2 * Modifications for Lustre
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2011, 2013, Intel Corporation.
8 * Author: Eric Mei <ericm@clusterfs.com>
12 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
13 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
14 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
15 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
16 * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
18 * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
19 * All rights reserved.
21 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
22 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
24 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
25 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
28 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
30 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
31 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
32 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
33 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
34 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
35 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
39 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
40 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
41 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
42 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
43 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
44 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
45 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
46 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
47 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_SEC
53 #include <linux/init.h>
54 #include <linux/module.h>
55 #include <linux/slab.h>
56 #include <linux/crypto.h>
57 #include <linux/mutex.h>
59 #include <liblustre.h>
63 #include <obd_class.h>
64 #include <obd_support.h>
65 #include <lustre/lustre_idl.h>
66 #include <lustre_net.h>
67 #include <lustre_import.h>
68 #include <lustre_sec.h>
71 #include "gss_internal.h"
76 static spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
80 char *ke_enc_name; /* linux tfm name */
81 char *ke_hash_name; /* linux tfm name */
82 int ke_enc_mode; /* linux tfm mode */
83 int ke_hash_size; /* checksum size */
84 int ke_conf_size; /* confounder size */
85 unsigned int ke_hash_hmac:1; /* is hmac? */
89 * NOTE: for aes128-cts and aes256-cts, MIT implementation use CTS encryption.
90 * but currently we simply CBC with padding, because linux doesn't support CTS
91 * yet. this need to be fixed in the future.
93 static struct krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
94 [ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW] = { /* des-cbc-md5 */
103 [ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW] = { /* des3-hmac-sha1 */
112 [ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes128-cts */
113 "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
121 [ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96] = { /* aes256-cts */
122 "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
130 [ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC] = { /* arcfour-hmac-md5 */
141 #define MAX_ENCTYPES sizeof(enctypes)/sizeof(struct krb5_enctype)
143 static const char * enctype2str(__u32 enctype)
145 if (enctype < MAX_ENCTYPES && enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname)
146 return enctypes[enctype].ke_dispname;
152 int keyblock_init(struct krb5_keyblock *kb, char *alg_name, int alg_mode)
154 kb->kb_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg_name, alg_mode, 0);
155 if (IS_ERR(kb->kb_tfm)) {
156 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm: %s, mode %d\n",
161 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(kb->kb_tfm, kb->kb_key.data, kb->kb_key.len)) {
162 CERROR("failed to set %s key, len %d\n",
163 alg_name, kb->kb_key.len);
171 int krb5_init_keys(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
173 struct krb5_enctype *ke;
175 if (kctx->kc_enctype >= MAX_ENCTYPES ||
176 enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype].ke_hash_size == 0) {
177 CERROR("unsupported enctype %x\n", kctx->kc_enctype);
181 ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
183 /* tfm arc4 is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
184 if (kctx->kc_enctype != ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC &&
185 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keye, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
188 /* tfm hmac is stateful, user should alloc-use-free by his own */
189 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
190 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyi, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
192 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac == 0 &&
193 keyblock_init(&kctx->kc_keyc, ke->ke_enc_name, ke->ke_enc_mode))
200 void keyblock_free(struct krb5_keyblock *kb)
202 rawobj_free(&kb->kb_key);
204 ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(kb->kb_tfm);
208 int keyblock_dup(struct krb5_keyblock *new, struct krb5_keyblock *kb)
210 return rawobj_dup(&new->kb_key, &kb->kb_key);
214 int get_bytes(char **ptr, const char *end, void *res, int len)
219 if (q > end || q < p)
227 int get_rawobj(char **ptr, const char *end, rawobj_t *res)
233 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &len, sizeof(len)))
237 if (q > end || q < p)
240 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(res->data, len);
245 memcpy(res->data, p, len);
251 int get_keyblock(char **ptr, const char *end,
