+/**
+ * ll_setup_filename() - overlay to llcrypt_setup_filename
+ * @dir: the directory that will be searched
+ * @iname: the user-provided filename being searched for
+ * @lookup: 1 if we're allowed to proceed without the key because it's
+ * ->lookup() or we're finding the dir_entry for deletion; 0 if we cannot
+ * proceed without the key because we're going to create the dir_entry.
+ * @fname: the filename information to be filled in
+ * @fid: fid retrieved from user-provided filename
+ *
+ * This overlay function is necessary to properly encode @fname after
+ * encryption, as it will be sent over the wire.
+ * This overlay function is also necessary to handle the case of operations
+ * carried out without the key. Normally llcrypt makes use of digested names in
+ * that case. Having a digested name works for local file systems that can call
+ * llcrypt_match_name(), but Lustre server side is not aware of encryption.
+ * So for keyless @lookup operations on long names, for Lustre we choose to
+ * present to users the encoded struct ll_digest_filename, instead of a digested
+ * name. FID and name hash can then easily be extracted and put into the
+ * requests sent to servers.
+ */
+int ll_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
+ int lookup, struct llcrypt_name *fname,
+ struct lu_fid *fid)
+{
+ int digested = 0;
+ struct qstr dname;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (fid && IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && !llcrypt_has_encryption_key(dir) &&
+ iname->name[0] == '_')
+ digested = 1;
+
+ dname.name = iname->name + digested;
+ dname.len = iname->len - digested;
+
+ if (fid) {
+ fid->f_seq = 0;
+ fid->f_oid = 0;
+ fid->f_ver = 0;
+ }
+ rc = llcrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dname, lookup, fname);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT && lookup &&
+ !llcrypt_has_encryption_key(dir) &&
+ unlikely(filename_is_volatile(iname->name, iname->len, NULL))) {
+ /* For purpose of migration or mirroring without enc key, we
+ * allow lookup of volatile file without enc context.
+ */
+ memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct llcrypt_name));
+ fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
+ fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (digested) {
+ /* Without the key, for long names user should have struct
+ * ll_digest_filename representation of the dentry instead of
+ * the name. So make sure it is valid, return fid and put
+ * excerpt of cipher text name in disk_name.
+ */
+ struct ll_digest_filename *digest;
+
+ if (fname->crypto_buf.len < sizeof(struct ll_digest_filename)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ digest = (struct ll_digest_filename *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
+ *fid = digest->ldf_fid;
+ if (!fid_is_sane(fid)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ fname->disk_name.name = digest->ldf_excerpt;
+ fname->disk_name.len = LLCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ }
+ if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) &&
+ !name_is_dot_or_dotdot(fname->disk_name.name,
+ fname->disk_name.len)) {
+ int presented_len = critical_chars(fname->disk_name.name,
+ fname->disk_name.len);
+ char *buf;
+
+ buf = kmalloc(presented_len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ if (presented_len == fname->disk_name.len)
+ memcpy(buf, fname->disk_name.name, presented_len);
+ else
+ critical_encode(fname->disk_name.name,
+ fname->disk_name.len, buf);
+ buf[presented_len] = '\0';
+ kfree(fname->crypto_buf.name);
+ fname->crypto_buf.name = buf;
+ fname->crypto_buf.len = presented_len;
+ fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
+ fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+
+out_free:
+ llcrypt_free_filename(fname);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ll_fname_disk_to_usr() - overlay to llcrypt_fname_disk_to_usr
+ * @inode: the inode to convert name
+ * @hash: major hash for inode
+ * @minor_hash: minor hash for inode
+ * @iname: the user-provided filename needing conversion
+ * @oname: the filename information to be filled in
+ * @fid: the user-provided fid for filename
+ *
+ * The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
+ *
+ * This overlay function is necessary to properly decode @iname before
+ * decryption, as it comes from the wire.
+ * This overlay function is also necessary to handle the case of operations
+ * carried out without the key. Normally llcrypt makes use of digested names in
+ * that case. Having a digested name works for local file systems that can call
+ * llcrypt_match_name(), but Lustre server side is not aware of encryption.
+ * So for keyless @lookup operations on long names, for Lustre we choose to
+ * present to users the encoded struct ll_digest_filename, instead of a digested
+ * name. FID and name hash can then easily be extracted and put into the
+ * requests sent to servers.
+ */
+int ll_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
+ u32 hash, u32 minor_hash,
+ struct llcrypt_str *iname, struct llcrypt_str *oname,
+ struct lu_fid *fid)
+{
+ struct llcrypt_str lltr = LLTR_INIT(iname->name, iname->len);
+ struct ll_digest_filename digest;
+ int digested = 0;
+ char *buf = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
+ if (!name_is_dot_or_dotdot(lltr.name, lltr.len) &&
+ strnchr(lltr.name, lltr.len, '=')) {
+ /* Only proceed to critical decode if
+ * iname contains espace char '='.
+ */
+ int len = lltr.len;
+
+ buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ len = critical_decode(lltr.name, len, buf);
+ lltr.name = buf;
+ lltr.len = len;
+ }
+ if (lltr.len > LLCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE &&
+ !llcrypt_has_encryption_key(inode) &&
+ likely(llcrypt_policy_has_filename_enc(inode))) {
+ digested = 1;
+ /* Without the key for long names, set the dentry name
+ * to the representing struct ll_digest_filename. It
+ * will be encoded by llcrypt for display, and will
+ * enable further lookup requests.
+ */
+ if (!fid)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ digest.ldf_fid = *fid;
+ memcpy(digest.ldf_excerpt,
+ LLCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(lltr.name, lltr.len),
+ LLCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ lltr.name = (char *)&digest;
+ lltr.len = sizeof(digest);
+
+ oname->name[0] = '_';
+ oname->name = oname->name + 1;
+ oname->len--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = llcrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode, hash, minor_hash, &lltr, oname);
+
+ kfree(buf);
+ oname->name = oname->name - digested;
+ oname->len = oname->len + digested;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Copied from llcrypt_d_revalidate, as it is not exported */
+/*
+ * Validate dentries in encrypted directories to make sure we aren't potentially
+ * caching stale dentries after a key has been added.
+ */
+int ll_revalidate_d_crypto(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct dentry *dir;
+ int err;
+ int valid;
+
+ /*
+ * Plaintext names are always valid, since llcrypt doesn't support
+ * reverting to ciphertext names without evicting the directory's inode
+ * -- which implies eviction of the dentries in the directory.
+ */
+ if (!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME))
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Ciphertext name; valid if the directory's key is still unavailable.
+ *
+ * Although llcrypt forbids rename() on ciphertext names, we still must
+ * use dget_parent() here rather than use ->d_parent directly. That's
+ * because a corrupted fs image may contain directory hard links, which
+ * the VFS handles by moving the directory's dentry tree in the dcache
+ * each time ->lookup() finds the directory and it already has a dentry
+ * elsewhere. Thus ->d_parent can be changing, and we must safely grab
+ * a reference to some ->d_parent to prevent it from being freed.
+ */
+
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
+ return -ECHILD;
+
+ dir = dget_parent(dentry);
+ err = llcrypt_get_encryption_info(d_inode(dir));
+ valid = !llcrypt_has_encryption_key(d_inode(dir));
+ dput(dir);
+
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ return valid;
+}
+