2 * Modifications for Lustre
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2011, 2015, Intel Corporation.
8 * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
12 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
13 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
14 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
15 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
16 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
18 * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
19 * All rights reserved.
21 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
22 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
24 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
25 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
28 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
30 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
31 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
32 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
33 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
34 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
35 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
39 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
40 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
41 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
42 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
43 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
44 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
45 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
46 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
47 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
52 #include <linux/init.h>
53 #include <linux/module.h>
54 #include <linux/random.h>
55 #include <linux/slab.h>
56 #include <linux/crypto.h>
57 #include <linux/mutex.h>
60 #include <obd_class.h>
61 #include <obd_support.h>
62 #include <lustre_net.h>
63 #include <lustre_import.h>
64 #include <lustre_sec.h>
67 #include "gss_internal.h"
71 #include "gss_crypto.h"
73 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(krb5_seq_lock);
77 char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */
78 char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */
79 int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */
80 int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */
81 int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */
82 unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */
86 * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption.
87 * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS
88 * yet. this need to be fixed in the future.
90 static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
91 [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */
92 .ke_dispname = "des-cbc-md5",
93 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des)",
94 .ke_hash_name = "md5",
98 #ifdef HAVE_DES3_SUPPORT
99 [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
100 .ke_dispname = "des3-hmac-sha1",
101 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
102 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
108 [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
109 .ke_dispname = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
110 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
111 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
116 [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
117 .ke_dispname = "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
118 .ke_enc_name = "cbc(aes)",
119 .ke_hash_name = "sha1",
124 [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
125 .ke_dispname = "arcfour-hmac-md5",
126 .ke_enc_name = "ecb(arc4)",
127 .ke_hash_name = "md5",
134 static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
136 if (enctype < ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
137 return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
143 int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
145 struct krb5_enctype *ke;
147 if (kctx->kc_enctype >= ARRAY_SIZE(enctypes) ||
148 enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
149 CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
153 ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
155 /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
156 if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC &&
157 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
160 /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
161 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
162 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
164 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
165 gss_keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
172 void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
174 rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used);
176 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye);
177 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi);
178 gss_keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc);
182 __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
184 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
187 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
189 kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0);
192 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)))
195 /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */
196 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
197 gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
200 /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
201 * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
202 * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
204 * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
206 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
210 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
212 kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint;
215 if (gss_get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
218 /* old style enc/seq keys in format:
222 * we decompose them to fit into the new context
226 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
229 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
232 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
236 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
237 tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype)
240 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
244 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
247 /* old style fallback */
248 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc))
254 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported rfc1964 context\n");
257 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
260 /* Flags for version 2 context flags */
261 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001
262 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002
263 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004
266 __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
268 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
270 /* end time. While kc_endtime might be 64 bit the krb5 API
271 * still uses 32 bits. To delay the 2038 bug see the incoming
272 * value as a u32 which give us until 2106. See the link for details:
274 * http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-current/doc/appdev/y2038.html
276 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(u32)))
280 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
283 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR)
284 kctx->kc_initiate = 1;
285 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX)
287 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
288 kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
291 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send,
292 sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send)))
296 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
299 /* size of each key */
300 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
303 /* number of keys - should always be 3 */
304 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
308 CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint);
313 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
316 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize))
319 if (gss_get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
322 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully imported v2 context\n");
325 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
329 * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing
330 * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature
331 * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc.
334 __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf,
335 struct gss_ctx *gctx)
337 struct krb5_ctx *kctx;
338 char *p = (char *)inbuf->data;
339 char *end = (char *)(inbuf->data + inbuf->len);
340 unsigned int tmp_uint, rc;
342 if (gss_get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) {
343 CERROR("Fail to read version\n");
344 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
347 /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */
349 CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint);
350 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
355 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
357 if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) {
358 kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint;
359 rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end);
361 rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end);
365 rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx);
368 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
371 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
374 gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx;
375 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
379 __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
380 struct gss_ctx *gctx_new)
382 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
383 struct krb5_ctx *knew;
387 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
389 knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1;
390 knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx;
391 knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init;
392 knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey;
393 knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
395 memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed));
396 knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv;
397 knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send;
398 knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype;
400 if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
403 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye))
405 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi))
407 if (gss_keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc))
409 if (krb5_init_keys(knew))
412 gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew;
413 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "successfully copied reverse context\n");
414 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
417 delete_context_kerberos(knew);
419 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
423 __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
426 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
428 *endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
429 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
433 void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx)
435 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
437 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
442 * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended
443 * with krb5 wire token header.
