#include <string.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-/* We need to use some deprecated APIs */
-#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <libcfs/util/string.h>
* of the prime provided as input parameter to DH_check(). This makes the check
* roughly x10 longer, and causes request timeouts when an SSK flavor is being
* used.
- *
* Instead, use a dynamic number Miller-Rabin rounds based on the speed of the
* check on the current system, evaluated when the lsvcgssd daemon starts, but
* at least as many as OpenSSL 1.1.1b used for the same key size. If default
* DH_check() duration is OK, use it directly instead of limiting the rounds.
- *
* If \a num_rounds == 0, we just call original DH_check() directly.
+ *
+ * OpenSSL v3 internally forces a minimum of 64 rounds when checking prime, so
+ * it is no longer possible to test prime check speed with fewer rounds. In this
+ * case, do not bother and directly call EVP_PKEY_param_check.
*/
-static bool sk_is_dh_valid(const DH *dh, int num_rounds)
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
+static bool sk_is_dh_valid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (EVP_PKEY_param_check(ctx) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "EVP_PKEY_param_check failed\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool sk_check_dh(const DH *dh, int num_rounds, bool fullcheck)
{
- const BIGNUM *p, *g;
+ const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
BN_ULONG word;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM *r;
bool valid = false;
int rc;
- if (num_rounds == 0) {
- int codes = 0;
-
- rc = DH_check(dh, &codes);
- if (rc != 1 || codes) {
- printerr(0, "DH_check(0) failed: codes=%#x: rc=%d\n",
- codes, rc);
- return false;
- }
- return true;
- }
-
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+ if (!p || !g)
+ return false;
if (!BN_is_word(g, SK_GENERATOR)) {
printerr(0, "%s: Diffie-Hellman generator is not %u\n",
}
word = BN_mod_word(p, 24);
- if (word != 11) {
+ /* OpenSSL v3 changed the way the prime is generated,
+ * using p mod 24 == 23.
+ * So we must accept word == 23 if the prime was generated
+ * by a client with OpenSSL v3.
+ */
+ if ((word != 11) && (word != 23)) {
printerr(0, "%s: Diffie-Hellman prime modulo=%lu unsuitable\n",
program_invocation_short_name, word);
return false;
}
+ if (!fullcheck)
+ return true;
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
printerr(0, "%s: Diffie-Hellman error allocating context\n",
return valid;
}
+static bool sk_is_dh_valid(const DH *dh, int num_rounds)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (num_rounds == 0) {
+ int codes = 0;
+
+ rc = DH_check(dh, &codes);
+ if (codes == DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR &&
+ sk_check_dh(dh, num_rounds, false))
+ return true;
+ if (rc != 1 || codes) {
+ printerr(0, "DH_check(0) failed: codes=%#x: rc=%d\n",
+ codes, rc);
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return sk_check_dh(dh, num_rounds, true);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
#define VALUE_LENGTH 256
static unsigned char test_prime[VALUE_LENGTH] =
"\xf7\xfa\x49\xd8\xec\xb1\x3b\xff\x26\x10\x3f\xc5\x3a\xc5\xcc\x40"
return prev_rounds;
}
+#endif /* !HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
+static uint32_t __sk_gen_params(struct sk_cred *skc, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *g,
+ int num_rounds)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_from_key = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+ uint32_t rc = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+ if (!tmpl ||
+ !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) ||
+ !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)) {
+ printerr(0, "error: params cannot be pushed\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
+ if (!params) {
+ printerr(0, "error: params cannot be allocated\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL);
+ if (!ctx ||
+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &key,
+ EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "error: params cannot be set\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx_from_key = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, key, NULL);
+ if (!ctx_from_key) {
+ printerr(0, "error: ctx_from_key cannot be allocated\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify that we have a safe prime and valid generator */
+ if (!sk_is_dh_valid(ctx_from_key))
+ goto err;
+
+ skc->sc_params = NULL;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx_from_key) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx_from_key, &skc->sc_params) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "Failed to generate public DH key: %s\n",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* skc->sc_pub_key.value is allocated by
+ * EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key
