#define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <obd.h>
#include <obd_class.h>
#include <obd_support.h>
-#include <lustre/lustre_idl.h>
#include <lustre_net.h>
#include <lustre_import.h>
#include <lustre_sec.h>
#include "gss_krb5.h"
#include "gss_crypto.h"
-static spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(krb5_seq_lock);
struct krb5_enctype {
char *ke_dispname;
.ke_hash_size = 16,
.ke_conf_size = 8,
},
+#ifdef HAVE_DES3_SUPPORT
[ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
.ke_dispname = "des3-hmac-sha1",
.ke_enc_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
- .ke_hash_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
.ke_hash_size = 20,
.ke_conf_size = 8,
.ke_hash_hmac = 1,
},
+#endif
[ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
.ke_dispname = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
.ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
- .ke_hash_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
.ke_hash_size = 12,
.ke_conf_size = 16,
.ke_hash_hmac = 1,
[ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
.ke_dispname = "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
.ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
- .ke_hash_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
.ke_hash_size = 12,
.ke_conf_size = 16,
.ke_hash_hmac = 1,
[ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
.ke_dispname = "arcfour-hmac-md5",
.ke_enc_name = "ecb(arc4)",
- .ke_hash_name = "hmac(md5)",
+ .ke_hash_name = "md5",
.ke_hash_size = 16,
.ke_conf_size = 8,
.ke_hash_hmac = 1,
}
};
-#define MAX_ENCTYPES sizeof(enctypes)/sizeof(struct krb5_enctype)
-
static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
{
- if (enctype < MAX_ENCTYPES && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
- return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
+ if (enctype < ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
+ return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
- return "unknown";
+ return "unknown";
}
static
int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
{
- struct krb5_enctype *ke;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke;
- if (kctx->kc_enctype >= MAX_ENCTYPES ||
- enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
- CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype >= ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) ||
+ enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
+ CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
+ return -1;
+ }
ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
goto out_err;
- /* end time */
- if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
+ /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
+ * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
+ * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
+ *
+ * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
+ */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
goto out_err;
/* seq send */
{
unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
- /* end time */
- if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
+ /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
+ * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
+ * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
+ *
+ * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
+ */
+ if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
goto out_err;
/* flags */
static
__u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
- unsigned long *endtime)
+ time64_t *endtime)
{
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
- *endtime = (unsigned long)((__u32) kctx->kc_endtime);
+ *endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
struct gss_keyblock *kb,
struct krb5_header *khdr,
int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
- int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
- rawobj_t *cksum)
+ int iovcnt, struct bio_vec *iovs,
+ rawobj_t *cksum,
+ digest_hash hash_func)
{
- struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
- struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
- rawobj_t hdr;
- __u32 code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
- int rc;
-
- tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(ke->ke_hash_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
- CERROR("failed to alloc TFM: %s\n", ke->ke_hash_name);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
+ struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
+ enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg hash_algo;
+ rawobj_t hdr;
+ int rc;
+
+ hash_algo = cfs_crypto_hash_alg(ke->ke_hash_name);
+
+ /* For the cbc(des) case we want md5 instead of hmac(md5) */
+ if (strcmp(ke->ke_enc_name, "cbc(des)"))
+ req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, kb->kb_key.data,
+ kb->kb_key.len);
+ else
+ req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, NULL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(req)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(req);
+ CERROR("failed to alloc hash %s : rc = %d\n",
+ ke->ke_hash_name, rc);
+ goto out_no_hash;
+ }
- cksum->len = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
- OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
- if (!cksum->data) {
- cksum->len = 0;
- goto out_tfm;
- }
+ cksum->len = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_algo);
+ OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
+ if (!cksum->data) {
+ cksum->len = 0;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_hash;
+ }
hdr.data = (__u8 *)khdr;
hdr.len = sizeof(*khdr);
- if (ke->ke_hash_hmac)
- rc = gss_digest_hmac(tfm, &kb->kb_key,
- &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
- else
- rc = gss_digest_norm(tfm, kb,
- &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
+ if (!hash_func) {
+ rc = -EPROTO;
+ CERROR("hash function for %s undefined\n",
+ ke->ke_hash_name);
+ goto out_free_hash;
+ }
+ rc = hash_func(req, &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_hash;
+
+ if (!ke->ke_hash_hmac) {
+ LASSERT(kb->kb_tfm);
+
+ cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
+ rc = gss_crypt_generic(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL,
+ cksum->data, cksum->data,
+ cksum->len);
+ goto out_no_hash;
+ }
- if (rc == 0)
- code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-out_tfm:
- crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
- return code;
+out_free_hash:
+ if (req)
+ cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
+out_no_hash:
+ return rc ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
static
__u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
- int msgcnt,
- rawobj_t *msgs,
- int iovcnt,
- lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
- rawobj_t *token)
+ int msgcnt,
+ rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt,
+ struct bio_vec *iovs,
+ rawobj_t *token)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
- struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
- struct krb5_header *khdr;
- rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ u32 major;
- /* fill krb5 header */
- LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
+ /* fill krb5 header */
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
- fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
-
- /* checksum */
- if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
- khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
- LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
- LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
- memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
- ke->ke_hash_size);
+ /* checksum */
+ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, khdr,
+ msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
+ gctx->hash_func))
+ GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
- token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
+ memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size);
+
+ token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+out_free_cksum:
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return major;
}
static
__u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
- int msgcnt,
- rawobj_t *msgs,
- int iovcnt,
- lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
- rawobj_t *token)
+ int msgcnt,
+ rawobj_t *msgs,
+ int iovcnt,
+ struct bio_vec *iovs,
+ rawobj_t *token)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
- struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
- struct krb5_header *khdr;
- rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- __u32 major;
-
- if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
- CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ u32 major;
+
+ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
+ CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
- major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
- if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
- return major;
- }
-
- if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
- CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
- token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
- khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) {
- CERROR("failed to make checksum\n");
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
+ CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
+ token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
+ GOTO(out, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
+ }
- LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
- if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
- ke->ke_hash_size)) {
- CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- }
+ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
+ khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
+ gctx->hash_func))
+ GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
+ if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size)) {
+ CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
+ GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_BAD_SIG);
+ }
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+out_free_cksum:
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+out:
+ return major;
}
/*
* if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
*/
static
-int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
- struct krb5_header *khdr,
- char *confounder,
- struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
- rawobj_t *cipher,
- int adj_nob)
+int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+ struct krb5_header *khdr,
+ char *confounder,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *cipher,
+ int adj_nob)
{
- struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
- __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
- struct scatterlist src, dst;
- struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
- int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
+ __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
+ int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
- LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
- LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
- LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
-
- blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
- LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
- LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
- ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
- ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
- ciph_desc.flags = 0;
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
+ LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
- /* encrypt confounder */
+ /* encrypt confounder */
rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, confounder, blocksize);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
return rc;
}
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
+ blocksize, local_iv);
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl,
- sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
- if (rc) {
- CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
- return rc;
- }
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return rc;
+ }
- /* encrypt clear pages */
- for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
+ /* encrypt clear pages */
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
sg_init_table(&src, 1);
- sg_set_page(&src, BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
- (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len +
+ sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page,
+ (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len +
blocksize - 1) &
(~(blocksize - 1)),
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset);
if (adj_nob)
nob += src.length;
sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
- sg_set_page(&dst, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
+ sg_set_page(&dst, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page,
src.length, src.offset);
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset = dst.offset;
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len = dst.length;
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset = dst.offset;
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len = dst.length;
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
- src.length);
- if (rc) {
- CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
- return rc;
- }
- }
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst,
+ src.length, local_iv);
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, &dst, &src, src.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
- /* encrypt krb5 header */
+ /* encrypt krb5 header */
rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
- if (rc != 0)
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
return rc;
+ }
rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
sizeof(*khdr));
if (rc != 0) {
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
return rc;
}
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
- sizeof(*khdr));
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
+ sizeof(*khdr), local_iv);
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
+ sizeof(*khdr));
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
* desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
* desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
*
- * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
+ * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's bv_len to the actual
* plain text size.
* - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
- * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
+ * bd_iov[]->bv_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
* be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to
- * bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len.
+ * bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->bv_len.
* this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
* data in a page which is not the last one.
* - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
- * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
- * and bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len should be
- * round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
+ * thus bv_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
+ * and bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->bv_len should be
+ * round_up(bd_iov[]->bv_len) which
* should have been done by prep_bulk().
*/
static
-int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
- struct krb5_header *khdr,
- struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
- rawobj_t *cipher,
- rawobj_t *plain,
- int adj_nob)
+int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+ struct krb5_header *khdr,
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *cipher,
+ rawobj_t *plain,
+ int adj_nob)
{
- struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
- __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
- struct scatterlist src, dst;
- struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
- int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
- int blocksize, i, rc;
-
- LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
- LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
- LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
- LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
-
- blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
- LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
- LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
-
- ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
- ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
- ciph_desc.flags = 0;
-
- if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
- CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
- return -EPROTO;
- }
+ __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
+ int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
+ int blocksize, i, rc;
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
+
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
+ LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
- /* decrypt head (confounder) */
+ if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
+ CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
+ return -EPROTO;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt head (confounder) */
rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data, blocksize);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
return rc;
}
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl,
- sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
+ blocksize, local_iv);
+
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
- if (rc) {
- CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
- return rc;
- }
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return rc;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
i++) {
- if (BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset % blocksize
- != 0 ||
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize
- != 0) {
+ if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize != 0) {
CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
- i, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len,
+ i, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset,
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len,
blocksize);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (adj_nob) {
- if (ct_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len >
+ if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len >
desc->bd_nob_transferred)
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len =
desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
- if (pt_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len >
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len =
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len;
+ if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len >
desc->bd_nob)
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len =
desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
} else {
/* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
- LASSERT(ct_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).
- kiov_len <=
+ LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].
+ bv_len <=
desc->bd_nob_transferred);
- LASSERT(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len <=
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len <=
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len);
}
- if (BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len == 0)
+ if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len == 0)
continue;
sg_init_table(&src, 1);
- sg_set_page(&src, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len,
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
+ sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page,
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len,
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset);
dst = src;
- if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
+ if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize == 0)
sg_assign_page(&dst,
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page);
-
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
- src.length);
- if (rc) {
- CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
- return rc;
- }
-
- if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
- memcpy(page_address(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page) +
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
- page_address(BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).
- kiov_page) +
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len);
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
+ src.length, local_iv);
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_decrypt_iv(req, &dst, &src, src.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize != 0) {
+ memcpy(page_address(desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page) +
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset,
+ page_address(desc->bd_enc_vec[i].