446 __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
447 struct gss_keyblock *kb,
448 struct krb5_header *khdr,
449 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
450 int iovcnt, struct bio_vec *iovs,
452 digest_hash hash_func)
454 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
455 struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
456 enum cfs_crypto_hash_alg hash_algo;
460 hash_algo = cfs_crypto_hash_alg(ke->ke_hash_name);
462 /* For the cbc(des) case we want md5 instead of hmac(md5) */
463 if (strcmp(ke->ke_enc_name, "cbc(des)"))
464 req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, kb->kb_key.data,
467 req = cfs_crypto_hash_init(hash_algo, NULL, 0);
470 CERROR("failed to alloc hash %s : rc = %d\n",
471 ke->ke_hash_name, rc);
475 cksum->len = cfs_crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_algo);
476 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
483 hdr.data = (__u8 *)khdr;
484 hdr.len = sizeof(*khdr);
488 CERROR("hash function for %s undefined\n",
492 rc = hash_func(req, &hdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs);
496 if (!ke->ke_hash_hmac) {
499 cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
500 rc = gss_crypt_generic(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL,
501 cksum->data, cksum->data,
508 cfs_crypto_hash_final(req, cksum->data, &cksum->len);
510 return rc ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
513 static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
514 struct krb5_header *khdr,
517 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
519 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
522 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
523 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
524 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
525 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
527 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
528 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
529 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
530 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
533 khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
534 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
535 khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
536 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
539 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
540 struct krb5_header *khdr,
543 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
544 __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
546 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
549 tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
552 tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
557 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
558 CERROR("bad token id\n");
559 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
561 if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
562 CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
563 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
565 if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
566 CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
567 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
569 if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
570 CERROR("bad filler\n");
571 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
573 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
574 be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
575 CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
576 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
578 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
582 __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
586 struct bio_vec *iovs,
589 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
590 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
591 struct krb5_header *khdr;
592 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
595 /* fill krb5 header */
596 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
597 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
598 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
601 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc, khdr,
602 msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
604 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
606 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
607 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
608 memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
611 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
612 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
619 __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
623 struct bio_vec *iovs,
626 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
627 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
628 struct krb5_header *khdr;
629 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
632 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
633 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
634 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
637 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
639 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
640 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
641 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
645 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
646 CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
647 token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
648 GOTO(out, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
651 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
652 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum,
654 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
656 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
657 if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
659 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
660 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_BAD_SIG);
662 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
670 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
673 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
674 struct krb5_header *khdr,
676 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
680 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
681 struct scatterlist src, dst;
682 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
683 int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
684 SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
686 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
687 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
689 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
690 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
691 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
693 /* encrypt confounder */
694 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, confounder, blocksize);
698 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
700 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
703 skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
704 skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
705 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
706 blocksize, local_iv);
708 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
710 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
711 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
714 CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
715 skcipher_request_zero(req);
719 /* encrypt clear pages */
720 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
721 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
722 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page,
723 (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len +
726 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset);
729 sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
730 sg_set_page(&dst, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page,
731 src.length, src.offset);
733 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset = dst.offset;
734 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len = dst.length;
736 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst,
737 src.length, local_iv);
738 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, &dst, &src, src.length);
740 CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
741 skcipher_request_zero(req);
746 /* encrypt krb5 header */
747 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
749 skcipher_request_zero(req);
753 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
756 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
757 skcipher_request_zero(req);
761 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
762 sizeof(*khdr), local_iv);
763 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
765 skcipher_request_zero(req);
767 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
768 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
771 CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
782 * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
783 * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
785 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's bv_len to the actual
787 * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
788 * bd_iov[]->bv_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
789 * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to
790 * bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->bv_len.
791 * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
792 * data in a page which is not the last one.
793 * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
794 * thus bv_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
795 * and bd_u.bd_kiov.bd_enc_vec[]->bv_len should be
796 * round_up(bd_iov[]->bv_len) which
797 * should have been done by prep_bulk().