252 struct krb5_keyblock *kb, __u32 keysize)
256 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(buf, keysize);
260 if (get_bytes(ptr, end, buf, keysize)) {
261 OBD_FREE_LARGE(buf, keysize);
265 kb->kb_key.len = keysize;
266 kb->kb_key.data = buf;
271 void delete_context_kerberos(struct krb5_ctx *kctx)
273 rawobj_free(&kctx->kc_mech_used);
275 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keye);
276 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyi);
277 keyblock_free(&kctx->kc_keyc);
281 __u32 import_context_rfc1964(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
283 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
286 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
288 kctx->kc_seed_init = (tmp_uint != 0);
291 if (get_bytes(&p, end, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed)))
294 /* sign/seal algorithm, not really used now */
295 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
296 get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
300 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
304 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
306 kctx->kc_seq_send = tmp_uint;
309 if (get_rawobj(&p, end, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
312 /* old style enc/seq keys in format:
316 * we decompose them to fit into the new context
320 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
323 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
326 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
330 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
331 tmp_uint != kctx->kc_enctype)
334 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)) ||
338 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
341 /* old style fallback */
342 if (keyblock_dup(&kctx->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyc))
348 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully imported rfc1964 context\n");
351 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
354 /* Flags for version 2 context flags */
355 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR 0x00000001
356 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX 0x00000002
357 #define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY 0x00000004
360 __u32 import_context_rfc4121(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *p, char *end)
362 unsigned int tmp_uint, keysize;
365 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_endtime, sizeof(kctx->kc_endtime)))
369 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
372 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR)
373 kctx->kc_initiate = 1;
374 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_CFX)
376 if (tmp_uint & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
377 kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
380 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_seq_send, sizeof(kctx->kc_seq_send)))
384 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &kctx->kc_enctype, sizeof(kctx->kc_enctype)))
387 /* size of each key */
388 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &keysize, sizeof(keysize)))
391 /* number of keys - should always be 3 */
392 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint)))
396 CERROR("Invalid number of keys: %u\n", tmp_uint);
401 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keye, keysize))
404 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyi, keysize))
407 if (get_keyblock(&p, end, &kctx->kc_keyc, keysize))
410 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully imported v2 context\n");
413 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
417 * The whole purpose here is trying to keep user level gss context parsing
418 * from nfs-utils unchanged as possible as we can, they are not quite mature
419 * yet, and many stuff still not clear, like heimdal etc.
422 __u32 gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(rawobj_t *inbuf,
423 struct gss_ctx *gctx)
425 struct krb5_ctx *kctx;
426 char *p = (char *) inbuf->data;
427 char *end = (char *) (inbuf->data + inbuf->len);
428 unsigned int tmp_uint, rc;
430 if (get_bytes(&p, end, &tmp_uint, sizeof(tmp_uint))) {
431 CERROR("Fail to read version\n");
432 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
435 /* only support 0, 1 for the moment */
437 CERROR("Invalid version %u\n", tmp_uint);
438 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
443 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
445 if (tmp_uint == 0 || tmp_uint == 1) {
446 kctx->kc_initiate = tmp_uint;
447 rc = import_context_rfc1964(kctx, p, end);
449 rc = import_context_rfc4121(kctx, p, end);
453 rc = krb5_init_keys(kctx);
456 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
459 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
462 gctx->internal_ctx_id = kctx;
463 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
467 __u32 gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
468 struct gss_ctx *gctx_new)
470 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
471 struct krb5_ctx *knew;
475 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
477 knew->kc_initiate = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : 1;
478 knew->kc_cfx = kctx->kc_cfx;
479 knew->kc_seed_init = kctx->kc_seed_init;
480 knew->kc_have_acceptor_subkey = kctx->kc_have_acceptor_subkey;
481 knew->kc_endtime = kctx->kc_endtime;
483 memcpy(knew->kc_seed, kctx->kc_seed, sizeof(kctx->kc_seed));
484 knew->kc_seq_send = kctx->kc_seq_recv;
485 knew->kc_seq_recv = kctx->kc_seq_send;
486 knew->kc_enctype = kctx->kc_enctype;
