1 /* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; -*-
2 * vim:expandtab:shiftwidth=8:tabstop=8:
4 * Modifications for Lustre
6 * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved
8 * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
12 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
13 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
14 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
15 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
16 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
18 * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
19 * All rights reserved.
21 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
22 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
24 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
25 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
28 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
30 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
31 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
32 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
33 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
34 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
35 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
39 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
40 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
41 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
42 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
43 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
44 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
45 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
46 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
47 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 # define EXPORT_SYMTAB
54 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
56 #include <linux/init.h>
57 #include <linux/module.h>
58 #include <linux/slab.h>
59 #include <linux/crypto.h>
60 #include <linux/random.h>
61 #include <linux/mutex.h>
63 #include <liblustre.h>
67 #include <obd_class.h>
68 #include <obd_support.h>
69 #include <lustre/lustre_idl.h>
70 #include <lustre_net.h>
71 #include <lustre_import.h>
72 #include <lustre_sec.h>
75 #include "gss_internal.h"
80 static spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
84 char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */
85 char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */
86 int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */
87 int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */
88 int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */
89 unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */
93 * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption.
94 * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS
95 * yet. this need to be fixed in the future.
97 static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
98 [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */
107 [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
116 [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
117 "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
125 [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
126 "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
134 [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
145 #define MAX_ENCTYPES sizeof(enctypes)/sizeof(struct krb5_enctype)
147 static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
149 if (enctype < MAX_ENCTYPES && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
150 return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
156 int keyblock_init(struct krb5_keyblock *kb, char *alg_name, int alg_mode)
158 kb->kb_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg_name, alg_mode, 0);
159 if (kb->kb_tfm == NULL) {
160 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm: %s, mode %d\n",
165 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(kb->kb_tfm, kb->kb_key.data, kb->kb_key.len)) {
166 CERROR("failed to set %s key, len %d\n",
167 alg_name, kb->kb_key.len);
175 int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
177 struct krb5_enctype *ke;
179 if (kctx->kc_enctype >= MAX_ENCTYPES ||
180 enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
181 CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
185 ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
187 /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
188 if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC &&
189 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
192 /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
193 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
194 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
196 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
197 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
204 void keyblock_free(struct krb5_keyblock *kb)
206 rawobj_free(&kb->kb_key);
208 ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(kb->kb_tfm);
212 int keyblock_dup(struct krb5_keyblock *new, struct krb5_keyblock *kb)
214 return rawobj_dup(&new->kb_key, &kb->kb_key);
218 int get_bytes(char **ptr, const char *end, void *res, int len)
223 if (q > end || q < p)
231 int get_rawobj(char **ptr, const char *end, rawobj_t *res)
237 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &len, sizeof(len)))
241 if (q > end || q < p)
244 OBD_ALLOC(res->data, len);
249 memcpy(res->data, p, len);
255 int get_keyblock(char **ptr, const char *end,
256 struct krb5_keyblock *kb, __u32 keysize)
260 OBD_ALLOC(buf, keysize);
264 if (get_bytes(ptr, end, buf, keysize)) {
265 OBD_FREE(buf, keysize);
269 kb->kb_key.len = keysize;
270 kb->kb_key.data = buf;
275 void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
277 rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used);
279 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye);
280 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi);
281 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc);
285 __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
287 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
290 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
292 kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0);
295 if (get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)))
298 /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */
299 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
300 get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
304 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
308 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
310 kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint;
313 if (get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
316 /* old style enc/seq keys in format:
320 * we decompose them to fit into the new context
324 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
327 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
330 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
334 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
335 tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype)
338 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
342 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
345 /* old style fallback */
346 if (keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc))
352 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully imported rfc1964 context\n");
355 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
358 /* Flags for version 2 context flags */
359 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001
360 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002
361 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004
364 __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
366 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
369 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
373 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
376 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR)
377 kctx->kc_initiate = 1;
378 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX)
380 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
381 kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
384 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send, sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send)))
388 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
391 /* size of each key */
392 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
395 /* number of keys - should always be 3 */
396 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
400 CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint);
405 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
408 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize))
411 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
414 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully imported v2 context\n");
417 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
421 * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing
422 * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature
423 * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc.
