2 * Modifications for Lustre
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2011, 2015, Intel Corporation.
8 * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
12 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
13 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
14 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
15 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
16 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
18 * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
19 * All rights reserved.
21 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
22 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
24 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
25 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
28 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
30 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
31 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
32 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
33 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
34 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
35 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
39 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
40 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
41 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
42 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
43 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
44 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
45 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
46 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
47 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
52 #include <linux/init.h>
53 #include <linux/module.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/crypto.h>
56 #include <linux/mutex.h>
59 #include <obd_class.h>
60 #include <obd_support.h>
61 #include <lustre_net.h>
62 #include <lustre_import.h>
63 #include <lustre_sec.h>
66 #include "gss_internal.h"
70 #include "gss_crypto.h"
72 static spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
76 char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */
77 char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */
78 int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */
79 int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */
80 int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */
81 unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */
85 * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption.
86 * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS
87 * yet. this need to be fixed in the future.
89 static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
90 [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */
91 .ke_dispname = "des-cbc-md5",
92 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des)",
93 .ke_hash_name = "md5",
97 [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
98 .ke_dispname = "des3-hmac-sha1",
99 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
100 .ke_hash_name = "hmac(sha1)",
105 [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
106 .ke_dispname = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
107 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
108 .ke_hash_name = "hmac(sha1)",
113 [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
114 .ke_dispname = "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
115 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
116 .ke_hash_name = "hmac(sha1)",
121 [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
122 .ke_dispname = "arcfour-hmac-md5",
123 .ke_enc_name = "ecb(arc4)",
124 .ke_hash_name = "hmac(md5)",
131 #define MAX_ENCTYPES sizeof(enctypes)/sizeof(struct krb5_enctype)
133 static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
135 if (enctype < MAX_ENCTYPES && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
136 return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
142 int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
144 struct krb5_enctype *ke;
146 if (kctx->kc_enctype >= MAX_ENCTYPES ||
147 enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
148 CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
152 ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
154 /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
155 if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC &&
156 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
159 /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
160 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
161 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
163 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
164 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
171 void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
173 rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used);
175 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye);
176 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi);
177 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc);
181 __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
183 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
186 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
188 kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0);
191 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)))
194 /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */
195 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
196 gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
200 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
204 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
206 kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint;
209 if (gss_get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
212 /* old style enc/seq keys in format:
216 * we decompose them to fit into the new context
220 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
223 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
226 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
230 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
231 tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype)
234 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
238 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
241 /* old style fallback */
242 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc))
248 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported rfc1964 context\n");
251 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
254 /* Flags for version 2 context flags */
255 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001
256 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002
257 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004
260 __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
262 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
265 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
269 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
272 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR)
273 kctx->kc_initiate = 1;
274 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX)
276 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
277 kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
280 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send,
281 sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send)))
285 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
288 /* size of each key */
289 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
292 /* number of keys - should always be 3 */
293 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
297 CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint);
302 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
305 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize))
308 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
311 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported v2 context\n");
314 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
318 * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing
319 * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature
320 * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc.
323 __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf,
324 struct gss_ctx *gctx)
326 struct krb5_ctx *kctx;
327 char *p = (char *)inbuf->data;
328 char *end = (char *)(inbuf->data + inbuf->len);
329 unsigned int tmp_uint, rc;
331 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) {
332 CERROR("Fail to read version\n");
333 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
336 /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */
338 CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint);
339 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
344 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
346 if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) {
347 kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint;
348 rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end);
350 rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end);
354 rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx);
357 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
360 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
363 gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx;
364 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
368 __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
369 struct gss_ctx *gctx_new)
371 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
372 struct krb5_ctx *knew;
376 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
378 knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1;
379 knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx;
380 knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init;
381 knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey;
382 knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
384 memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed));
385 knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv;
386 knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send;
387 knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype;
389 if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
392 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye))
394 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi))
396 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc))
398 if (krb5_init_keys(knew))
401 gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew;
402 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully copied reverse context\n");
403 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
406 delete_context_kerberos(knew);
408 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
412 __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
413 unsigned long *endtime)
415 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
417 *endtime = (unsigned long)((__u32) kctx->kc_endtime);
418 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
422 void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx)
424 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
426 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
431 * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended
432 * with krb5 wire token header.