+ */
+ skc->sc_pub_key.length =
+ EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(skc->sc_params,
+ (unsigned char **)&skc->sc_pub_key.value);
+ if (skc->sc_pub_key.length == 0) {
+ printerr(0, "error: cannot get pub key\n");
+ skc->sc_pub_key.value = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx_from_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(p);
+ return rc;
+}
+#else /* !HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY */
+static uint32_t __sk_gen_params(struct sk_cred *skc, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *g,
+ int num_rounds)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+
+ /* Populate DH parameters */
+ /* "dh" takes over freeing of 'p' and 'g' if this succeeds */
+ skc->sc_params = DH_new();
+ if (!skc->sc_params || !DH_set0_pqg(skc->sc_params, p, NULL, g)) {
+ printerr(0, "Failed to set pqg\n");
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(p);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify that we have a safe prime and valid generator */
+ if (!sk_is_dh_valid(skc->sc_params, num_rounds))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if (DH_generate_key(skc->sc_params) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "Failed to generate public DH key: %s\n",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ DH_get0_key(skc->sc_params, &pub_key, NULL);
+ skc->sc_pub_key.length = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+ skc->sc_pub_key.value = malloc(skc->sc_pub_key.length);
+ if (!skc->sc_pub_key.value) {
+ printerr(0, "Failed to allocate memory for public key\n");
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, skc->sc_pub_key.value);
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY */
/**
* Populates the DH parameters for the DHKE
{
uint32_t random;
BIGNUM *p, *g;
- const BIGNUM *pub_key;
/* Random value used by both the request and response as part of the
* key binding material. This also should ensure we have unqiue
* tokens that are sent to the remote server which is important because
* the token is hashed for the sunrpc cache lookups and a failure there
* would cause connection attempts to fail indefinitely due to the large
- * timeout value on the server side */
+ * timeout value on the server side.
+ */
if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&random, sizeof(random)) != 1) {
printerr(0, "Failed to get data for random parameter: %s\n",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
}
/* The random value will always be used in byte range operations
- * so we keep it as big endian from this point on */
+ * so we keep it as big endian from this point on.
+ */
skc->sc_kctx.skc_host_random = random;
- /* Populate DH parameters */
- skc->sc_params = DH_new();
- if (!skc->sc_params) {
- printerr(0, "Failed to allocate DH\n");
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
-
p = BN_bin2bn(skc->sc_p.value, skc->sc_p.length, NULL);
if (!p) {
printerr(0, "Failed to convert binary to BIGNUM\n");
g = BN_new();
if (!g) {
printerr(0, "Failed to allocate new BIGNUM\n");
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto free_p;
}
if (BN_set_word(g, SK_GENERATOR) != 1) {
printerr(0, "Failed to set g value for DH params\n");
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
-
- if (!DH_set0_pqg(skc->sc_params, p, NULL, g)) {
- printerr(0, "Failed to set pqg\n");
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
-
- /* Verify that we have a safe prime and valid generator */
- if (!sk_is_dh_valid(skc->sc_params, num_rounds))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- if (DH_generate_key(skc->sc_params) != 1) {
- printerr(0, "Failed to generate public DH key: %s\n",
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto free_g;
}
- DH_get0_key(skc->sc_params, &pub_key, NULL);
- skc->sc_pub_key.length = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
- skc->sc_pub_key.value = malloc(skc->sc_pub_key.length);
- if (!skc->sc_pub_key.value) {
- printerr(0, "Failed to allocate memory for public key\n");
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ return __sk_gen_params(skc, p, g, num_rounds);
- BN_bn2bin(pub_key, skc->sc_pub_key.value);
+free_g:
+ BN_free(g);
+free_p:
+ BN_free(p);
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/**
int sk_sign_bufs(gss_buffer_desc *key, gss_buffer_desc *bufs, const int numbufs,
const EVP_MD *hash_alg, gss_buffer_desc *hmac)
{
- HMAC_CTX *hctx;
unsigned int hashlen = EVP_MD_size(hash_alg);
- int i;
- int rc = -1;
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ int i, rc = -1;
+ DECLARE_EVP_MD(subalg, hash_alg);
if (hash_alg == EVP_md_null()) {
printerr(0, "Invalid hash algorithm\n");
return -1;
}
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-
hmac->length = hashlen;
hmac->value = malloc(hashlen);
if (!hmac->value) {
goto out;
}