800 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
801 struct krb5_header *khdr,
802 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
807 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
808 struct scatterlist src, dst;
809 struct sg_table sg_src, sg_dst;
810 int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
811 int blocksize, i, rc;
812 SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
814 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
815 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
816 LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
818 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
819 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
820 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
822 if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
823 CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
827 /* decrypt head (confounder) */
828 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data, blocksize);
832 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, plain->data, blocksize);
834 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
838 skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
839 skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
840 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
841 blocksize, local_iv);
843 rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl, blocksize);
845 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
846 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
849 CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
850 skcipher_request_zero(req);
854 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
856 if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
857 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize != 0) {
858 CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
859 i, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset,
860 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len,
862 skcipher_request_zero(req);
867 if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len >
868 desc->bd_nob_transferred)
869 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len =
870 desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
872 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len =
873 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len;
874 if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len >
876 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len =
877 desc->bd_nob - pt_nob;
879 /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
880 LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_vec[i].
882 desc->bd_nob_transferred);
883 LASSERT(desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len <=
884 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len);
887 if (desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len == 0)
890 sg_init_table(&src, 1);
891 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page,
892 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len,
893 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset);
895 if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize == 0)
897 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page);
899 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
900 src.length, local_iv);
901 rc = crypto_skcipher_decrypt_iv(req, &dst, &src, src.length);
903 CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
904 skcipher_request_zero(req);
908 if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len % blocksize != 0) {
909 memcpy(page_address(desc->bd_vec[i].bv_page) +
910 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset,
911 page_address(desc->bd_enc_vec[i].
913 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset,
914 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len);
917 ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len;
918 pt_nob += desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len;
921 if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
922 CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
923 desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
924 skcipher_request_zero(req);
928 if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
929 CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
930 desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
931 skcipher_request_zero(req);
935 /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
937 while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
938 desc->bd_vec[i++].bv_len = 0;
940 /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
941 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_src, &src, cipher->data + blocksize,
946 rc = gss_setup_sgtable(&sg_dst, &dst, cipher->data + blocksize,
949 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
953 skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_src.sgl, sg_dst.sgl,
954 src.length, local_iv);
955 rc = crypto_skcipher_decrypt_iv(req, sg_dst.sgl, sg_src.sgl,
957 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_src);
958 gss_teardown_sgtable(&sg_dst);
960 skcipher_request_zero(req);
962 CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
966 if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
967 CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
975 __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
981 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
982 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
983 struct krb5_header *khdr;
985 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
986 rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
987 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
988 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
993 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
994 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
996 crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
999 * final token format:
1000 * ---------------------------------------------------
1001 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
1002 * ---------------------------------------------------
1005 /* fill krb5 header */
1006 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1007 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1008 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1010 /* generate confounder */
1011 get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1013 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1014 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1015 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1016 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1019 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1020 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(
1021 kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1023 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1025 /* padding the message */
1026 if (gss_add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
1027 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1030 * clear text layout for checksum:
1031 * ------------------------------------------------------
1032 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1033 * ------------------------------------------------------
1035 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1036 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1037 data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1038 data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1039 data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
1040 data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
1042 /* compute checksum */
1043 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1044 khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum,
1046 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1047 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1050 * clear text layout for encryption:
1051 * -----------------------------------------
1052 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1053 * -----------------------------------------
1055 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1056 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1057 data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
1058 data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
1059 data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
1060 data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
1062 /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
1063 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1064 cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
1065 LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
1067 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1068 rawobj_t arc4_keye = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1069 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *arc4_tfm;
1071 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1072 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
1074 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1075 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1078 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1079 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1080 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1081 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1084 if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1086 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1088 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1091 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 3, data_desc,
1094 crypto_free_sync_skcipher(arc4_tfm);
1096 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1098 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 3,
1099 data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1103 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1105 /* fill in checksum */
1106 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1107 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1108 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1111 /* final token length */
1112 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1113 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1115 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1120 __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1121 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
1123 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1126 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1127 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec);
1128 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1130 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1132 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1133 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_page);
1135 * offset should always start at page boundary of either
1136 * client or server side.