488 if (rawobj_dup(&knew->kc_mech_used, &kctx->kc_mech_used))
491 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keye, &kctx->kc_keye))
493 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyi, &kctx->kc_keyi))
495 if (keyblock_dup(&knew->kc_keyc, &kctx->kc_keyc))
497 if (krb5_init_keys(knew))
500 gctx_new->internal_ctx_id = knew;
501 CDEBUG(D_SEC, "succesfully copied reverse context\n");
502 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
505 delete_context_kerberos(knew);
507 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
511 __u32 gss_inquire_context_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
512 unsigned long *endtime)
514 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
516 *endtime = (unsigned long) ((__u32) kctx->kc_endtime);
517 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
521 void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx)
523 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
525 delete_context_kerberos(kctx);
530 void buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, void *ptr, int len)
532 sg_set_buf(sg, ptr, len);
536 __u32 krb5_encrypt(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
543 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
544 struct scatterlist sg;
545 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
550 desc.info = local_iv;
553 if (length % ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0) {
554 CERROR("output length %d mismatch blocksize %d\n",
555 length, ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm));
559 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 16) {
560 CERROR("iv size too large %d\n", ll_crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
565 memcpy(local_iv, iv, ll_crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
567 memcpy(out, in, length);
568 buf_to_sg(&sg, out, length);
571 ret = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&desc, &sg, &sg, length);
573 ret = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&desc, &sg, &sg, length);
579 #ifdef HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER
582 int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
584 struct krb5_header *khdr,
585 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
586 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
589 struct hash_desc desc;
590 struct scatterlist sg[1];
593 ll_crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, key->data, key->len);
597 ll_crypto_hash_init(&desc);
599 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
600 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
602 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
603 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
606 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
607 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
610 sg_set_page(&sg[0], iovs[i].kiov_page, iovs[i].kiov_len,
611 iovs[i].kiov_offset);
612 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
616 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
617 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
620 return ll_crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
623 #else /* ! HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */
626 int krb5_digest_hmac(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
628 struct krb5_header *khdr,
629 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
630 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
633 struct scatterlist sg[1];
634 __u32 keylen = key->len, i;
636 crypto_hmac_init(tfm, key->data, &keylen);
638 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
639 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
641 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
642 crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
645 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
646 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
649 sg_set_page(&sg[0], iovs[i].kiov_page, iovs[i].kiov_len,
650 iovs[i].kiov_offset);
651 crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
655 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
656 crypto_hmac_update(tfm, sg, 1);
659 crypto_hmac_final(tfm, key->data, &keylen, cksum->data);
663 #endif /* HAVE_ASYNC_BLOCK_CIPHER */
666 int krb5_digest_norm(struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm,
667 struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
668 struct krb5_header *khdr,
669 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
670 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
673 struct hash_desc desc;
674 struct scatterlist sg[1];
681 ll_crypto_hash_init(&desc);
683 for (i = 0; i < msgcnt; i++) {
684 if (msgs[i].len == 0)
686 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) msgs[i].data, msgs[i].len);
687 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, msgs[i].len);
690 for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
691 if (iovs[i].kiov_len == 0)
694 sg_set_page(&sg[0], iovs[i].kiov_page, iovs[i].kiov_len,
695 iovs[i].kiov_offset);
696 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, iovs[i].kiov_len);
700 buf_to_sg(sg, (char *) khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
701 ll_crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sizeof(*khdr));
704 ll_crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
706 return krb5_encrypt(kb->kb_tfm, 0, NULL, cksum->data,
707 cksum->data, cksum->len);
711 * compute (keyed/keyless) checksum against the plain text which appended
712 * with krb5 wire token header.
