RETURN(0);
}
+/*
+ * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
+ */
static
int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
struct krb5_header *khdr,
/*
* desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
* desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
+ *
+ * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
+ * plain text size.
+ * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
+ * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
+ * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len.
+ * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
+ * data in a page which is not the last one.
+ * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
+ * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
+ * and bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len should be round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
+ * should have been done by prep_bulk().
*/
static
int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
struct krb5_header *khdr,
struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
rawobj_t *cipher,
- rawobj_t *plain)
+ rawobj_t *plain,
+ int adj_nob)
{
struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
__u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
return rc;
}
- /*
- * decrypt clear pages. note the enc_iov is prepared by prep_bulk()
- * which already done some sanity checkings.
- *
- * desc->bd_nob is the actual plain text size supposed to be
- * transferred. desc->bd_nob_transferred is the actual cipher
- * text received.
- */
for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
i++) {
- if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
- continue;
+ if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
+ CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
+ i, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset,
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len, blocksize);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
- if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
- desc->bd_nob_transferred)
- desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
- desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
+ if (adj_nob) {
+ if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred)
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
- desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
- if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len > desc->bd_nob)
- desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
+ if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >desc->bd_nob)
+ desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob -pt_nob;
+ } else {
+ /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
+ LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len <=
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len <=
+ desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len);
+ }
+
+ if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
+ continue;
src.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page;
src.offset = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset;
src.length = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
dst = src;
-
- if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize == 0)
+ if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
dst.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page;
rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
return rc;
}
- if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize) {
+ if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
memcpy(cfs_page_address(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page) +
desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
cfs_page_address(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page) +
pt_nob += desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len;
}
+ if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
+ CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
+ CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
+ desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
+ if (adj_nob)
+ while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
+ desc->bd_iov[i++].kiov_len = 0;
+
/* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
static
__u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
- rawobj_t *token)
+ rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
{
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
plain.len = cipher.len;
rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
- desc, &cipher, &plain);
+ desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
if (rc)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
git://git.whamcloud.com / fs / lustre-release.git / blobdiff