1138 if (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset & blocksize) {
1139 CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
1140 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset, i);
1141 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1144 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_offset =
1145 desc->bd_vec[i].bv_offset;
1146 desc->bd_enc_vec[i].bv_len =
1147 (desc->bd_vec[i].bv_len +
1148 blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
1151 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1155 __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1156 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1157 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1159 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1160 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1161 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1163 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1164 rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
1165 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1170 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1173 * final token format:
1174 * --------------------------------------------------
1175 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
1176 * --------------------------------------------------
1179 /* fill krb5 header */
1180 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1181 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1182 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1184 /* generate confounder */
1185 get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1187 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1188 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1189 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1190 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1193 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1194 blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1198 * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
1199 * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
1200 * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
1202 LASSERT(blocksz <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1203 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksz && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksz == 0);
1204 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
1207 * clear text layout for checksum:
1208 * ------------------------------------------
1209 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1210 * ------------------------------------------
1212 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1213 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1215 /* compute checksum */
1216 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1218 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_vec,
1219 &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
1220 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1221 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1224 * clear text layout for encryption:
1225 * ------------------------------------------
1226 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1227 * ------------------------------------------
1229 * ---------- (cipher pages) |
1231 * -------------------------------------------
1232 * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
1233 * -------------------------------------------
1235 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1236 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1238 cipher.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1239 cipher.len = blocksz + sizeof(*khdr);
1241 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1245 rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1246 conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
1249 GOTO(out_free_cksum, major = GSS_S_FAILURE);
1251 /* fill in checksum */
1252 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1253 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1254 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1257 /* final token length */
1258 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1259 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1261 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1266 __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1271 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1272 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1273 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1274 unsigned char *tmpbuf;
1275 int blocksz, bodysize;
1276 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1277 rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
1278 rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
1281 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1285 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1286 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1287 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1290 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1292 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1293 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1294 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1299 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1300 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1303 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1304 blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1307 /* expected token layout:
1308 * ----------------------------------------
1309 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
1310 * ----------------------------------------
1312 bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
1314 if (bodysize % blocksz) {
1315 CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1316 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1319 if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
1320 CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1321 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1324 if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
1325 CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
1326 msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
1327 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1331 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1333 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1335 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
1337 cipher_in.data = (__u8 *)(khdr + 1);
1338 cipher_in.len = bodysize;
1339 plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
1340 plain_out.len = bodysize;
1342 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1344 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *arc4_tfm;
1346 cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
1347 cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
1349 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1350 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye,
1352 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1353 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1356 arc4_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1357 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1358 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1359 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1362 if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1364 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1366 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1369 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, NULL, 1, &cipher_in,
1372 crypto_free_sync_skcipher(arc4_tfm);
1374 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1376 cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1378 rc = gss_crypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, local_iv, 1,
1379 &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1383 CERROR("error decrypt\n");
1386 LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
1388 /* expected clear text layout:
1389 * -----------------------------------------
1390 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1391 * -----------------------------------------
1394 /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
1395 if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
1397 CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
1401 /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1402 * ------------------------------------------------------
1403 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1404 * ------------------------------------------------------
1406 hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1407 hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
1408 hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1409 hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1410 hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1411 hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
1412 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1413 khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum,
1417 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1418 if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
1419 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1420 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1421 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1425 msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1426 memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
1428 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1430 OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1431 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1436 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1437 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1438 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1440 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1441 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1442 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1444 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1445 rawobj_t cipher, plain;
1446 rawobj_t data_desc[1];
1452 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1453 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1454 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1457 khdr = (struct krb5_header *)token->data;
1459 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1460 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1461 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1466 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1467 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1471 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1472 blocksz = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1474 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksz && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksz == 0);
1477 * token format is expected as:
1478 * -----------------------------------------------
1479 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
1480 * -----------------------------------------------
1482 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr) +
1484 CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
1485 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1488 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1489 cipher.len = blocksz + sizeof(*khdr);
1490 plain.data = cipher.data;
1491 plain.len = cipher.len;
1493 rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1494 desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
1496 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1499 * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1500 * ------------------------------------------
1501 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1502 * ------------------------------------------
1504 data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
1505 data_desc[0].len = blocksz;
1507 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1511 &cksum, gctx->hash_func))
1512 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1513 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1515 if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksz + sizeof(*khdr),
1516 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1517 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1518 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1519 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1520 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
1523 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1524 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1527 int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
1531 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
1534 written = scnprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
1535 enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
1539 static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
1540 .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
1541 .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos,
1542 .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos,
1543 .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
1544 .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
1545 .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
1546 .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
1547 .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
1548 .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
1549 .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
1550 .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
1551 .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
1554 static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = {
1556 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N,
1558 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
1562 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A,
1564 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
1568 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I,
1570 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
1574 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P,
1576 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV,
1581 static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
1582 /* .gm_owner uses default NULL value for THIS_MODULE */
1584 .gm_oid = (rawobj_t)
1585 {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"},
1586 .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
1588 .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs,
1591 int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
1595 status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
1597 CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
1601 void cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
1603 lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);