715 __s32 krb5_make_checksum(__u32 enctype,
716 struct krb5_keyblock *kb,
717 struct krb5_header *khdr,
718 int msgcnt, rawobj_t *msgs,
719 int iovcnt, lnet_kiov_t *iovs,
722 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[enctype];
723 struct ll_crypto_hash *tfm;
724 __u32 code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
727 if (!(tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_hash(ke->ke_hash_name, 0, 0))) {
728 CERROR("failed to alloc TFM: %s\n", ke->ke_hash_name);
729 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
732 cksum->len = ll_crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm);
733 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(cksum->data, cksum->len);
739 if (ke->ke_hash_hmac)
740 rc = krb5_digest_hmac(tfm, &kb->kb_key,
741 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
743 rc = krb5_digest_norm(tfm, kb,
744 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, cksum);
747 code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
749 ll_crypto_free_hash(tfm);
753 static void fill_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
754 struct krb5_header *khdr,
757 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
759 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
762 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
763 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag | FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
764 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0);
765 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0);
767 khdr->kh_tok_id = cpu_to_be16(KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
768 khdr->kh_flags = acceptor_flag;
769 khdr->kh_ec = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
770 khdr->kh_rrc = cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
773 khdr->kh_filler = 0xff;
774 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
775 khdr->kh_seq = cpu_to_be64(kctx->kc_seq_send++);
776 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
779 static __u32 verify_krb5_header(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
780 struct krb5_header *khdr,
783 unsigned char acceptor_flag;
784 __u16 tok_id, ec_rrc;
786 acceptor_flag = kctx->kc_initiate ? FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR : 0;
789 tok_id = KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG;
792 tok_id = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
797 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_tok_id) != tok_id) {
798 CERROR("bad token id\n");
799 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
801 if ((khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR) != acceptor_flag) {
802 CERROR("bad direction flag\n");
803 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
805 if (privacy && (khdr->kh_flags & FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL) == 0) {
806 CERROR("missing confidential flag\n");
807 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
809 if (khdr->kh_filler != 0xff) {
810 CERROR("bad filler\n");
811 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
813 if (be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_ec) != ec_rrc ||
814 be16_to_cpu(khdr->kh_rrc) != ec_rrc) {
815 CERROR("bad EC or RRC\n");
816 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
818 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
822 __u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
829 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
830 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
831 struct krb5_header *khdr;
832 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
834 /* fill krb5 header */
835 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
836 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
837 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
840 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
841 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum))
842 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
844 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
845 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
846 memcpy(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
849 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size;
851 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
855 __u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
862 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
863 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
864 struct krb5_header *khdr;
865 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
868 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
869 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
870 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
873 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
875 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 0);
876 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
877 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
881 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size) {
882 CERROR("short signature: %u, require %d\n",
883 token->len, (int) sizeof(*khdr) + ke->ke_hash_size);
884 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
887 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyc,
888 khdr, msgcnt, msgs, iovcnt, iovs, &cksum)) {
889 CERROR("failed to make checksum\n");
890 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
893 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
894 if (memcmp(khdr + 1, cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
896 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
898 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
902 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
906 int add_padding(rawobj_t *msg, int msg_buflen, int blocksize)
910 padding = (blocksize - (msg->len & (blocksize - 1))) &
915 if (msg->len + padding > msg_buflen) {
916 CERROR("bufsize %u too small: datalen %u, padding %u\n",
917 msg_buflen, msg->len, padding);
921 memset(msg->data + msg->len, padding, padding);
927 int krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
934 struct blkcipher_desc desc;
935 struct scatterlist src, dst;
936 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0}, *buf;
943 desc.info = local_iv;
946 for (i = 0; i < inobj_cnt; i++) {
947 LASSERT(buf + inobjs[i].len <= outobj->data + outobj->len);
949 buf_to_sg(&src, inobjs[i].data, inobjs[i].len);
950 buf_to_sg(&dst, buf, outobj->len - datalen);
954 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(
955 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
957 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(
958 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
961 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(
962 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
964 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(
965 &desc, &dst, &src, src.length);
969 CERROR("encrypt error %d\n", rc);
973 datalen += inobjs[i].len;
974 buf += inobjs[i].len;
977 outobj->len = datalen;
982 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust desc->bd_nob to the actual cipher text size.
985 int krb5_encrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
986 struct krb5_header *khdr,
988 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
992 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
993 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
994 struct scatterlist src, dst;
995 int blocksize, i, rc, nob = 0;
997 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
998 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1000 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
1001 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
1002 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
1004 ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
1005 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
1006 ciph_desc.flags = 0;
1008 /* encrypt confounder */
1009 buf_to_sg(&src, confounder, blocksize);
1010 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data, blocksize);
1012 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
1014 CERROR("error to encrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
1018 /* encrypt clear pages */
1019 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1020 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page,
1021 (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len + blocksize - 1) &
1023 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset);
1026 sg_set_page(&dst, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page, src.length,
1029 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = dst.offset;
1030 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = dst.length;
1032 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
1035 CERROR("error to encrypt page: %d\n", rc);
1040 /* encrypt krb5 header */
1041 buf_to_sg(&src, khdr, sizeof(*khdr));
1042 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1044 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&ciph_desc,
1045 &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr));
1047 CERROR("error to encrypt krb5 header: %d\n", rc);
1058 * desc->bd_nob_transferred is the size of cipher text received.