426 __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf,
427 struct gss_ctx *gctx)
429 struct krb5_ctx *kctx;
430 char *p = (char *) inbuf->data;
431 char *end = (char *) (inbuf->data + inbuf->len);
432 unsigned int tmp_uint, rc;
434 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) {
435 CERROR("Fail to read version\n");
436 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
439 /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */
441 CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint);
442 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
447 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
449 if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) {
450 kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint;
451 rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end);
453 rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end);
457 rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx);
460 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
463 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
466 gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx;
467 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
471 __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
472 struct gss_ctx *gctx_new)
474 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
475 struct krb5_ctx *knew;
479 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
481 knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1;
482 knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx;
483 knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init;
484 knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey;
485 knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
487 memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed));
488 knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv;
489 knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send;
490 knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype;
492 if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
495 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye))
497 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi))
499 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc))
501 if (krb5_init_keys(knew))
504 gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew;
505 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully copied reverse context\n");
506 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
509 delete_context_kerberos(knew);
511 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
515 __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
516 unsigned long *endtime)
518 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
520 *endtime = (unsigned long) ((__u32) kctx->kc_endtime);
521 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
525 void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx)
527 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
529 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
534 void buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, void *ptr, int len)
536 sg->page = virt_to_page(ptr);
537 sg->offset = offset_in_page(ptr);
542 __u32 krb5_encrypt(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
549 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
550 struct scatterlist sg;
551 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
556 desc.info = local_iv;
559 if (length % ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0) {
560 CERROR("output length %d mismatch blocksize %d\n",
561 length, ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm));
565 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 16) {
566 CERROR("iv size too large %d\n", ll_crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
571 memcpy(local_iv, iv, ll_crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
573 memcpy(out, in, length);
574 buf_to_sg(&sg, out, length);
577 ret = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&desc, &sg, &sg, length);
579 ret = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&desc, &sg, &sg, length);
585 #ifdef HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER
588 int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
590 struct krb5_header *khdr,
591 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
592 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
595 struct hash_desc desc;
596 struct scatterlist sg[1];
599 ll_crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, key->data, key->len);
603 ll_crypto_hash_init(&desc);
605 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
606 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
608 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
609 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
612 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
613 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
615 sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page;
616 sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset;
617 sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len;
618 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
622 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
623 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
626 return ll_crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
629 #else /* ! HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */
632 int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
634 struct krb5_header *khdr,
635 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
636 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
639 struct scatterlist sg[1];
640 __u32 keylen = key->len, i;
642 crypto_hmac_init(tfm, key->data, &keylen);
644 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
645 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
647 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
648 crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
651 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
652 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
654 sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page;
655 sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset;
656 sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len;
657 crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
661 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
662 crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
665 crypto_hmac_final(tfm, key->data, &keylen, cksum->data);
669 #endif /* HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */
672 int krb5_digest_norm(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
673 struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
674 struct krb5_header *khdr,
675 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
676 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
679 struct hash_desc desc;
680 struct scatterlist sg[1];
687 ll_crypto_hash_init(&desc);
689 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
690 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
692 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
693 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
696 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
697 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
699 sg[0].page = iovs[i].kiov_page;
700 sg[0].offset = iovs[i].kiov_offset;
701 sg[0].length = iovs[i].kiov_len;
702 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
706 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
707 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
710 ll_crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
712 return krb5_encrypt(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL, cksum->data,
713 cksum->data, cksum->len);
717 * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended
718 * with krb5 wire token header.
721 __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
722 struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
723 struct krb5_header *khdr,
724 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
725 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
728 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
729 struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm;
730 __u32 code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
733 if (!(tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_hash(ke->ke_hash_name, 0, 0))) {
734 CERROR("failed to alloc TFM: %s\n", ke->ke_hash_name);
735 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
738 cksum->len = ll_crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm);
739 OBD_ALLOC(cksum->data, cksum->len);
745 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac)
746 rc = krb5_digest_hmac(tfm, &kb->kb_key,
747 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
749 rc = krb5_digest_norm(tfm, kb,
750 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
753 code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
755 ll_crypto_free_hash(tfm);
759 static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
760 struct krb5_header *khdr,
763 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
765 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
768 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
769 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
770 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
771 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
773 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
774 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
775 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
776 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
779 khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
780 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
781 khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
782 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
785 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
786 struct krb5_header *khdr,
789 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
790 __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
792 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
795 tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
798 tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
803 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
804 CERROR("bad token id\n");
805 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
807 if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
808 CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
809 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
811 if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
812 CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
813 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
815 if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
816 CERROR("bad filler\n");
817 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
819 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
820 be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
821 CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
822 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
824 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
828 __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
835 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
836 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
837 struct krb5_header *khdr;
838 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
840 /* fill krb5 header */
841 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
842 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
843 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
846 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
847 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum))
848 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
850 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
851 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
852 memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
855 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
857 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
861 __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
868 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
869 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
870 struct krb5_header *khdr;
871 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
874 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
875 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
876 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
879 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
881 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
882 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
883 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
887 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
888 CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
889 token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
890 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
893 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
894 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) {
895 CERROR("failed to make checksum\n");
896 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
899 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
900 if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
902 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
904 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
908 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
912 int add_padding(rawobj_t *msg, int msg_buflen, int blocksize)
916 padding = (blocksize - (msg->len & (blocksize - 1))) &
921 if (msg->len + padding > msg_buflen) {
922 CERROR("bufsize %u too small: datalen %u, padding %u\n",
923 msg_buflen, msg->len, padding);
927 memset(msg->data + msg->len, padding, padding);
933 int krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
