCES);
+ GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
}
if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
arc4_keye.len);
- GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, enc_rc = -EACCES);
+ GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
}
- enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
- 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
+ rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
+ 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
arc4_out_tfm:
ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
arc4_out_key:
arc4_out:
cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
} else {
- enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
- 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
+ rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
+ 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
}
- if (enc_rc != 0) {
+ if (rc != 0) {
CERROR("error decrypt\n");
goto out_free;
}
hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
- hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size;
+ hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- khdr, 3, hash_objs, &cksum))
+ khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum))
goto out_free;
LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
ke->ke_hash_size)) {
- CERROR("cksum mismatch\n");
+ CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
goto out_free;
}
msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
- rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
out_free:
OBD_FREE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return rc;
+ return major;
}
static
-__u32 gss_plain_encrypt_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
- int decrypt,
- int length,
- void *in_buf,
- void *out_buf)
+__u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *token)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
- __u32 rc;
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ int blocksize;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ rawobj_t cipher, plain;
+ rawobj_t data_desc[1];
+ int rc;
+ __u32 major;
+
+ LASSERT(ke);
+
+ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
+ CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
+
+ major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
+ return major;
+ }
+
+ /* block size */
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
+ blocksize = 1;
+ LBUG();
+ } else {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ }
+ LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
+
+ /*
+ * token format is expected as:
+ * -----------------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
+ * -----------------------------------------------
+ */
+ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) +
+ ke->ke_hash_size) {
+ CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
+ cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
+ plain.data = cipher.data;
+ plain.len = cipher.len;
- rc = krb5_encrypt(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, decrypt,
- NULL, in_buf, out_buf, length);
+ rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
+ desc, &cipher, &plain);
if (rc)
- CERROR("plain encrypt error: %d\n", rc);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ /*
+ * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
+ data_desc[0].len = blocksize;
+
+ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
+ khdr, 1, data_desc,
+ desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
+ &cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
+
+ if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr),
+ cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size)) {
+ CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ }
- return rc;
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
.gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
.gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
.gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
- .gss_plain_encrypt = gss_plain_encrypt_kerberos,
+ .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
+ .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
+ .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
.gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
.gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
};
git://git.whamcloud.com / fs / lustre-release.git / blobdiff