1059 * desc->bd_nob is the target size of plain text supposed to be.
1061 * if adj_nob != 0, we adjust each page's kiov_len to the actual
1063 * - for client read: we don't know data size for each page, so
1064 * bd_iov[]->kiov_len is set to PAGE_SIZE, but actual data received might
1065 * be smaller, so we need to adjust it according to bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len.
1066 * this means we DO NOT support the situation that server send an odd size
1067 * data in a page which is not the last one.
1068 * - for server write: we knows exactly data size for each page being expected,
1069 * thus kiov_len is accurate already, so we should not adjust it at all.
1070 * and bd_enc_iov[]->kiov_len should be round_up(bd_iov[]->kiov_len) which
1071 * should have been done by prep_bulk().
1074 int krb5_decrypt_bulk(struct ll_crypto_cipher *tfm,
1075 struct krb5_header *khdr,
1076 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1081 struct blkcipher_desc ciph_desc;
1082 __u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
1083 struct scatterlist src, dst;
1084 int ct_nob = 0, pt_nob = 0;
1085 int blocksize, i, rc;
1087 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1088 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1089 LASSERT(desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1091 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
1092 LASSERT(blocksize > 1);
1093 LASSERT(cipher->len == blocksize + sizeof(*khdr));
1095 ciph_desc.tfm = tfm;
1096 ciph_desc.info = local_iv;
1097 ciph_desc.flags = 0;
1099 if (desc->bd_nob_transferred % blocksize) {
1100 CERROR("odd transferred nob: %d\n", desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1104 /* decrypt head (confounder) */
1105 buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data, blocksize);
1106 buf_to_sg(&dst, plain->data, blocksize);
1108 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src, blocksize);
1110 CERROR("error to decrypt confounder: %d\n", rc);
1114 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count && ct_nob < desc->bd_nob_transferred;
1116 if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset % blocksize != 0 ||
1117 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
1118 CERROR("page %d: odd offset %u len %u, blocksize %d\n",
1119 i, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1120 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len, blocksize);
1125 if (ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >
1126 desc->bd_nob_transferred)
1127 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len =
1128 desc->bd_nob_transferred - ct_nob;
1130 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
1131 if (pt_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len >desc->bd_nob)
1132 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len = desc->bd_nob -pt_nob;
1134 /* this should be guaranteed by LNET */
1135 LASSERT(ct_nob + desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len <=
1136 desc->bd_nob_transferred);
1137 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len <=
1138 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len);
1141 if (desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len == 0)
1144 sg_set_page(&src, desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page,
1145 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len,
1146 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset);
1148 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize == 0)
1149 sg_assign_page(&dst, desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page);
1151 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc, &dst, &src,
1154 CERROR("error to decrypt page: %d\n", rc);
1158 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len % blocksize != 0) {
1159 memcpy(page_address(desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_page) +
1160 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1161 page_address(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page) +
1162 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset,
1163 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len);
1166 ct_nob += desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len;
1167 pt_nob += desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len;
1170 if (unlikely(ct_nob != desc->bd_nob_transferred)) {
1171 CERROR("%d cipher text transferred but only %d decrypted\n",
1172 desc->bd_nob_transferred, ct_nob);
1176 if (unlikely(!adj_nob && pt_nob != desc->bd_nob)) {
1177 CERROR("%d plain text expected but only %d received\n",
1178 desc->bd_nob, pt_nob);
1182 /* if needed, clear up the rest unused iovs */
1184 while (i < desc->bd_iov_count)
1185 desc->bd_iov[i++].kiov_len = 0;
1187 /* decrypt tail (krb5 header) */
1188 buf_to_sg(&src, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1189 buf_to_sg(&dst, cipher->data + blocksize, sizeof(*khdr));
1191 rc = ll_crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&ciph_desc,
1192 &dst, &src, sizeof(*khdr));
1194 CERROR("error to decrypt tail: %d\n", rc);
1198 if (memcmp(cipher->data + blocksize, khdr, sizeof(*khdr))) {
1199 CERROR("krb5 header doesn't match\n");
1207 __u32 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1213 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1214 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1215 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1217 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1218 rawobj_t data_desc[3], cipher;
1219 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1223 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1224 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL ||
1226 ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm));
1229 * final token format:
1230 * ---------------------------------------------------
1231 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum (16 bytes) |
1232 * ---------------------------------------------------
1235 /* fill krb5 header */
1236 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1237 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1238 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1240 /* generate confounder */