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key->value, key->length, hash_alg, NULL) != 1) {
+ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL);
+ if (!mac) {
+ printerr(0, "Failed to fetch HMAC\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ printerr(0, "Failed to init HMAC ctx\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx, key->value, key->length, subalg) != 1) {
printerr(0, "Failed to init HMAC\n");
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < numbufs; i++) {
- if (HMAC_Update(hctx, bufs[i].value, bufs[i].length) != 1) {
+ if (EVP_MAC_update(ctx, bufs[i].value, bufs[i].length) != 1) {
printerr(0, "Failed to update HMAC\n");
goto out;
}
}
/* The result gets populated in hmac */
- if (HMAC_Final(hctx, hmac->value, &hashlen) != 1) {
+ if (EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->value, &len, hashlen) != 1) {
printerr(0, "Failed to finalize HMAC\n");
goto out;
}
-
- if (hmac->length != hashlen) {
- printerr(0, "HMAC size does not match expected\n");
+ if (hmac->length != len) {
+ printerr(0, "HMAC size %zu does not match expected %zu\n",
+ len, hmac->length);
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
out:
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
return rc;
}
free(skc->sc_kctx.skc_session_key.value);
}
- if (skc->sc_params)
- DH_free(skc->sc_params);
+ if (skc->sc_params) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skc->sc_params);
+ skc->sc_params = NULL;
+ }
free(skc);
skc = NULL;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * Computes a session key based on the DH parameters from the host and its peer
- *
- * \param[in,out] skc Shared key credentials structure with
- * the session key populated with the
- * compute key
- * \param[in] pub_key Public key returned from peer in
- * gss_buffer_desc
- * \return gss error failure
- * \return GSS_S_COMPLETE success
- */
-uint32_t sk_compute_dh_key(struct sk_cred *skc, const gss_buffer_desc *pub_key)
+uint32_t __sk_compute_dh_key(struct sk_cred *skc,
+ const gss_buffer_desc *pub_key,
+ size_t *expected_len)
{
gss_buffer_desc *dh_shared = &skc->sc_dh_shared_key;
- BIGNUM *remote_pub_key;
- int status;
uint32_t rc = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *peerkey = NULL;
+
+ peerkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (!peerkey ||
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(peerkey, skc->sc_params) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "error: peerkey cannot be init\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(peerkey,
+ pub_key->value,
+ pub_key->length) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "error: peerkey cannot be set\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, skc->sc_params, NULL);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ printerr(0, "error: ctx cannot be allocated\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peerkey) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "error: ctx cannot be init\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, expected_len) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "error: cannot get dh length\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ dh_shared->length = *expected_len;
+ dh_shared->value = malloc(*expected_len);
+ if (!dh_shared->value) {
+ printerr(0, "error: cannot allocate memory for shared key\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, dh_shared->value, &dh_shared->length) != 1) {
+ printerr(0, "error: cannot derive dh key\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+out_err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(peerkey);
+#else /* !HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY */
+ BIGNUM *remote_pub_key;
remote_pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key->value, pub_key->length, NULL);
if (!remote_pub_key) {
return rc;
}
- dh_shared->length = DH_size(skc->sc_params);
- dh_shared->value = malloc(dh_shared->length);
+ *expected_len = DH_size(skc->sc_params);
+ dh_shared->length = *expected_len;
+ dh_shared->value = malloc(*expected_len);
if (!dh_shared->value) {
- printerr(0, "Failed to allocate memory for computed shared "
- "secret key\n");
+ printerr(0,
+ "Failed to allocate memory for computed shared secret key\n");
goto out_err;
}
- /* This compute the shared key from the DHKE */
- status = DH_compute_key(dh_shared->value, remote_pub_key,
- skc->sc_params);
- if (status == -1) {
- printerr(0, "DH_compute_key() failed: %s\n",
+ /* This computes the shared key from the DHKE */
+ dh_shared->length = DH_compute_key(dh_shared->value, remote_pub_key,
+ skc->sc_params);
+ if (dh_shared->length == -1) {
+ printerr(0, "DH key derivation failed: %s\n",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto out_err;
- } else if (status < dh_shared->length) {
+ }
+
+ rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+out_err:
+ BN_free(remote_pub_key);
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY */
