X-Git-Url: https://git.whamcloud.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lustre%2Fptlrpc%2Fgss%2Fgss_krb5_mech.c;h=5bd9f08e54b84dd9b5409802dfd52246eeb29c20;hb=495778754c1e8935ecd9c308e23f9797165863c5;hp=a9a5388da38e791c3cd609619535f2c92df107c1;hpb=9edebe083264464d2692da446f68483e3e45a80d;p=fs%2Flustre-release.git diff --git a/lustre/ptlrpc/gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/lustre/ptlrpc/gss/gss_krb5_mech.c index a9a5388..5bd9f08 100644 --- a/lustre/ptlrpc/gss/gss_krb5_mech.c +++ b/lustre/ptlrpc/gss/gss_krb5_mech.c @@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) } static -void buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, char *ptr, int len) +void buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, void *ptr, int len) { sg->page = virt_to_page(ptr); sg->offset = offset_in_page(ptr); @@ -582,13 +582,15 @@ out: return(ret); } +#ifdef HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER + static inline int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, rawobj_t *key, struct krb5_header *khdr, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, + int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *cksum) -#ifdef HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER { struct hash_desc desc; struct scatterlist sg[1]; @@ -607,6 +609,15 @@ int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len); } + for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) { + if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0) + continue; + sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page; + sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset; + sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len; + ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len); + } + if (khdr) { buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr)); ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr)); @@ -614,7 +625,16 @@ int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, return ll_crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data); } -#else /* HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */ + +#else /* ! HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */ + +static inline +int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, + rawobj_t *key, + struct krb5_header *khdr, + int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, + int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs, + rawobj_t *cksum) { struct scatterlist sg[1]; __u32 keylen = key->len, i; @@ -628,6 +648,15 @@ int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1); } + for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) { + if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0) + continue; + sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page; + sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset; + sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len; + crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1); + } + if (khdr) { buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr)); crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1); @@ -636,6 +665,7 @@ int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, crypto_hmac_final(tfm, key->data, &keylen, cksum->data); return 0; } + #endif /* HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */ static inline @@ -643,6 +673,7 @@ int krb5_digest_norm(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, struct krb5_keyblock *kb, struct krb5_header *khdr, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, + int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *cksum) { struct hash_desc desc; @@ -662,6 +693,15 @@ int krb5_digest_norm(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm, ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len); } + for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) { + if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0) + continue; + sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page; + sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset; + sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len; + ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len); + } + if (khdr) { buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr)); ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr)); @@ -682,6 +722,7 @@ __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype, struct krb5_keyblock *kb, struct krb5_header *khdr, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, + int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *cksum) { struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype]; @@ -703,10 +744,10 @@ __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype, if (ke->ke_hash_hmac) rc = krb5_digest_hmac(tfm, &kb->kb_key, - khdr, msgcnt, msgs, cksum); + khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum); else rc = krb5_digest_norm(tfm, kb, - khdr, msgcnt, msgs, cksum); + khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum); if (rc == 0) code = GSS_S_COMPLETE; @@ -715,38 +756,96 @@ out_tfm: return code; } +static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, + struct krb5_header *khdr, + int privacy) +{ + unsigned char acceptor_flag; + + acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR; + + if (privacy) { + khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG); + khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL; + khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0); + khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0); + } else { + khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG); + khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag; + khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff); + khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff); + } + + khdr->kh_filler = 0xff; + spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); + khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++); + spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); +} + +static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, + struct krb5_header *khdr, + int privacy) +{ + unsigned char acceptor_flag; + __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc; + + acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0; + + if (privacy) { + tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG; + ec_rrc = 0x0; + } else { + tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG; + ec_rrc = 0xffff; + } + + /* sanity checks */ + if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) { + CERROR("bad token id\n"); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) { + CERROR("bad direction flag\n"); + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + } + if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) { + CERROR("missing confidential flag\n"); + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + } + if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) { + CERROR("bad filler\n"); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc || + be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) { + CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n"); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + static __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, + int iovcnt, + lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *token) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; - unsigned char acceptor_flag; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; - __u32 rc = GSS_S_FAILURE; - - acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR; /* fill krb5 header */ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr)); khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data; - - khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG); - khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag; - khdr->kh_filler = 0xff; - khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff); - khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff); - spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); - khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++); - spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); + fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0); /* checksum */ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, - khdr, msgcnt, msgs, &cksum)) - goto out_err; + khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size); @@ -754,26 +853,23 @@ __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, ke->ke_hash_size); token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size; - rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE; -out_err: rawobj_free(&cksum); - return rc; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs, + int iovcnt, + lnet_kiov_t *iovs, rawobj_t *token) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; - unsigned char acceptor_flag; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; - __u32 rc = GSS_S_FAILURE; - - acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0; + __u32 major; if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) { CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len); @@ -782,47 +878,34 @@ __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data; - /* sanity checks */ - if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != KG_TOK_MIC_MSG) { - CERROR("bad token id\n"); - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - } - if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) { - CERROR("bad direction flag\n"); - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - } - if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) { - CERROR("bad filler\n"); - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - } - if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != 0xffff || - be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != 0xffff) { - CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n"); - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0); + if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + CERROR("bad krb5 header\n"); + return major; } if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) { CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n", token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size); - goto out; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; } if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, - khdr, msgcnt, msgs, &cksum)) + khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) { + CERROR("failed to make checksum\n"); return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size)) { CERROR("checksum mismatch\n"); - rc = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - goto out; + rawobj_free(&cksum); + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; } - rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE; -out: rawobj_free(&cksum); - return rc; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static @@ -901,6 +984,235 @@ int krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm, RETURN(0); } +/* + * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size. + */ +static +int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm, + struct krb5_header *khdr, + char *confounder, + struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, + rawobj_t *cipher, + int adj_nob) +{ + struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc; + __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; + struct scatterlist src, dst; + int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0; + + LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count); + LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov); + + blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm); + LASSERT(blocksize > 1); + LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr)); + + ciph_desc.tfm = tfm; + ciph_desc.info = local_iv; + ciph_desc.flags = 0; + + /* encrypt confounder */ + buf_to_sg(&src, confounder, blocksize); + buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data, blocksize); + + rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize); + if (rc) { + CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + + /* encrypt clear pages */ + for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) { + src.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page; + src.offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset; + src.length = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len + blocksize - 1) & + (~(blocksize - 1)); + + if (adj_nob) + nob += src.length; + + dst.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page; + dst.offset = src.offset; + dst.length = src.length; + + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = dst.offset; + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = dst.length; + + rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, + src.length); + if (rc) { + CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + } + + /* encrypt krb5 header */ + buf_to_sg(&src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr)); + buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr)); + + rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, + &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr)); + if (rc) { + CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + + if (adj_nob) + desc->bd_nob = nob; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received. + * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be. + * + * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual + * plain text size. + * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so + * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might + * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len. + * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size + * data in a page which is not the last one. + * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected, + * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all. + * and bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len should be round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which + * should have been done by prep_bulk(). + */ +static +int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm, + struct krb5_header *khdr, + struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, + rawobj_t *cipher, + rawobj_t *plain, + int adj_nob) +{ + struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc; + __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; + struct scatterlist src, dst; + int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0; + int blocksize, i, rc; + + LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count); + LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov); + LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred); + + blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm); + LASSERT(blocksize > 1); + LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr)); + + ciph_desc.tfm = tfm; + ciph_desc.info = local_iv; + ciph_desc.flags = 0; + + if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) { + CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred); + return -EPROTO; + } + + /* decrypt head (confounder) */ + buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data, blocksize); + buf_to_sg(&dst, plain->data, blocksize); + + rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize); + if (rc) { + CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + + for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred; + i++) { + if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 || + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) { + CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n", + i, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset, + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len, blocksize); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (adj_nob) { + if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len > + desc->bd_nob_transferred) + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = + desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob; + + desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len; + if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >desc->bd_nob) + desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob -pt_nob; + } else { + /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */ + LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len <= + desc->bd_nob_transferred); + LASSERT(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len <= + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len); + } + + if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0) + continue; + + src.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page; + src.offset = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset; + src.length = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len; + + dst = src; + if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize == 0) + dst.