1241 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1243 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1244 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1245 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1246 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1249 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1250 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1252 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1254 /* padding the message */
1255 if (add_padding(msg, msg_buflen, blocksize))
1256 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1259 * clear text layout for checksum:
1260 * ------------------------------------------------------
1261 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1262 * ------------------------------------------------------
1264 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1265 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1266 data_desc[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1267 data_desc[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1268 data_desc[2].data = msg->data;
1269 data_desc[2].len = msg->len;
1271 /* compute checksum */
1272 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1273 khdr, 3, data_desc, 0, NULL, &cksum))
1274 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1275 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1278 * clear text layout for encryption:
1279 * -----------------------------------------
1280 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1281 * -----------------------------------------
1283 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1284 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1285 data_desc[1].data = msg->data;
1286 data_desc[1].len = msg->len;
1287 data_desc[2].data = (__u8 *) khdr;
1288 data_desc[2].len = sizeof(*khdr);
1290 /* cipher text will be directly inplace */
1291 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1292 cipher.len = token->len - sizeof(*khdr);
1293 LASSERT(cipher.len >= ke->ke_conf_size + msg->len + sizeof(*khdr));
1295 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1297 struct ll_crypto_cipher *arc4_tfm;
1299 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1300 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1301 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1302 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1305 arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1306 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1307 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1308 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1311 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm, arc4_keye.data,
1313 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1315 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1318 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
1319 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1321 ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1323 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1325 do {} while(0); /* just to avoid compile warning */
1327 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
1328 3, data_desc, &cipher, 1);
1332 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1333 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1336 /* fill in checksum */
1337 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1338 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1339 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1341 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1343 /* final token length */
1344 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1345 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1349 __u32 gss_prep_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1350 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc)
1352 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1355 LASSERT(desc->bd_iov_count);
1356 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov);
1357 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1359 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1361 for (i = 0; i < desc->bd_iov_count; i++) {
1362 LASSERT(desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_page);
1364 * offset should always start at page boundary of either
1365 * client or server side.
1367 if (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset & blocksize) {
1368 CERROR("odd offset %d in page %d\n",
1369 desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset, i);
1370 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1373 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_offset = desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_offset;
1374 desc->bd_enc_iov[i].kiov_len = (desc->bd_iov[i].kiov_len +
1375 blocksize - 1) & (~(blocksize - 1));
1378 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1382 __u32 gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1383 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1384 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1386 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1387 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1388 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1390 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1391 rawobj_t data_desc[1], cipher;
1392 __u8 conf[GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK];
1396 LASSERT(ke->ke_conf_size <= GSS_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK);
1399 * final token format:
1400 * --------------------------------------------------
1401 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | checksum |
1402 * --------------------------------------------------
1405 /* fill krb5 header */
1406 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr));
1407 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1408 fill_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1410 /* generate confounder */
1411 cfs_get_random_bytes(conf, ke->ke_conf_size);
1413 /* get encryption blocksize. note kc_keye might not associated with
1414 * a tfm, currently only for arcfour-hmac */
1415 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1416 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1419 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1420 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1424 * we assume the size of krb5_header (16 bytes) must be n * blocksize.