+ bv_page) +
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset,
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len);
}
- ct_nob += BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
- pt_nob += BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
+ ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len;
+ pt_nob += desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len;
}
- if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
- CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
- desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
+ if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
+ CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
+ desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
- if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
- CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
- desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
+ if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
+ CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
+ desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
/* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
if (adj_nob)
while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i++).kiov_len = 0;
+ desc->bd_vec[i++].bv_len = 0;
- /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
+ /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data + blocksize,
sizeof(*khdr));
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
}
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
- sizeof(*khdr));
-
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
+ src.length, local_iv);
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_decrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
+ sizeof(*khdr));
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
- if (rc) {
- CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
- return rc;
- }
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ if (rc) {
+ CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
- if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
- CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
- return -EACCES;
- }
+ if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
+ CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
- return 0;
+ return 0;
}
static
__u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
- rawobj_t *gsshdr,
- rawobj_t *msg,
- int msg_buflen,
- rawobj_t *token)
+ rawobj_t *gsshdr,
+ rawobj_t *msg,
+ int msg_buflen,
+ rawobj_t *token)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
- struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
- struct krb5_header *khdr;
- int blocksize;
- rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
- __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ int blocksize;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
+ __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
__u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
- int rc = 0;
-
- LASSERT(ke);
- LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
- ke->ke_conf_size >=
- crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
-
- /*
- * final token format:
- * ---------------------------------------------------
- * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
- * ---------------------------------------------------
- */
-
- /* fill krb5 header */
- LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
+ u32 major;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ LASSERT(ke);
+ LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
+ ke->ke_conf_size >=
+ crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
+
+ /*
+ * final token format:
+ * ---------------------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
+ * ---------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+ /* fill krb5 header */
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
- fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
+ fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
- /* generate confounder */
- cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
+ /* generate confounder */
+ get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
- /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
- * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
- if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
- blocksize = 1;
- } else {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- }
- LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
+ /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
+ * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
+ blocksize = 1;
+ } else {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(
+ kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ }
+ LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
/* padding the message */
if (gss_add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- /*
- * clear text layout for checksum:
- * ------------------------------------------------------
- * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
- * ------------------------------------------------------
- */
- data_desc[0].data = conf;
- data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
- data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
- data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
- data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
- data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
-
- /* compute checksum */
- if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
-
- /*
- * clear text layout for encryption:
- * -----------------------------------------
- * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
- * -----------------------------------------
- */
- data_desc[0].data = conf;
- data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
- data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
- data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
- data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
- data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
-
- /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
+ /*
+ * clear text layout for checksum:
+ * ------------------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = conf;
+ data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
+ data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
+ data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
+ data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
+ data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
+
+ /* compute checksum */
+ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
+ khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum,
+ gctx->hash_func))
+ GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
+ LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
+
+ /*
+ * clear text layout for encryption:
+ * -----------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
+ * -----------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = conf;
+ data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
+ data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
+ data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
+ data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
+ data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
+
+ /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
- cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
- LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
+ cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
+ LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
- rawobj_t arc4_keye;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
+ rawobj_t arc4_keye = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *arc4_tfm;
if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
+ NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
+ gctx->hash_func)) {
CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
- GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
+ GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
}
- arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
+ arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
}
- if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
- arc4_keye.len)) {
- CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
- arc4_keye.len);
- GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
- }
+ if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
+ arc4_keye.len)) {
+ CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
+ arc4_keye.len);
+ GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
+ }
rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 3, data_desc,
&cipher, 1);
arc4_out_tfm:
- crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(arc4_tfm);
arc4_out_key:
- rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
-arc4_out:
- do {} while(0); /* just to avoid compile warning */
- } else {
+ rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
+ } else {
rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 3,
data_desc, &cipher, 1);
- }
-
- if (rc != 0) {
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
-
- /* fill in checksum */
- LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
- memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
- cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
- ke->ke_hash_size);
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ }
- /* final token length */
- token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ if (rc)
+ GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
+
+ /* fill in checksum */
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
+ memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
+ cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size);
+
+ /* final token length */
+ token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+out_free_cksum:
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return major;
}
static
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
int blocksize, i;
- LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
- LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
- LASSERT(BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page);
+ LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page);
/*
* offset should always start at page boundary of either
* client or server side.
