2 * Modifications for Lustre
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2011, 2015, Intel Corporation.
8 * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
12 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
13 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
14 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
15 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
16 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
18 * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
19 * All rights reserved.
21 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
22 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
24 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
25 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
28 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
30 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
31 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
32 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
33 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
34 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
35 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
39 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
40 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
41 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
42 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
43 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
44 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
45 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
46 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
47 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
52 #include <linux/init.h>
53 #include <linux/module.h>
54 #include <linux/random.h>
55 #include <linux/slab.h>
56 #include <linux/crypto.h>
57 #include <linux/mutex.h>
60 #include <obd_class.h>
61 #include <obd_support.h>
62 #include <lustre_net.h>
63 #include <lustre_import.h>
64 #include <lustre_sec.h>
67 #include "gss_internal.h"
71 #include "gss_crypto.h"
73 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(krb5_seq_lock);
77 char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */
78 char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */
79 int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */
80 int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */
81 int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */
82 unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */
86 * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption.
87 * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS
88 * yet. this need to be fixed in the future.
90 static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
91 [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */
92 .ke_dispname = "des-cbc-md5",
93 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des)",
94 .ke_hash_name = "md5",
98 [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
99 .ke_dispname = "des3-hmac-sha1",
100 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
101 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
106 [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
107 .ke_dispname = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
108 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
109 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
114 [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
115 .ke_dispname = "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
116 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
117 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
122 [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
123 .ke_dispname = "arcfour-hmac-md5",
124 .ke_enc_name = "ecb(arc4)",
125 .ke_hash_name = "md5",
132 static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
134 if (enctype < ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
135 return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
141 int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
143 struct krb5_enctype *ke;
145 if (kctx->kc_enctype >= ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) ||
146 enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
147 CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
151 ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
153 /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
154 if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC &&
155 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
158 /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
159 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
160 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
162 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
163 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
170 void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
172 rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used);
174 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye);
175 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi);
176 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc);
180 __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
182 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
185 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
187 kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0);
190 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)))
193 /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */
194 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
195 gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
198 /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
199 * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
200 * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
202 * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
204 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
208 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
210 kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint;
213 if (gss_get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
216 /* old style enc/seq keys in format:
220 * we decompose them to fit into the new context
224 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
227 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
230 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
234 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
235 tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype)
238 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
242 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
245 /* old style fallback */
246 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc))
252 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported rfc1964 context\n");
255 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
258 /* Flags for version 2 context flags */
259 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001
260 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002
261 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004
264 __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
266 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
268 /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
269 * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
270 * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
272 * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
274 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
278 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
281 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR)
282 kctx->kc_initiate = 1;
283 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX)
285 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
286 kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
289 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send,
290 sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send)))
294 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
297 /* size of each key */
298 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
301 /* number of keys - should always be 3 */
302 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
306 CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint);
311 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
314 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize))
317 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
320 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported v2 context\n");
323 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
327 * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing
328 * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature
329 * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc.
332 __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf,
333 struct gss_ctx *gctx)
335 struct krb5_ctx *kctx;
336 char *p = (char *)inbuf->data;
337 char *end = (char *)(inbuf->data + inbuf->len);
338 unsigned int tmp_uint, rc;
340 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) {
341 CERROR("Fail to read version\n");
342 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
345 /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */
347 CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint);
348 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
353 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
355 if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) {
356 kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint;
357 rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end);
359 rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end);
363 rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx);
366 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
369 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
372 gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx;
373 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
377 __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
378 struct gss_ctx *gctx_new)
380 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
381 struct krb5_ctx *knew;
385 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
387 knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1;
388 knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx;
389 knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init;
390 knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey;
391 knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
393 memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed));
394 knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv;
395 knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send;
396 knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype;
398 if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
401 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye))
403 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi))
405 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc))
407 if (krb5_init_keys(knew))
410 gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew;
411 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully copied reverse context\n");
412 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
415 delete_context_kerberos(knew);
417 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
421 __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
424 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
426 *endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
427 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
431 void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx)
433 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
435 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
440 * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended
441 * with krb5 wire token header.