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a session key based on the DH parameters from the host and its peer
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] skc Shared key credentials structure with
+ * the session key populated with the
+ * compute key
+ * \param[in] pub_key Public key returned from peer in
+ * gss_buffer_desc
+ * \return gss error failure
+ * \return GSS_S_COMPLETE success
+ */
+uint32_t sk_compute_dh_key(struct sk_cred *skc, const gss_buffer_desc *pub_key)
+{
+ size_t expected_len;
+ uint32_t rc;
+
+ rc = __sk_compute_dh_key(skc, pub_key, &expected_len);
+ if (rc != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (skc->sc_dh_shared_key.length < expected_len) {
/* there is around 1 chance out of 256 that the returned
* shared key is shorter than expected
*/
- if (status >= dh_shared->length - 2) {
- int shift = dh_shared->length - status;
+ if (skc->sc_dh_shared_key.length >= expected_len - 2) {
+ int shift = expected_len - skc->sc_dh_shared_key.length;
+
/* if the key is short by only 1 or 2 bytes, just
* prepend it with 0s
*/
- memmove((void *)(dh_shared->value + shift),
- dh_shared->value, status);
- memset(dh_shared->value, 0, shift);
+ memmove((void *)(skc->sc_dh_shared_key.value + shift),
+ skc->sc_dh_shared_key.value,
+ skc->sc_dh_shared_key.length);
+ memset(skc->sc_dh_shared_key.value, 0, shift);
} else {
/* if the key is really too short, return GSS_S_BAD_QOP
* so that the caller can retry to generate
*/
- printerr(0, "DH_compute_key() returned a short key of %d bytes, expected: %zu\n",
- status, dh_shared->length);
+ printerr(0,
+ "DH derivation returned a short key of %zu bytes, expected: %zu\n",
+ skc->sc_dh_shared_key.length, expected_len);
rc = GSS_S_BAD_QOP;
- goto out_err;
}
}
-
- rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-
-out_err:
- BN_free(remote_pub_key);
return rc;
}
#include <keyutils.h>
#endif
#include <linux/lustre/lustre_idl.h>
-/* We need to use some deprecated APIs */
-#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <libcfs/libcfs_crypto.h>
if (priv_key != NULL)
*priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
+
+static inline const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh)
+{
+ return dh->p;
+}
#endif
/* Some limits and defaults */
gss_buffer_desc skc_session_key;
};
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
+#define DECLARE_EVP_MD(name, hash) \
+ OSSL_PARAM name[] = { \
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, \
+ (char *)EVP_MD_get0_name(hash), \
+ 0), \
+ OSSL_PARAM_END \
+ }
+#else /* !HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY */
+#define EVP_PKEY DH
+#define EVP_PKEY_free(dh) DH_free(dh)
+struct dh_ssk_ctx { uint32_t bits; uint32_t gen; };
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX struct dh_ssk_ctx
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(p1, name, p2) malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY_CTX))
+#define EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(ctx) 1
+#undef EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len) ((ctx)->bits = len)
+#undef EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(ctx, g) ((ctx)->gen = g)
+#define EVP_PKEY_paramgen(ctx, dhp) \
+ ((*dhp = DH_new()) && \
+ DH_generate_parameters_ex(*(dhp), (ctx)->bits, (ctx)->gen, NULL))
+#define EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(dh, param, bnp) (*bnp = (BIGNUM *)DH_get0_p(dh))
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx) free(ctx)
+#define DECLARE_EVP_MD(name, hash) \
+ const EVP_MD *name = hash
+#define EVP_MAC_CTX HMAC_CTX
+#define EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac) HMAC_CTX_new()
+#define EVP_MAC_CTX_free HMAC_CTX_free
+#define EVP_MAC void
+#define EVP_MAC_fetch(a, b, c) (void *)1
+#define EVP_MAC_init(ctx, val, len, alg) HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, val, len, alg, NULL)
+#define EVP_MAC_update HMAC_Update
+#define EVP_MAC_final(ctx, val, lenp, hlen) \
+ HMAC_Final(ctx, val, (unsigned int *)(lenp))
+#define EVP_MAC_free(mac) {}
+#endif
+
/* Structure used in context initiation to hold all necessary data */
struct sk_cred {
uint32_t sc_flags;
gss_buffer_desc sc_hmac;
gss_buffer_desc sc_dh_shared_key;
struct sk_kernel_ctx sc_kctx;
- DH *sc_params;
+ EVP_PKEY *sc_params;
};
/* Names match up with openssl enc and dgst commands */
const gss_buffer_desc *current_hash);
struct sk_cred *sk_create_cred(const char *fsname, const char *cluster,
const uint32_t flags);
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_PKEY
int sk_speedtest_dh_valid(unsigned int usec_check_max);
+#endif
uint32_t sk_gen_params(struct sk_cred *skc, int num_rounds);
int sk_sign_bufs(gss_buffer_desc *key, gss_buffer_desc *bufs, const int numbufs,
const EVP_MD *hash_alg, gss_buffer_desc *hmac);
git://git.whamcloud.com / fs / lustre-release.git / commitdiff