435 __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
436 struct gss_keyblock *kb,
437 struct krb5_header *khdr,
438 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
439 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
442 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
443 struct crypto_hash *tfm;
445 __u32 code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
448 if (!(tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ke->ke_hash_name, 0, 0))) {
449 CERROR("failed to alloc TFM: %s\n", ke->ke_hash_name);
450 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
453 cksum->len = crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm);
454 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
460 hdr.data = (__u8 *)khdr;
461 hdr.len = sizeof(*khdr);
463 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac)
464 rc = gss_digest_hmac(tfm, &kb->kb_key,
465 &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
467 rc = gss_digest_norm(tfm, kb,
468 &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
471 code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
473 crypto_free_hash(tfm);
477 static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
478 struct krb5_header *khdr,
481 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
483 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
486 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
487 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
488 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
489 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
491 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
492 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
493 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
494 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
497 khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
498 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
499 khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
500 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
503 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
504 struct krb5_header *khdr,
507 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
508 __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
510 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
513 tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
516 tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
521 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
522 CERROR("bad token id\n");
523 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
525 if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
526 CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
527 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
529 if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
530 CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
531 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
533 if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
534 CERROR("bad filler\n");
535 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
537 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
538 be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
539 CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
540 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
542 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
546 __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
553 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
554 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
555 struct krb5_header *khdr;
556 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
558 /* fill krb5 header */
559 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
560 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
561 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
564 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
565 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum))
566 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
568 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
569 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
570 memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
573 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
575 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
579 __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
586 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
587 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
588 struct krb5_header *khdr;
589 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
592 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
593 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
594 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
597 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
599 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
600 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
601 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
605 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
606 CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
607 token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
608 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
611 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
612 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) {
613 CERROR("failed to make checksum\n");
614 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
617 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
618 if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
620 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
622 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
626 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
630 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
633 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
634 struct krb5_header *khdr,
636 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
640 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
641 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
642 struct scatterlist src, dst;
643 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
644 int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
646 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
647 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
648 LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
650 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
651 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
652 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
655 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
658 /* encrypt confounder */
659 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, confounder, blocksize);
663 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
665 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
669 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl,
670 sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
672 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
673 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
676 CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
680 /* encrypt clear pages */
681 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
682 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
683 sg_set_page(&src, BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
684 (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len +
687 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
690 sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
691 sg_set_page(&dst, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
692 src.length, src.offset);
694 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset = dst.offset;
695 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len = dst.length;
697 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
700 CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
705 /* encrypt krb5 header */
706 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
710 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
713 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
717 rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
720 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
721 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
724 CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
735 * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
736 * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
738 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
740 * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
741 * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
742 * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to
743 * bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len.
744 * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
745 * data in a page which is not the last one.
746 * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
747 * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
748 * and bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->kiov_len should be
749 * round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
750 * should have been done by prep_bulk().
753 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
754 struct krb5_header *khdr,
755 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
760 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
761 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
762 struct scatterlist src, dst;
763 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
764 int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
765 int blocksize, i, rc;
767 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
768 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
769 LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
770 LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
772 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
773 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
774 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
777 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
780 if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
781 CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
785 /* decrypt head (confounder) */
786 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data, blocksize);
790 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, plain->data, blocksize);
792 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
796 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl,
797 sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
799 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
800 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
803 CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
807 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
809 if (BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset % blocksize
811 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize
813 CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
814 i, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
815 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len,
821 if (ct_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len >
822 desc->bd_nob_transferred)
823 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
824 desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
826 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
827 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
828 if (pt_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len >
830 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
831 desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
833 /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
834 LASSERT(ct_nob + BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).
836 desc->bd_nob_transferred);
837 LASSERT(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len <=
838 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len);
841 if (BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len == 0)
844 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
845 sg_set_page(&src, BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page,
846 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len,
847 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset);
849 if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
851 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page);
853 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
856 CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
860 if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
861 memcpy(page_address(BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page) +
862 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
863 page_address(BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).
865 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset,
866 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len);
869 ct_nob += BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
870 pt_nob += BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len;
873 if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
874 CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
875 desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
879 if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
880 CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
881 desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
885 /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
887 while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
888 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i++).kiov_len = 0;
890 /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
891 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data + blocksize,
896 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
899 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
903 rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
906 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
907 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
910 CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
914 if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
915 CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
923 __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
929 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
930 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
931 struct krb5_header *khdr;
933 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
934 rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
935 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
936 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
940 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
941 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
943 crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
946 * final token format:
947 * ---------------------------------------------------
948 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
949 * ---------------------------------------------------
952 /* fill krb5 header */
953 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
954 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
955 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
957 /* generate confounder */
958 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
960 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
961 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
962 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
963 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
966 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
967 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
969 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
971 /* padding the message */
972 if (gss_add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
973 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
976 * clear text layout for checksum:
977 * ------------------------------------------------------
978 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
979 * ------------------------------------------------------
981 data_desc[0].data = conf;
982 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
983 data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
984 data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
985 data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
986 data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
988 /* compute checksum */
989 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
990 khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum))
991 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
992 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
995 * clear text layout for encryption:
996 * -----------------------------------------
997 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
998 * -----------------------------------------
1000 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1001 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1002 data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
1003 data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
1004 data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
1005 data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
1007 /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
1008 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1009 cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
1010 LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
1012 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1014 struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
1016 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1017 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1018 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1019 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1022 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1023 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1024 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1025 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1028 if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1030 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1032 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1035 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 3, data_desc,
1038 crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1040 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1042 do {} while(0); /* just to avoid compile warning */
1044 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 3,
1045 data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1049 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1050 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1053 /* fill in checksum */
1054 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1055 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1056 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1058 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1060 /* final token length */
1061 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1062 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1066 __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1067 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
1069 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1072 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
1073 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1074 LASSERT(GET_ENC_KIOV(desc));
1075 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1077 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1079 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1080 LASSERT(BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_page);
1082 * offset should always start at page boundary of either
1083 * client or server side.