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page; + + rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, + src.length); + if (rc) { + CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + + if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) { + memcpy(cfs_page_address(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page) + + desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset, + cfs_page_address(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page) + + desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset, + desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len); + } + + ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len; + pt_nob += desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len; + } + + if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) { + CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n", + desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) { + CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n", + desc->bd_nob, pt_nob); + return -EFAULT; + } + + /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */ + if (adj_nob) + while (i < desc->bd_iov_count) + desc->bd_iov[i++].kiov_len = 0; + + /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */ + buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr)); + buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr)); + + rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, + &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr)); + if (rc) { + CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + + if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) { + CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; +} + static __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, rawobj_t *gsshdr, @@ -911,12 +1223,11 @@ __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; - unsigned char acceptor_flag; int blocksize; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; - rawobj_t data_desc[4], cipher; + rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher; __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK]; - int enc_rc = 0; + int rc = 0; LASSERT(ke); LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK); @@ -934,16 +1245,7 @@ __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, /* fill krb5 header */ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr)); khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data; - acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR; - - khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG); - khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL; - khdr->kh_filler = 0xff; - khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0); - khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0); - spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); - khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++); - spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); + fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); /* generate confounder */ get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size); @@ -975,12 +1277,10 @@ __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len; data_desc[2].data = msg->data; data_desc[2].len = msg->len; - data_desc[3].data = (__u8 *) khdr; - data_desc[3].len = sizeof(*khdr); /* compute checksum */ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, - khdr, 4, data_desc, &cksum)) + khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); @@ -1007,26 +1307,26 @@ __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct ll_crypto_cipher *arc4_tfm; if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi, - NULL, 1, &cksum, &arc4_keye)) { + NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) { CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n"); - GOTO(arc4_out, enc_rc = -EACCES); + GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES); } arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0); if (arc4_tfm == NULL) { CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n"); - GOTO(arc4_out_key, enc_rc = -EACCES); + GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES); } if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) { CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n", arc4_keye.len); - GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, enc_rc = -EACCES); + GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES); } - enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1, - 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1); + rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1, + 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1); arc4_out_tfm: ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm); arc4_out_key: @@ -1034,11 +1334,155 @@ arc4_out_key: arc4_out: do {} while(0); /* just to avoid compile warning */ } else { - enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0, - 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1); + rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0, + 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1); + } + + if (rc != 0) { + rawobj_free(&cksum); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + /* fill in checksum */ + LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size); + memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len, + cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, + ke->ke_hash_size); + rawobj_free(&cksum); + + /* final token length */ + token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static +__u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, + struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; + int blocksize, i; + + LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count); + LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov); + LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); + + blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); + + for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) { + LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page); + /* + * offset should always start at page boundary of either + * client or server side. + */ + if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset & blocksize) { + CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n", + desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset, i); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset; + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len + + blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1)); + } + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static +__u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, + struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, + rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; + struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; + struct krb5_header *khdr; + int blocksize; + rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; + rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher; + __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK]; + int rc = 0; + + LASSERT(ke); + LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK); + + /* + * final token format: + * -------------------------------------------------- + * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum | + * -------------------------------------------------- + */ + + /* fill krb5 header */ + LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr)); + khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data; + fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); + + /* generate confounder */ + get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size); + + /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with + * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */ + if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { + LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL); + blocksize = 1; + } else { + LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); + blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); + } + + /* + * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize. + * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) + + * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize) + */ + LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size); + LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0); + LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16); + + /* + * clear text layout for checksum: + * ------------------------------------------ + * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header | + * ------------------------------------------ + */ + data_desc[0].data = conf; + data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size; + + /* compute checksum */ + if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, + khdr, 1, data_desc, + desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov, + &cksum)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); + + /* + * clear text layout for encryption: + * ------------------------------------------ + * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header | + * ------------------------------------------ + * | | | + * ---------- (cipher pages) | + * result token: | | + * ------------------------------------------- + * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text | + * ------------------------------------------- + */ + data_desc[0].data = conf; + data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size; + + cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1); + cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr); + + if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { + LBUG(); + rc = 0; + } else { + rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr, + conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob); } - if (enc_rc != 0) { + if (rc != 0) { rawobj_free(&cksum); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } @@ -1064,18 +1508,16 @@ __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; struct krb5_header *khdr; - unsigned char acceptor_flag; unsigned char *tmpbuf; int blocksize, bodysize; rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out; rawobj_t hash_objs[3]; - __u32 rc = GSS_S_FAILURE, enc_rc = 0; + int rc = 0; + __u32 major; LASSERT(ke); - acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0; - if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) { CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; @@ -1083,27 +1525,10 @@ __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data; - /* sanity check header */ - if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) { - CERROR("bad token id\n"); - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - } - if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) { - CERROR("bad direction flag\n"); - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - } - if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) { - CERROR("missing confidential flag\n"); - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - } - if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) { - CERROR("bad filler\n"); - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - } - if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != 0x0 || - be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != 0x0) { - CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n"); - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); + if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + CERROR("bad krb5 header\n"); + return major; } /* block size */ @@ -1143,6 +1568,8 @@ __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, if (!tmpbuf) return GSS_S_FAILURE; + major = GSS_S_FAILURE; + cipher_in.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1); cipher_in.len = bodysize; plain_out.data = tmpbuf; @@ -1156,26 +1583,26 @@ __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size; if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi, - NULL, 1, &cksum, &arc4_keye)) { + NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) { CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n"); - GOTO(arc4_out, enc_rc = -EACCES); + GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES); } arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0); if (arc4_tfm == NULL) { CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n"); - GOTO(arc4_out_key, enc_rc = -EACCES); + GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES); } if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) { CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n", arc4_keye.len); - GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, enc_rc = -EACCES); + GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES); } - enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1, - 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0); + rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1, + 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0); arc4_out_tfm: ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm); arc4_out_key: @@ -1183,11 +1610,11 @@ arc4_out_key: arc4_out: cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; } else { - enc_rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0, - 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0); + rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0, + 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0); } - if (enc_rc != 0) { + if (rc != 0) { CERROR("error decrypt\n"); goto out_free; } @@ -1215,46 +1642,119 @@ arc4_out: hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data; hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len; hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data; - hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size; + hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr); hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size; if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, - khdr, 3, hash_objs, &cksum)) + khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum)) goto out_free; LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, ke->ke_hash_size)) { - CERROR("cksum mismatch\n"); + CERROR("checksum mismatch\n"); goto out_free; } msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr); memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len); - rc = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; out_free: OBD_FREE(tmpbuf, bodysize); rawobj_free(&cksum); - return rc; + return major; } static -__u32 gss_plain_encrypt_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, - int decrypt, - int length, - void *in_buf, - void *out_buf) +__u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, + struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc, + rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob) { - struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id; - __u32 rc; + struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; + struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype]; + struct krb5_header *khdr; + int blocksize; + rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY; + rawobj_t cipher, plain; + rawobj_t data_desc[1]; + int rc; + __u32 major; + + LASSERT(ke); + + if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) { + CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + + khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data; - rc = krb5_encrypt(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, decrypt, - NULL, in_buf, out_buf, length); + major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1); + if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + CERROR("bad krb5 header\n"); + return major; + } + + /* block size */ + if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { + LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL); + blocksize = 1; + LBUG(); + } else { + LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); + blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm); + } + LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0); + + /* + * token format is expected as: + * ----------------------------------------------- + * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum | + * ----------------------------------------------- + */ + if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + + ke->ke_hash_size) { + CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + + cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1); + cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr); + plain.data = cipher.data; + plain.len = cipher.len; + + rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr, + desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob); if (rc) - CERROR("plain encrypt error: %d\n", rc); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + /* + * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout: + * ------------------------------------------ + * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header | + * ------------------------------------------ + */ + data_desc[0].data = plain.data; + data_desc[0].len = blocksize; + + if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi, + khdr, 1, data_desc, + desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov, + &cksum)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size); + + if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr), + cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size, + ke->ke_hash_size)) { + CERROR("checksum mismatch\n"); + rawobj_free(&cksum); + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + } - return rc; + rawobj_free(&cksum); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, @@ -1277,7 +1777,9 @@ static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = { .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos, .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos, .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos, - .gss_plain_encrypt = gss_plain_encrypt_kerberos, + .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos, + .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos, + .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos, .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos, .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos, };