/* * Modifications for Lustre * * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. * * Copyright (c) 2011, 2015, Intel Corporation. * * Author: Eric Mei */ /* * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c * * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan. * All rights reserved. * * Andy Adamson * J. Bruce Fields * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived * from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "gss_err.h" #include "gss_internal.h" #include "gss_api.h" #include "gss_asn1.h" #include "gss_krb5.h" #include "gss_crypto.h" static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(krb5_seq_lock); struct krb5_enctype { char *ke_dispname; char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */ char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */ int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */ int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */ int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */ unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */ }; /* * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption. * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS * yet. this need to be fixed in the future. */ static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = { [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */ .ke_dispname = "des-cbc-md5", .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des)", .ke_hash_name = "md5", .ke_hash_size = 16, .ke_conf_size = 8, }, [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */ .ke_dispname = "des3-hmac-sha1", .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des3_ede)", .ke_hash_name = "sha1", .ke_hash_size = 20, .ke_conf_size = 8, .ke_hash_hmac = 1, }, [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */ .ke_dispname = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96", .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)", .ke_hash_name = "sha1", .ke_hash_size = 12, .ke_conf_size = 16, .ke_hash_hmac = 1, }, [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */ .ke_dispname = "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96", .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)", .ke_hash_name = "sha1", .ke_hash_size = 12, .ke_conf_size = 16, .ke_hash_hmac = 1, }, [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */ .ke_dispname = "arcfour-hmac-md5", .ke_enc_name = "ecb(arc4)", .ke_hash_name = "md5", .ke_hash_size = 16, .ke_conf_size = 8, .ke_hash_hmac = 1, } }; static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype) { if (enctype < ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname) return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname; return "unknown"; } static int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx) { struct krb5_enctype *ke; if (kctx->kc_enctype >= ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) || enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) { CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype); return -1; } ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */ if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC && gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode)) return -1; /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */ if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 && gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode)) return -1; if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 && gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode)) return -1; return 0; } static void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx) { rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used); gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye); gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi); gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc); } static __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end) { unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize; /* seed_init flag */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) goto out_err; kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0); /* seed */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed))) goto out_err; /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) || gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) goto out_err; /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details: * * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32))) goto out_err; /* seq send */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) goto out_err; kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint; /* mech oid */ if (gss_get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used)) goto out_err; /* old style enc/seq keys in format: * - enctype (u32) * - keysize (u32) * - keydata * we decompose them to fit into the new context */ /* enc key */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype))) goto out_err; if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize))) goto out_err; if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize)) goto out_err; /* seq key */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) || tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype) goto out_err; if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) || tmp_uint != keysize) goto out_err; if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize)) goto out_err; /* old style fallback */ if (gss_keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc)) goto out_err; if (p != end) goto out_err; CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported rfc1964 context\n"); return 0; out_err: return GSS_S_FAILURE; } /* Flags for version 2 context flags */ #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004 static __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end) { unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize; /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details: * * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32))) goto out_err; /* flags */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) goto out_err; if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) kctx->kc_initiate = 1; if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX) kctx->kc_cfx = 1; if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1; /* seq send */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send, sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send))) goto out_err; /* enctype */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype))) goto out_err; /* size of each key */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize))) goto out_err; /* number of keys - should always be 3 */ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) goto out_err; if (tmp_uint != 3) { CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint); goto out_err; } /* ke */ if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize)) goto out_err; /* ki */ if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize)) goto out_err; /* ki */ if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize)) goto out_err; CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported v2 context\n"); return 0; out_err: return GSS_S_FAILURE; } /* * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc. */ static __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf, struct gss_ctx *gctx) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx; char *p = (char *)inbuf->data; char *end = (char *)(inbuf->data + inbuf->len); unsigned int tmp_uint, rc; if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) { CERROR("Fail to read version\n"); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */ if (tmp_uint > 2) { CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } OBD_ALLOC_PTR(kctx); if (!kctx) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) { kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint; rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end); } else { rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end); } if (rc == 0) rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx); if (rc) { delete_context_kerberos(kctx); OBD_FREE_PTR(kctx); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct gss_ctx *gctx_new) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_ctx *knew; OBD_ALLOC_PTR(knew); if (!knew) return GSS_S_FAILURE; knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1; knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx; knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init; knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey; knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime; memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)); knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv; knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send; knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype; if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used)) goto out_err; if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye)) goto out_err; if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi)) goto out_err; if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc)) goto out_err; if (krb5_init_keys(knew)) goto out_err; gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew; CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully copied reverse context\n"); return GSS_S_COMPLETE; out_err: delete_context_kerberos(knew); OBD_FREE_PTR(knew); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } static __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, time64_t *endtime) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; *endtime = kctx->kc_endtime; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx; delete_context_kerberos(kctx); OBD_FREE_PTR(kctx); } /* * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended * with krb5 wire token header. */ static __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype, struct gss_keyblock *kb, struct