1085 if (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset & blocksize) {
1086 CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
1087 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset, i);
1088 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1091 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset =
1092 BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_offset;
1093 BD_GET_ENC_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len =
1094 (BD_GET_KIOV(desc, i).kiov_len +
1095 blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
1098 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1102 __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1103 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1104 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1106 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1107 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1108 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1110 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1111 rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
1112 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1115 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
1117 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1120 * final token format:
1121 * --------------------------------------------------
1122 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
1123 * --------------------------------------------------
1126 /* fill krb5 header */
1127 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1128 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1129 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1131 /* generate confounder */
1132 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1134 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1135 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1136 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1137 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1140 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1141 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1145 * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
1146 * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
1147 * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
1149 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1150 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1151 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
1154 * clear text layout for checksum:
1155 * ------------------------------------------
1156 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1157 * ------------------------------------------
1159 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1160 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1162 /* compute checksum */
1163 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1165 desc->bd_iov_count, GET_KIOV(desc),
1167 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1168 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1171 * clear text layout for encryption:
1172 * ------------------------------------------
1173 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1174 * ------------------------------------------
1176 * ---------- (cipher pages) |
1178 * -------------------------------------------
1179 * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
1180 * -------------------------------------------
1182 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1183 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1185 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1186 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1188 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1192 rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1193 conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
1197 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1198 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1201 /* fill in checksum */
1202 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1203 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1204 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1206 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1208 /* final token length */
1209 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1210 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1214 __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1219 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1220 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1221 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1222 unsigned char *tmpbuf;
1223 int blocksize, bodysize;
1224 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1225 rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
1226 rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
1229 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1233 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1234 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1235 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1238 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1240 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1241 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1242 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1247 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1248 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1251 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1252 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1255 /* expected token layout:
1256 * ----------------------------------------
1257 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
1258 * ----------------------------------------
1260 bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
1262 if (bodysize % blocksize) {
1263 CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1264 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1267 if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
1268 CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1269 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1272 if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
1273 CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
1274 msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
1275 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1279 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1281 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1283 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
1285 cipher_in.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1286 cipher_in.len = bodysize;
1287 plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
1288 plain_out.len = bodysize;
1290 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1292 struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4_tfm;
1294 cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
1295 cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
1297 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1298 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1299 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1300 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1303 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1304 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1305 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1306 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1309 if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
1310 arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
1311 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1313 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1316 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 1, &cipher_in,
1319 crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1321 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1323 cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1325 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 1,
1326 &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1330 CERROR("error decrypt\n");
1333 LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
1335 /* expected clear text layout:
1336 * -----------------------------------------
1337 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1338 * -----------------------------------------
1341 /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
1342 if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
1344 CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
1348 /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1349 * ------------------------------------------------------
1350 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1351 * ------------------------------------------------------
1353 hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1354 hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
1355 hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1356 hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1357 hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1358 hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
1359 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1360 khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum))
1363 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1364 if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
1365 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1366 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1367 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1371 msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1372 memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
1374 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1376 OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1377 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1382 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1383 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1384 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1386 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1387 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1388 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1390 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1391 rawobj_t cipher, plain;
1392 rawobj_t data_desc[1];
1396 LASSERT(ptlrpc_is_bulk_desc_kiov(desc->bd_type));
1399 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1400 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1401 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1404 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1406 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1407 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1408 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1413 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1414 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1418 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1419 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1421 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1424 * token format is expected as:
1425 * -----------------------------------------------
1426 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
1427 * -----------------------------------------------
1429 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) +
1431 CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
1432 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1435 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1436 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1437 plain.data = cipher.data;
1438 plain.len = cipher.len;
1440 rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1441 desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
1443 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1446 * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1447 * ------------------------------------------
1448 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1449 * ------------------------------------------
1451 data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
1452 data_desc[0].len = blocksize;
1454 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1459 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1460 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1462 if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr),
1463 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1464 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1465 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1466 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1467 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
1470 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1471 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1474 int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
1478 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
1481 written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
1482 enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
1486 static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
1487 .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
1488 .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos,
1489 .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos,
1490 .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
1491 .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
1492 .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
1493 .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
1494 .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
1495 .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
1496 .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
1497 .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
1498 .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
1501 static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = {
1503 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N,
1505 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
1509 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A,
1511 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
1515 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I,
1517 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
1521 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P,
1523 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV,
1528 static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
1529 /* .gm_owner uses default NULL value for THIS_MODULE */
1531 .gm_oid = (rawobj_t)
1532 {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"},
1533 .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
1535 .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs,
1538 int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
1542 spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
1544 status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
1546 CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
1550 void cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
1552 lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);