940 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
941 struct scatterlist src, dst;
942 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}, *buf;
949 desc.info = local_iv;
952 for (i = 0; i < inobj_cnt; i++) {
953 LASSERT(buf + inobjs[i].len <= outobj->data + outobj->len);
955 buf_to_sg(&src, inobjs[i].data, inobjs[i].len);
956 buf_to_sg(&dst, buf, outobj->len - datalen);
960 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(
961 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
963 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(
964 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
967 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(
968 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
970 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(
971 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
975 CERROR("encrypt error %d\n", rc);
979 datalen += inobjs[i].len;
980 buf += inobjs[i].len;
983 outobj->len = datalen;
988 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
991 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
992 struct krb5_header *khdr,
994 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
998 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
999 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1000 struct scatterlist src, dst;
1001 int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
1003 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1004 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1006 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
1007 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
1008 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
1010 ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
1011 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
1012 ciph_desc.flags = 0;
1014 /* encrypt confounder */
1015 buf_to_sg(&src, confounder, blocksize);
1016 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
1018 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
1020 CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
1024 /* encrypt clear pages */
1025 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1026 src.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page;
1027 src.offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset;
1028 src.length = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len + blocksize - 1) &
1034 dst.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page;
1035 dst.offset = src.offset;
1036 dst.length = src.length;
1038 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = dst.offset;
1039 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = dst.length;
1041 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
1044 CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
1049 /* encrypt krb5 header */
1050 buf_to_sg(&src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
1051 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1053 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc,
1054 &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr));
1056 CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
1067 * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
1068 * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
1070 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
1072 * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
1073 * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
1074 * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len.
1075 * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
1076 * data in a page which is not the last one.
1077 * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
1078 * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
1079 * and bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len should be round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
1080 * should have been done by prep_bulk().
1083 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
1084 struct krb5_header *khdr,
1085 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1090 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
1091 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1092 struct scatterlist src, dst;
1093 int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
1094 int blocksize, i, rc;
1096 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1097 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1098 LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1100 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
1101 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
1102 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
1104 ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
1105 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
1106 ciph_desc.flags = 0;
1108 if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
1109 CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1113 /* decrypt head (confounder) */
1114 buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data, blocksize);
1115 buf_to_sg(&dst, plain->data, blocksize);
1117 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
1119 CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
1123 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
1125 if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
1126 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
1127 CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
1128 i, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1129 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len, blocksize);
1134 if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
1135 desc->bd_nob_transferred)
1136 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
1137 desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
1139 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
1140 if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >desc->bd_nob)
1141 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob -pt_nob;
1143 /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
1144 LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len <=
1145 desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1146 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len <=
1147 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len);
1150 if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
1153 src.page = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page;
1154 src.offset = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset;
1155 src.length = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
1158 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
1159 dst.page = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page;
1161 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
1164 CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
1168 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
1169 memcpy(cfs_page_address(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page) +
1170 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1171 cfs_page_address(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page) +
1172 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1173 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len);
1176 ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
1177 pt_nob += desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len;
1180 if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
1181 CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
1182 desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
1186 if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
1187 CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
1188 desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
1192 /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
1194 while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
1195 desc->bd_iov[i++].kiov_len = 0;
1197 /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
1198 buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1199 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1201 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc,
1202 &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr));
1204 CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
1208 if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
1209 CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
1217 __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1223 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1224 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1225 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1227 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1228 rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
1229 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1233 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1234 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
1236 ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
1239 * final token format:
1240 * ---------------------------------------------------
1241 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
1242 * ---------------------------------------------------
1245 /* fill krb5 header */
1246 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1247 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1248 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1250 /* generate confounder */
1251 get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1253 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1254 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1255 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1256 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1259 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1260 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1262 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1264 /* padding the message */
1265 if (add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
1266 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1269 * clear text layout for checksum:
1270 * ------------------------------------------------------
1271 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1272 * ------------------------------------------------------
1274 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1275 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1276 data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1277 data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1278 data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
1279 data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
1281 /* compute checksum */
1282 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1283 khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum))
1284 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1285 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1288 * clear text layout for encryption:
1289 * -----------------------------------------
1290 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1291 * -----------------------------------------
1293 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1294 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1295 data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
1296 data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
1297 data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
1298 data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
1300 /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
1301 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1302 cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
1303 LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
1305 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1307 struct ll_crypto_cipher *arc4_tfm;
1309 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1310 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1311 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1312 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1315 arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1316 if (arc4_tfm == NULL) {
1317 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1318 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1321 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1323 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1325 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1328 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
1329 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1331 ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1333 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1335 do {} while(0); /* just to avoid compile warning */
1337 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
1338 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1342 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1343 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1346 /* fill in checksum */
1347 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1348 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1349 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1351 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1353 /* final token length */
1354 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1355 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1359 __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1360 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
1362 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1365 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1366 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1367 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1369 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1371 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1372 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page);
1374 * offset should always start at page boundary of either
1375 * client or server side.