krb5_header *khdr, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *cksum, digest_hash hash_func) { struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype]; struct ahash_request *req = NULL; enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg hash_algo; rawobj_t hdr; int rc; hash_algo = cfs_crypto_hash_alg(ke->ke_hash_name); /* For the cbc(des) case we want md5 instead of hmac(md5) */ if (strcmp(ke->ke_enc_name, "cbc(des)")) req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, kb->kb_key.data, kb->kb_key.len); else req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, NULL, 0); if (IS_ERR(req)) { rc = PTR_ERR(req); CERROR("failed to alloc hash %s : rc = %d\n", ke->ke_hash_name, rc); goto out_no_hash; } cksum->len = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_algo); OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len); if (!cksum->data) { cksum->len = 0; rc = -ENOMEM; goto out_free_hash; } hdr.data = (__u8 *)khdr; hdr.len = sizeof(*khdr); if (!hash_func) { rc = -EPROTO; CERROR("hash function for %s undefined\n", ke->ke_hash_name); goto out_free_hash; } rc = hash_func(req, &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs); if (rc) goto out_free_hash; if (!ke->ke_hash_hmac) { LASSERT(kb->kb_tfm); cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len); rc = gss_crypt_generic(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL, cksum->data, cksum->data, cksum->len); goto out_no_hash; } out_free_hash: if (req) cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len); out_no_hash: return rc ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct krb5_header *khdr, int privacy) { unsigned char acceptor_flag; acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR; if (privacy) { khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG); khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL; khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0); khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0); } else { khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG); khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag; khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff); khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff); } khdr->kh_filler = 0xff; spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++); spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); } static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct krb5_header *khdr, int privacy) { unsigned char acceptor_flag; __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc; acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0; if (privacy) { tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG; ec_rrc = 0x0; } else { tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG; ec_rrc = 0xffff; } /* sanity checks */ if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) { CERROR("bad token id\n"); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) { CERROR("bad direction flag\n"); return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; } if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) { CERROR("missing confidential flag\n"); return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; } if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) { CERROR("bad filler\n"); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc || be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) { CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n"); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *token) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; u32 major; /* fill krb5 header */ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr)); khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data; fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0); /* checksum */ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum, gctx->hash_func)) GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE); LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size); memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size); token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size; major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; out_free_cksum: rawobj_free(&cksum); return major; } static __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *token) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; u32 major; if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) { CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data; major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0); if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { CERROR("bad krb5 header\n"); goto out; } if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) { CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n", token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size); GOTO(out, major = GSS_S_FAILURE); } if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum, gctx->hash_func)) GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE); LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size)) { CERROR("checksum mismatch\n"); GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_BAD_SIG); } major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; out_free_cksum: rawobj_free(&cksum); out: return major; } /* * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size. */ static int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct krb5_header *khdr, char *confounder, struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *cipher, int adj_nob) { struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc; __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; struct scatterlist src, dst; struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst; int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0; LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count); LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm); LASSERT(blocksize > 1); LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr)); ciph_desc.tfm = tfm; ciph_desc.info = local_iv; ciph_desc.flags = 0; /* encrypt confounder */ rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, confounder, blocksize); if (rc != 0) return rc; rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data, blocksize); if (rc != 0) { gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); return rc; } rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); if (rc) { CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc); return rc; } /* encrypt clear pages */ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) { sg_init_table(&src, 1); sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_page, (desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len + blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1)), desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_offset); if (adj_nob) nob += src.length; sg_init_table(&dst, 1); sg_set_page(&dst, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_page, src.length, src.offset); desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_offset = dst.offset; desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len = dst.length; rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, src.length); if (rc) { CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc); return rc; } } /* encrypt krb5 header */ rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr)); if (rc != 0) return rc; rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr)); if (rc != 0) { gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); return rc; } rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, sizeof(*khdr)); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); if (rc) { CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc); return rc; } if (adj_nob) desc->bd_nob = nob; return 0; } /* * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received. * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be. * * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual * plain text size. * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to * bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len. * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size * data in a page which is not the last one. * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected, * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all. * and bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len should be * round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which * should have been done by prep_bulk(). */ static int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct krb5_header *khdr, struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *cipher, rawobj_t *plain, int adj_nob) { struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc; __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; struct scatterlist src, dst; struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst; int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0; int blocksize, i, rc; LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count); LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec); LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm); LASSERT(blocksize > 1); LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr)); ciph_desc.tfm = tfm; ciph_desc.info = local_iv; ciph_desc.flags = 0; if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) { CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred); return -EPROTO; } /* decrypt head (confounder) */ rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data, blocksize); if (rc != 0) return rc; rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, plain->data, blocksize); if (rc != 0) { gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); return rc; } rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); if (rc) { CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc); return rc; } for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred; i++) { if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 || desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) { CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n", i, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_offset, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len, blocksize); return -EFAULT; } if (adj_nob) { if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len > desc->bd_nob_transferred) desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob; desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len; if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len > desc->bd_nob) desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob - pt_nob; } else { /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */ LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i]. kiov_len <= desc->bd_nob_transferred); LASSERT(desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len <= desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len); } if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len == 0) continue; sg_init_table(&src, 1); sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_page, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_offset); dst = src; if (desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len % blocksize == 0) sg_assign_page(&dst, desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_page); rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, src.length); if (rc) { CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc); return rc; } if (desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) { memcpy(page_address(desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_page) + desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_offset, page_address(desc->bd_enc_vec[i]. kiov_page) + desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_offset, desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len); } ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len; pt_nob += desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len; } if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) { CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob); return -EFAULT; } if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) { CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n", desc->bd_nob, pt_nob); return -EFAULT; } /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */ if (adj_nob) while (i < desc->bd_iov_count) desc->bd_vec[i++].kiov_len = 0; /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */ rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr)); if (rc != 0) return rc; rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr)); if (rc != 0) { gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); return rc; } rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, sizeof(*khdr)); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src); gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst); if (rc) { CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc); return rc; } if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) { CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n"); return -EACCES; } return 0; } static __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, rawobj_t *gsshdr, rawobj_t *msg, int msg_buflen, rawobj_t *token) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; int blocksize; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher; __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK]; __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; u32 major; int rc = 0; LASSERT(ke); LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK); LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL || ke->ke_conf_size >= crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm)); /* * final token format: * --------------------------------------------------- * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) | * --------------------------------------------------- */ /* fill krb5 header */ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr)); khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data; fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); /* generate confounder */ get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size); /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL); blocksize = 1; } else { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); } LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size); /* padding the message */ if (gss_add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; /* * clear text layout for checksum: * ------------------------------------------------------ * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header | * ------------------------------------------------------ */ data_desc[0].data = conf; data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size; data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data; data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len; data_desc[2].data = msg->data; data_desc[2].len = msg->len; /* compute checksum */ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum, gctx->hash_func)) GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE); LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); /* * clear text layout for encryption: * ----------------------------------------- * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header | * ----------------------------------------- */ data_desc[0].data = conf; data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size; data_desc[1].data = msg->data; data_desc[1].len = msg->len; data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr; data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr); /* cipher text will be directly inplace */ cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1); cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr); LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr)); if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { rawobj_t arc4_keye = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm; if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi, NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye, gctx->hash_func)) { CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n"); GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES); } arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) { CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n"); GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES); } if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) { CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n", arc4_keye.len); GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES); } rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1); arc4_out_tfm: crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm); arc4_out_key: rawobj_free(&arc4_keye); } else { rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1); } if (rc) GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE); /* fill in checksum */ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size); memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size); /* final token length */ token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size; major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; out_free_cksum: rawobj_free(&cksum); return major; } static __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; int blocksize, i; LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count); LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec); LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) { LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_page); /* * offset should always start at page boundary of either * client or server side. */ if (desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_offset & blocksize) { CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n", desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_offset, i); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_offset = desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_offset; desc->bd_enc_vec[i].kiov_len = (desc->bd_vec[i].kiov_len + blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1)); } return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; int blocksize; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher; __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK]; int rc = 0; u32 major; LASSERT(ke); LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK); /* * final token format: * -------------------------------------------------- * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum | * -------------------------------------------------- */ /* fill krb5 header */ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr)); khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data; fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); /* generate confounder */ get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size); /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL); blocksize = 1; } else { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); } /* * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize. * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) + * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize) */ LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size); LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0); LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16); /* * clear text layout for checksum: * ------------------------------------------ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header | * ------------------------------------------ */ data_desc[0].data = conf; data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size; /* compute checksum */ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, khdr, 1, data_desc, desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_vec, &cksum, gctx->hash_func)) GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE); LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); /* * clear