444 __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
445 struct gss_keyblock *kb,
446 struct krb5_header *khdr,
447 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
448 int iovcnt, struct bio_vec *iovs,
450 digest_hash hash_func)
452 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
453 struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
454 enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg hash_algo;
458 hash_algo = cfs_crypto_hash_alg(ke->ke_hash_name);
460 /* For the cbc(des) case we want md5 instead of hmac(md5) */
461 if (strcmp(ke->ke_enc_name, "cbc(des)"))
462 req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, kb->kb_key.data,
465 req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, NULL, 0);
468 CERROR("failed to alloc hash %s : rc = %d\n",
469 ke->ke_hash_name, rc);
473 cksum->len = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_algo);
474 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
481 hdr.data = (__u8 *)khdr;
482 hdr.len = sizeof(*khdr);
486 CERROR("hash function for %s undefined\n",
490 rc = hash_func(req, &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs);
494 if (!ke->ke_hash_hmac) {
497 cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
498 rc = gss_crypt_generic(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL,
499 cksum->data, cksum->data,
506 cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
508 return rc ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
511 static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
512 struct krb5_header *khdr,
515 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
517 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
520 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
521 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
522 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
523 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
525 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
526 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
527 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
528 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
531 khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
532 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
533 khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
534 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
537 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
538 struct krb5_header *khdr,
541 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
542 __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
544 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
547 tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
550 tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
555 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
556 CERROR("bad token id\n");
557 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
559 if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
560 CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
561 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
563 if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
564 CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
565 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
567 if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
568 CERROR("bad filler\n");
569 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
571 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
572 be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
573 CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
574 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
576 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
580 __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
584 struct bio_vec *iovs,
587 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
588 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
589 struct krb5_header *khdr;
590 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
593 /* fill krb5 header */
594 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
595 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
596 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
599 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, khdr,
600 msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
602 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
604 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
605 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
606 memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
609 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
610 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
617 __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
621 struct bio_vec *iovs,
624 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
625 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
626 struct krb5_header *khdr;
627 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
630 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
631 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
632 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
635 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
637 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
638 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
639 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
643 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
644 CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
645 token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
646 GOTO(out, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
649 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
650 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
652 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
654 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
655 if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
657 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
658 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_BAD_SIG);
660 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
668 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
671 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
672 struct krb5_header *khdr,
674 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
678 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
679 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
680 struct scatterlist src, dst;
681 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
682 int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
684 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
685 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
687 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
688 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
689 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
692 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
695 /* encrypt confounder */
696 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, confounder, blocksize);
700 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
702 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
706 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl,
707 sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
709 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
710 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
713 CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
717 /* encrypt clear pages */
718 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
719 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
720 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page,
721 (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len +
724 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset);
727 sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
728 sg_set_page(&dst, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page,
729 src.length, src.offset);
731 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset = dst.offset;
732 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len = dst.length;
734 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
737 CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
742 /* encrypt krb5 header */
743 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
747 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
750 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
754 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
757 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
758 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
761 CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
772 * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
773 * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
775 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's bv_len to the actual
777 * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
778 * bd_iov[]->bv_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
779 * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to
780 * bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->bv_len.
781 * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
782 * data in a page which is not the last one.
783 * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
784 * thus bv_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
785 * and bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->bv_len should be
786 * round_up(bd_iov[]->bv_len) which
787 * should have been done by prep_bulk().
790 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
791 struct krb5_header *khdr,
792 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
797 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
798 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
799 struct scatterlist src, dst;
800 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
801 int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
802 int blocksize, i, rc;
804 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
805 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
806 LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
808 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
809 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
810 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
813 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
816 if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
817 CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
821 /* decrypt head (confounder) */
822 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data, blocksize);
826 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, plain->data, blocksize);
828 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
832 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl,
833 sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
835 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
836 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
839 CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
843 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
845 if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset % blocksize
847 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize
849 CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
850 i, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset,
851 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len,
857 if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len >
858 desc->bd_nob_transferred)
859 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len =
860 desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
862 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len =
863 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len;
864 if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len >
866 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len =
867 desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
869 /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
870 LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].
872 desc->bd_nob_transferred);
873 LASSERT(desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len <=
874 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len);
877 if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len == 0)
880 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
881 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page,
882 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len,
883 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset);
885 if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize == 0)
887 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page);
889 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
892 CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
896 if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize != 0) {
897 memcpy(page_address(desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page) +
898 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset,
899 page_address(desc->bd_enc_vec[i].
901 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset,
902 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len);
905 ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len;
906 pt_nob += desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len;
909 if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
910 CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
911 desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
915 if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
916 CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
917 desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
921 /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
923 while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
924 desc->bd_vec[i++].bv_len = 0;
926 /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
927 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data + blocksize,
932 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
935 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
939 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
942 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
943 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
946 CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
950 if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
951 CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
959 __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
965 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
966 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
967 struct krb5_header *khdr;
969 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
970 rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
971 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
972 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
977 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
978 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
980 crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
983 * final token format:
984 * ---------------------------------------------------
985 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
986 * ---------------------------------------------------
989 /* fill krb5 header */
990 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
991 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
992 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
994 /* generate confounder */
995 get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
997 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
998 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
999 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1000 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1003 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1004 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1006 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1008 /* padding the message */
1009 if (gss_add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
1010 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1013 * clear text layout for checksum:
1014 * ------------------------------------------------------
1015 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1016 * ------------------------------------------------------
1018 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1019 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1020 data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1021 data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1022 data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
1023 data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
1025 /* compute checksum */
1026 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1027 khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum,
1029 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1030 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1033 * clear text layout for encryption:
1034 * -----------------------------------------
1035 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1036 * -----------------------------------------
1038 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1039 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1040 data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
1041 data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
1042 data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
1043 data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
1045 /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
1046 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1047 cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
1048 LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
1050 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1051 rawobj_t arc4_keye = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1052 struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
1054 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1055 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
1057 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1058 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1061 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1062 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1063 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1064 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1067 if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1069 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1071 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1074 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 3, data_desc,
1077 crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1079 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1081 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 3,
1082 data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1086 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1088 /* fill in checksum */
1089 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1090 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1091 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1094 /* final token length */
1095 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1096 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1098 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1103 __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1104 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
1106 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1109 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1110 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
1111 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1113 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1115 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1116 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page);
1118 * offset should always start at page boundary of either
1119 * client or server side.