1425 * the bulk token size would be exactly (sizeof(krb5_header) +
1426 * blocksize + sizeof(krb5_header) + hashsize)
1428 LASSERT(blocksize <= ke->ke_conf_size);
1429 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1430 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) + 16);
1433 * clear text layout for checksum:
1434 * ------------------------------------------
1435 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1436 * ------------------------------------------
1438 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1439 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1441 /* compute checksum */
1442 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1444 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
1446 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1447 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1450 * clear text layout for encryption:
1451 * ------------------------------------------
1452 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1453 * ------------------------------------------
1455 * ---------- (cipher pages) |
1457 * -------------------------------------------
1458 * | krb5 header | cipher text | cipher text |
1459 * -------------------------------------------
1461 data_desc[0].data = conf;
1462 data_desc[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1464 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1465 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1467 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1471 rc = krb5_encrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1472 conf, desc, &cipher, adj_nob);
1476 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1477 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1480 /* fill in checksum */
1481 LASSERT(token->len >= sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size);
1482 memcpy((char *)(khdr + 1) + cipher.len,
1483 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1485 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1487 /* final token length */
1488 token->len = sizeof(*khdr) + cipher.len + ke->ke_hash_size;
1489 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1493 __u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1498 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1499 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1500 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1501 unsigned char *tmpbuf;
1502 int blocksize, bodysize;
1503 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1504 rawobj_t cipher_in, plain_out;
1505 rawobj_t hash_objs[3];
1511 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1512 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1513 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1516 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1518 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1519 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1520 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1525 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1526 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1529 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1530 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1533 /* expected token layout:
1534 * ----------------------------------------
1535 * | krb5 header | cipher text | checksum |
1536 * ----------------------------------------
1538 bodysize = token->len - sizeof(*khdr) - ke->ke_hash_size;
1540 if (bodysize % blocksize) {
1541 CERROR("odd bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1542 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1545 if (bodysize <= ke->ke_conf_size + sizeof(*khdr)) {
1546 CERROR("incomplete token: bodysize %d\n", bodysize);
1547 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1550 if (msg->len < bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr)) {
1551 CERROR("buffer too small: %u, require %d\n",
1552 msg->len, bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size);
1553 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1557 OBD_ALLOC_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1559 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1561 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
1563 cipher_in.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1564 cipher_in.len = bodysize;
1565 plain_out.data = tmpbuf;
1566 plain_out.len = bodysize;
1568 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1570 struct ll_crypto_cipher *arc4_tfm;
1572 cksum.data = token->data + token->len - ke->ke_hash_size;
1573 cksum.len = ke->ke_hash_size;
1575 if (krb5_make_checksum(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1576 NULL, 1, &cksum, 0, NULL, &arc4_keye)) {
1577 CERROR("failed to obtain arc4 enc key\n");
1578 GOTO(arc4_out, rc = -EACCES);
1581 arc4_tfm = ll_crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, 0);
1582 if (IS_ERR(arc4_tfm)) {
1583 CERROR("failed to alloc tfm arc4 in ECB mode\n");
1584 GOTO(arc4_out_key, rc = -EACCES);
1587 if (ll_crypto_blkcipher_setkey(arc4_tfm,
1588 arc4_keye.data, arc4_keye.len)) {
1589 CERROR("failed to set arc4 key, len %d\n",
1591 GOTO(arc4_out_tfm, rc = -EACCES);
1594 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(arc4_tfm, 1,
1595 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1597 ll_crypto_free_blkcipher(arc4_tfm);
1599 rawobj_free(&arc4_keye);
1601 cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1603 rc = krb5_encrypt_rawobjs(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, 0,
1604 1, &cipher_in, &plain_out, 0);
1608 CERROR("error decrypt\n");
1611 LASSERT(plain_out.len == bodysize);
1613 /* expected clear text layout:
1614 * -----------------------------------------
1615 * | confounder | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1616 * -----------------------------------------
1619 /* verify krb5 header in token is not modified */
1620 if (memcmp(khdr, plain_out.data + plain_out.len - sizeof(*khdr),
1622 CERROR("decrypted krb5 header mismatch\n");