1377 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset & blocksize) {
1378 CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
1379 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset, i);
1380 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1383 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset;
1384 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len +
1385 blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
1388 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1392 __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1393 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1394 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1396 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1397 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1398 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1400 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1401 rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
1402 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1406 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1409 * final token format:
1410 * --------------------------------------------------
1411 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
1412 * --------------------------------------------------
1415 /* fill krb5 header */
1416 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1417 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1418 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1420 /* generate confounder */
1421 get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1423 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1424 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1425 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1426 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1429 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1430 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1434 * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
1435 * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
1436 * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
1438 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1439 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1440 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
1443 * clear text layout for checksum:
1444 * ------------------------------------------
1445 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1446 * ------------------------------------------
1448 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1449 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1451 /* compute checksum */
1452 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1454 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
1456 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1457 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1460 * clear text layout for encryption:
1461 * ------------------------------------------
1462 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1463 * ------------------------------------------
1465 * ---------- (cipher pages) |
1467 * -------------------------------------------
1468 * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
1469 * -------------------------------------------
1471 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1472 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1474 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1475 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1477 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1481 rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1482 conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
1486 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1487 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1490 /* fill in checksum */
1491 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1492 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1493 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1495 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1497 /* final token length */
1498 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1499 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1503 __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1508 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1509 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1510 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1511 unsigned char *tmpbuf;
1512 int blocksize, bodysize;
1513 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1514 rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
1515 rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
1521 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1522 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1523 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1526 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1528 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1529 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1530 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1535 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1536 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1539 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1540 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1543 /* expected token layout:
1544 * ----------------------------------------
1545 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
1546 * ----------------------------------------
1548 bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
1550 if (bodysize % blocksize) {
1551 CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1552 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1555 if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
1556 CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1557 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1560 if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
1561 CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
1562 msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
1563 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1567 OBD_ALLOC(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1569 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1571 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
1573 cipher_in.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1574 cipher_in.len = bodysize;
1575 plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
1576 plain_out.len = bodysize;
1578 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1580 struct ll_crypto_cipher *arc4_tfm;
1582 cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
1583 cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
1585 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1586 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1587 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1588 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1591 arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1592 if (arc4_tfm == NULL) {
1593 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1594 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1597 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
1598 arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
1599 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1601 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1604 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
1605 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1607 ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1609 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1611 cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1613 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
1614 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1618 CERROR("error decrypt\n");
1621 LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
1623 /* expected clear text layout:
1624 * -----------------------------------------
1625 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1626 * -----------------------------------------
1629 /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
1630 if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
1632 CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
1636 /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1637 * ------------------------------------------------------
1638 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1639 * ------------------------------------------------------
1641 hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1642 hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
1643 hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1644 hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1645 hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1646 hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
1647 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1648 khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum))
1651 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1652 if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
1653 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1654 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1655 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1659 msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1660 memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
1662 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1664 OBD_FREE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1665 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1670 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1671 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1672 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1674 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1675 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1676 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1678 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1679 rawobj_t cipher, plain;
1680 rawobj_t data_desc[1];
1686 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1687 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1688 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1691 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1693 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1694 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1695 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1700 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1701 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1705 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1706 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1708 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1711 * token format is expected as:
1712 * -----------------------------------------------
1713 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
1714 * -----------------------------------------------
1716 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) +
1718 CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
1719 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1722 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1723 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1724 plain.data = cipher.data;
1725 plain.len = cipher.len;
1727 rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1728 desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
1730 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1733 * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1734 * ------------------------------------------
1735 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1736 * ------------------------------------------
1738 data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
1739 data_desc[0].len = blocksize;
1741 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1743 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
1745 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1746 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1748 if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr),
1749 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1750 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1751 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1752 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1753 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
1756 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1757 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1760 int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
1764 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
1767 written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
1768 enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
1772 static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
1773 .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
1774 .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos,
1775 .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos,
1776 .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
1777 .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
1778 .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
1779 .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
1780 .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
1781 .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
1782 .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
1783 .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
1784 .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
1787 static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = {
1789 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N,
1791 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
1795 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A,
1797 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
1801 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I,
1803 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
1807 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P,
1809 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV,
1815 * currently we leave module owner NULL
1817 static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
1818 .gm_owner = NULL, /*THIS_MODULE, */
1820 .gm_oid = (rawobj_t)
1821 {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"},
1822 .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
1824 .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs,
1827 int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
1831 spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
1833 status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
1835 CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
1839 void __exit cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
1841 lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);