1121 if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset & blocksize) {
1122 CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
1123 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset, i);
1124 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1127 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset =
1128 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset;
1129 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len =
1130 (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len +
1131 blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
1134 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1138 __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1139 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1140 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1142 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1143 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1144 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1146 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1147 rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
1148 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1153 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1156 * final token format:
1157 * --------------------------------------------------
1158 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
1159 * --------------------------------------------------
1162 /* fill krb5 header */
1163 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1164 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1165 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1167 /* generate confounder */
1168 get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1170 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1171 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1172 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1173 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1176 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1177 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1181 * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
1182 * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
1183 * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
1185 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1186 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1187 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
1190 * clear text layout for checksum:
1191 * ------------------------------------------
1192 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1193 * ------------------------------------------
1195 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1196 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1198 /* compute checksum */
1199 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1201 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_vec,
1202 &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
1203 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1204 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1207 * clear text layout for encryption:
1208 * ------------------------------------------
1209 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1210 * ------------------------------------------
1212 * ---------- (cipher pages) |
1214 * -------------------------------------------
1215 * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
1216 * -------------------------------------------
1218 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1219 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1221 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1222 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1224 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1228 rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1229 conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
1232 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1234 /* fill in checksum */
1235 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1236 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1237 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1240 /* final token length */
1241 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1242 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1244 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1249 __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1254 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1255 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1256 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1257 unsigned char *tmpbuf;
1258 int blocksize, bodysize;
1259 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1260 rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
1261 rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
1264 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1268 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1269 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1270 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1273 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1275 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1276 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1277 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1282 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1283 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1286 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1287 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1290 /* expected token layout:
1291 * ----------------------------------------
1292 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
1293 * ----------------------------------------
1295 bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
1297 if (bodysize % blocksize) {
1298 CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1299 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1302 if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
1303 CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1304 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1307 if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
1308 CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
1309 msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
1310 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1314 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1316 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1318 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
1320 cipher_in.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1321 cipher_in.len = bodysize;
1322 plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
1323 plain_out.len = bodysize;
1325 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1327 struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
1329 cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
1330 cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
1332 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1333 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
1335 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1336 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1339 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1340 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1341 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1342 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1345 if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
1346 arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
1347 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1349 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1352 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 1, &cipher_in,
1355 crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1357 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1359 cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1361 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 1,
1362 &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1366 CERROR("error decrypt\n");
1369 LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
1371 /* expected clear text layout:
1372 * -----------------------------------------
1373 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1374 * -----------------------------------------
1377 /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
1378 if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
1380 CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
1384 /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1385 * ------------------------------------------------------
1386 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1387 * ------------------------------------------------------
1389 hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1390 hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
1391 hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1392 hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1393 hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1394 hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
1395 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1396 khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum,
1400 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1401 if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
1402 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1403 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1404 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1408 msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1409 memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
1411 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1413 OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1414 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1419 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1420 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1421 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1423 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1424 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1425 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1427 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1428 rawobj_t cipher, plain;
1429 rawobj_t data_desc[1];
1435 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1436 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1437 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1440 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1442 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1443 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1444 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1449 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1450 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1454 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1455 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1457 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1460 * token format is expected as:
1461 * -----------------------------------------------
1462 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
1463 * -----------------------------------------------
1465 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) +
1467 CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
1468 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1471 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1472 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1473 plain.data = cipher.data;
1474 plain.len = cipher.len;
1476 rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1477 desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
1479 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1482 * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1483 * ------------------------------------------
1484 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1485 * ------------------------------------------
1487 data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
1488 data_desc[0].len = blocksize;
1490 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1494 &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
1495 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1496 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1498 if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr),
1499 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1500 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1501 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1502 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1503 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
1506 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1507 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1510 int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
1514 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
1517 written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
1518 enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
1522 static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
1523 .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
1524 .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos,
1525 .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos,
1526 .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
1527 .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
1528 .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
1529 .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
1530 .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
1531 .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
1532 .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
1533 .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
1534 .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
1537 static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = {
1539 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N,
1541 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
1545 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A,
1547 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
1551 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I,
1553 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
1557 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P,
1559 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV,
1564 static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
1565 /* .gm_owner uses default NULL value for THIS_MODULE */
1567 .gm_oid = (rawobj_t)
1568 {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"},
1569 .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
1571 .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs,
1574 int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
1578 status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
1580 CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
1584 void cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
1586 lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);