1626 /* verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1627 * ------------------------------------------------------
1628 * | confounder | gss header | clear msgs | krb5 header |
1629 * ------------------------------------------------------
1631 hash_objs[0].len = ke->ke_conf_size;
1632 hash_objs[0].data = plain_out.data;
1633 hash_objs[1].len = gsshdr->len;
1634 hash_objs[1].data = gsshdr->data;
1635 hash_objs[2].len = plain_out.len - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1636 hash_objs[2].data = plain_out.data + ke->ke_conf_size;
1637 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1638 khdr, 3, hash_objs, 0, NULL, &cksum))
1641 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1642 if (memcmp((char *)(khdr + 1) + bodysize,
1643 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1644 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1645 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1649 msg->len = bodysize - ke->ke_conf_size - sizeof(*khdr);
1650 memcpy(msg->data, tmpbuf + ke->ke_conf_size, msg->len);
1652 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1654 OBD_FREE_LARGE(tmpbuf, bodysize);
1655 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1660 __u32 gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
1661 struct ptlrpc_bulk_desc *desc,
1662 rawobj_t *token, int adj_nob)
1664 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
1665 struct krb5_enctype *ke = &enctypes[kctx->kc_enctype];
1666 struct krb5_header *khdr;
1668 rawobj_t cksum = RAWOBJ_EMPTY;
1669 rawobj_t cipher, plain;
1670 rawobj_t data_desc[1];
1676 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr)) {
1677 CERROR("short signature: %u\n", token->len);
1678 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1681 khdr = (struct krb5_header *) token->data;
1683 major = verify_krb5_header(kctx, khdr, 1);
1684 if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1685 CERROR("bad krb5 header\n");
1690 if (kctx->kc_enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1691 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm == NULL);
1695 LASSERT(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1696 blocksize = ll_crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm);
1698 LASSERT(sizeof(*khdr) >= blocksize && sizeof(*khdr) % blocksize == 0);
1701 * token format is expected as:
1702 * -----------------------------------------------
1703 * | krb5 header | head/tail cipher text | cksum |
1704 * -----------------------------------------------
1706 if (token->len < sizeof(*khdr) + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr) +
1708 CERROR("short token size: %u\n", token->len);
1709 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1712 cipher.data = (__u8 *) (khdr + 1);
1713 cipher.len = blocksize + sizeof(*khdr);
1714 plain.data = cipher.data;
1715 plain.len = cipher.len;
1717 rc = krb5_decrypt_bulk(kctx->kc_keye.kb_tfm, khdr,
1718 desc, &cipher, &plain, adj_nob);
1720 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1723 * verify checksum, compose clear text as layout:
1724 * ------------------------------------------
1725 * | confounder | clear pages | krb5 header |
1726 * ------------------------------------------
1728 data_desc[0].data = plain.data;
1729 data_desc[0].len = blocksize;
1731 if (krb5_make_checksum(kctx->kc_enctype, &kctx->kc_keyi,
1733 desc->bd_iov_count, desc->bd_iov,
1735 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1736 LASSERT(cksum.len >= ke->ke_hash_size);
1738 if (memcmp(plain.data + blocksize + sizeof(*khdr),
1739 cksum.data + cksum.len - ke->ke_hash_size,
1740 ke->ke_hash_size)) {
1741 CERROR("checksum mismatch\n");
1742 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1743 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
1746 rawobj_free(&cksum);
1747 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1750 int gss_display_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
1754 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
1757 written = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "krb5 (%s)",
1758 enctype2str(kctx->kc_enctype));
1762 static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
1763 .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
1764 .gss_copy_reverse_context = gss_copy_reverse_context_kerberos,
1765 .gss_inquire_context = gss_inquire_context_kerberos,
1766 .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
1767 .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
1768 .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
1769 .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
1770 .gss_prep_bulk = gss_prep_bulk_kerberos,
1771 .gss_wrap_bulk = gss_wrap_bulk_kerberos,
1772 .gss_unwrap_bulk = gss_unwrap_bulk_kerberos,
1773 .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
1774 .gss_display = gss_display_kerberos,
1777 static struct subflavor_desc gss_kerberos_sfs[] = {
1779 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5N,
1781 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_NULL,
1785 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5A,
1787 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_AUTH,
1791 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5I,
1793 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_INTG,
1797 .sf_subflavor = SPTLRPC_SUBFLVR_KRB5P,
1799 .sf_service = SPTLRPC_SVC_PRIV,
1805 * currently we leave module owner NULL
1807 static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
1808 .gm_owner = NULL, /*THIS_MODULE, */
1810 .gm_oid = (rawobj_t)
1811 {9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002"},
1812 .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
1814 .gm_sfs = gss_kerberos_sfs,
1817 int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
1821 spin_lock_init(&krb5_seq_lock);
1823 status = lgss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
1825 CERROR("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
1829 void __exit cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
1831 lgss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);