*/
- if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset & blocksize) {
+ if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset & blocksize) {
CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset, i);
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset, i);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset =
- BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset;
- BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
- (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len +
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset =
+ desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset;
+ desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len =
+ (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len +
blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
}
static
__u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
- struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
- rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
- struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
- struct krb5_header *khdr;
- int blocksize;
- rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
- __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
- int rc = 0;
-
- LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
- LASSERT(ke);
- LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
-
- /*
- * final token format:
- * --------------------------------------------------
- * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
- * --------------------------------------------------
- */
-
- /* fill krb5 header */
- LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ int blocksz;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
+ __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 major;
+
+ LASSERT(ke);
+ LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
+
+ /*
+ * final token format:
+ * --------------------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
+ * --------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+ /* fill krb5 header */
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
- fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
+ fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
- /* generate confounder */
- cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
+ /* generate confounder */
+ get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
- /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
- * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
- if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
- blocksize = 1;
- } else {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- }
+ /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
+ * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
+ blocksz = 1;
+ } else {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ }
- /*
- * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
- * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
- * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
- */
- LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
- LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
- LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
-
- /*
- * clear text layout for checksum:
- * ------------------------------------------
- * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
- * ------------------------------------------
- */
- data_desc[0].data = conf;
- data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
+ /*
+ * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
+ * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
+ * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
+ */
+ LASSERT(blocksz <= ke->ke_conf_size);
+ LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksz && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksz == 0);
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
+
+ /*
+ * clear text layout for checksum:
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = conf;
+ data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
/* compute checksum */
if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
khdr, 1, data_desc,
- desc->bd_iov_count, GET_KIOV(desc),
- &cksum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_vec,
+ &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
+ GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
- /*
- * clear text layout for encryption:
- * ------------------------------------------
- * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
- * ------------------------------------------
- * | | |
- * ---------- (cipher pages) |
- * result token: | |
- * -------------------------------------------
- * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
- * -------------------------------------------
- */
- data_desc[0].data = conf;
- data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
+ /*
+ * clear text layout for encryption:
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | | |
+ * ---------- (cipher pages) |
+ * result token: | |
+ * -------------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
+ * -------------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = conf;
+ data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
- cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
-
- if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
- LBUG();
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
- conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
- }
+ cipher.len = blocksz + sizeof(*khdr);
- if (rc != 0) {
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
-
- /* fill in checksum */
- LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
- memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
- cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
- ke->ke_hash_size);
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
-
- /* final token length */
- token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LBUG();
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
+ conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
+
+ /* fill in checksum */
+ LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
+ memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
+ cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size);
+
+ /* final token length */
+ token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+out_free_cksum:
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return major;
}
static
__u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
- rawobj_t *gsshdr,
- rawobj_t *token,
- rawobj_t *msg)
+ rawobj_t *gsshdr,
+ rawobj_t *token,
+ rawobj_t *msg)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
- struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
- struct krb5_header *khdr;
- unsigned char *tmpbuf;
- int blocksize, bodysize;
- rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
- rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
- int rc = 0;
- __u32 major;
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ unsigned char *tmpbuf;
+ int blocksz, bodysize;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
+ rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
+ int rc = 0;
+ __u32 major;
__u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
- LASSERT(ke);
+ LASSERT(ke);
- if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
- CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
+ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
+ CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
- major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
- if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
- return major;
- }
+ major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
+ return major;
+ }
- /* block size */
- if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
- blocksize = 1;
- } else {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- }
+ /* block size */
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
+ blocksz = 1;
+ } else {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ }
- /* expected token layout:
- * ----------------------------------------
- * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
- * ----------------------------------------
- */
- bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
+ /* expected token layout:
+ * ----------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
+ * ----------------------------------------
+ */
+ bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
- if (bodysize % blocksize) {
- CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
+ if (bodysize % blocksz) {
+ CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
- if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
- CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
+ if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
+ CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
- if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
- CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
- msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
+ CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
+ msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
- /* decrypting */
- OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
- if (!tmpbuf)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ /* decrypting */
+ OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
+ if (!tmpbuf)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
cipher_in.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
- cipher_in.len = bodysize;
- plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
- plain_out.len = bodysize;
+ cipher_in.len = bodysize;
+ plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
+ plain_out.len = bodysize;