text layout for encryption: * ------------------------------------------ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header | * ------------------------------------------ * | | | * ---------- (cipher pages) | * result token: | | * ------------------------------------------- * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text | * ------------------------------------------- */ data_desc[0].data = conf; data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size; cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1); cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr); if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { LBUG(); rc = 0; } else { rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr, conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob); } if (rc) GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE); /* fill in checksum */ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size); memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size); /* final token length */ token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size; major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; out_free_cksum: rawobj_free(&cksum); return major; } static __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, rawobj_t *gsshdr, rawobj_t *token, rawobj_t *msg) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; unsigned char *tmpbuf; int blocksize, bodysize; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out; rawobj_t hash_objs[3]; int rc = 0; __u32 major; __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; LASSERT(ke); if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) { CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data; major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { CERROR("bad krb5 header\n"); return major; } /* block size */ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL); blocksize = 1; } else { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); } /* expected token layout: * ---------------------------------------- * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum | * ---------------------------------------- */ bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size; if (bodysize % blocksize) { CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) { CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) { CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n", msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } /* decrypting */ OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize); if (!tmpbuf) return GSS_S_FAILURE; major = GSS_S_FAILURE; cipher_in.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1); cipher_in.len = bodysize; plain_out.data = tmpbuf; plain_out.len = bodysize; if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { rawobj_t arc4_keye; struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm; cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size; cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size; if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi, NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye, gctx->hash_func)) { CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n"); GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES); } arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) { CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n"); GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES); } if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) { CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n", arc4_keye.len); GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES); } rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0); arc4_out_tfm: crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm); arc4_out_key: rawobj_free(&arc4_keye); arc4_out: cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; } else { rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0); } if (rc != 0) { CERROR("error decrypt\n"); goto out_free; } LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize); /* expected clear text layout: * ----------------------------------------- * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header | * ----------------------------------------- */ /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */ if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr), sizeof(*khdr))) { CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n"); goto out_free; } /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout: * ------------------------------------------------------ * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header | * ------------------------------------------------------ */ hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size; hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data; hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len; hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data; hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr); hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size; if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum, gctx->hash_func)) goto out_free; LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size)) { CERROR("checksum mismatch\n"); goto out_free; } msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr); memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len); major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; out_free: OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize); rawobj_free(&cksum); return major; } static __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; int blocksize; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; rawobj_t cipher, plain; rawobj_t data_desc[1]; int rc; __u32 major; LASSERT(ke); if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) { CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data; major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { CERROR("bad krb5 header\n"); return major; } /* block size */ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL); blocksize = 1; LBUG(); } else { LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); } LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0); /* * token format is expected as: * ----------------------------------------------- * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum | * ----------------------------------------------- */ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) { CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1); cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr); plain.data = cipher.data; plain.len = cipher.len; rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr, desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob); if (rc) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; /* * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout: * ------------------------------------------ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header | * ------------------------------------------ */ data_desc[0].data = plain.data; data_desc[0].len = blocksize; if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, khdr, 1, data_desc, desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_vec, &cksum, gctx->hash_func)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr), cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size)) { CERROR("checksum mismatch\n"); rawobj_free(&cksum); return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; } rawobj_free(&cksum); return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, char *buf, int bufsize) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id; int written; written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)", enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype)); return written; } static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = { .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos, .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos, .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos, .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos, .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos, .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos, .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos, .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos, .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos, .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos, .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos, .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos, }; static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = { { .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N, .sf_qop = 0, .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL, .sf_name = "krb5n" }, { .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A, .sf_qop = 0, .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH, .sf_name = "krb5a" }, { .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I, .sf_qop = 0, .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG, .sf_name = "krb5i" }, { .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P, .sf_qop = 0, .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV, .sf_name = "krb5p" }, }; static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = { /* .gm_owner uses default NULL value for THIS_MODULE */ .gm_name = "krb5", .gm_oid = (rawobj_t) {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"}, .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops, .gm_sf_num = 4, .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs, }; int __init init_kerberos_module(void) { int status; status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech); if (status) CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n"); return status; } void cleanup_kerberos_module(void) { lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech); }