if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
rawobj_t arc4_keye;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *arc4_tfm;
cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
+ NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
+ gctx->hash_func)) {
CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
}
- arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
+ arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
}
- if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
- arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
- CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
- arc4_keye.len);
- GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
- }
+ if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
+ arc4_keye.len)) {
+ CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
+ arc4_keye.len);
+ GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
+ }
rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 1, &cipher_in,
&plain_out, 0);
arc4_out_tfm:
- crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(arc4_tfm);
arc4_out_key:
- rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
+ rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
arc4_out:
- cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- } else {
+ cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ } else {
rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 1,
&cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
- }
+ }
- if (rc != 0) {
- CERROR("error decrypt\n");
- goto out_free;
- }
- LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
-
- /* expected clear text layout:
- * -----------------------------------------
- * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
- * -----------------------------------------
- */
-
- /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
- if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
- sizeof(*khdr))) {
- CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ CERROR("error decrypt\n");
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
- /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
- * ------------------------------------------------------
- * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
- * ------------------------------------------------------
- */
- hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
- hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
- hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
- hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
- hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
- hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
- if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
- khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum))
- goto out_free;
-
- LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
- if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
- cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
- ke->ke_hash_size)) {
- CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
- goto out_free;
- }
+ /* expected clear text layout:
+ * -----------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
+ * -----------------------------------------
+ */
+
+ /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
+ if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
+ sizeof(*khdr))) {
+ CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
+ * ------------------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
+ hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
+ hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
+ hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
+ hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
+ hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
+ if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
+ khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum,
+ gctx->hash_func))
+ goto out_free;
+
+ LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
+ if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
+ cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size)) {
+ CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
+ goto out_free;
+ }
- msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
- memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
+ msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
+ memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
- major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
out_free:
- OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return major;
+ OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return major;
}
static
__u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
- struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
- rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
+ struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
+ rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
- struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
- struct krb5_header *khdr;
- int blocksize;
- rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
- rawobj_t cipher, plain;
- rawobj_t data_desc[1];
- int rc;
- __u32 major;
-
- LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
- LASSERT(ke);
-
- if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
- CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
+ struct krb5_header *khdr;
+ int blocksz;
+ rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
+ rawobj_t cipher, plain;
+ rawobj_t data_desc[1];
+ int rc;
+ __u32 major;
+
+ LASSERT(ke);
+
+ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
+ CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
- major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
- if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
- return major;
- }
-
- /* block size */
- if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
- blocksize = 1;
- LBUG();
- } else {
- LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
- }
- LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
-
- /*
- * token format is expected as:
- * -----------------------------------------------
- * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
- * -----------------------------------------------
- */
- if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) +
- ke->ke_hash_size) {
- CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
+ major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
+ return major;
+ }
- cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
- cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
- plain.data = cipher.data;
- plain.len = cipher.len;
+ /* block size */
+ if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
+ blocksz = 1;
+ LBUG();
+ } else {
+ LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
+ }
+ LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksz && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksz == 0);
- rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
- desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
- if (rc)
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ /*
+ * token format is expected as:
+ * -----------------------------------------------
+ * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
+ * -----------------------------------------------
+ */
+ if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr) +
+ ke->ke_hash_size) {
+ CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
- /*
- * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
- * ------------------------------------------
- * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
- * ------------------------------------------
- */
- data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
- data_desc[0].len = blocksize;
+ cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
+ cipher.len = blocksz + sizeof(*khdr);
+ plain.data = cipher.data;
+ plain.len = cipher.len;
+
+ rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
+ desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
+ if (rc)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ /*
+ * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ */
+ data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
+ data_desc[0].len = blocksz;
if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
khdr, 1, data_desc,
desc->bd_iov_count,
- GET_KIOV(desc),
- &cksum))
+ desc->bd_vec,
+ &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
- if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr),
- cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
- ke->ke_hash_size)) {
- CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- }
+ if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr),
+ cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
+ ke->ke_hash_size)) {
+ CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ }
- rawobj_free(&cksum);
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ rawobj_free(&cksum);
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
- char *buf,
- int bufsize)
+ char *buf,
+ int bufsize)
{
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
- int written;
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ int written;
- written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
- enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
- return written;
+ written = scnprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
+ enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
+ return written;
}
static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
{
int status;
- spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
-
status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
if (status)
CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
git://git.whamcloud.com / fs / lustre-release.git / blobdiff